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Since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, more than ever people have 
been looking to science for solutions to the numerous complex problems the 
world is suddenly facing. The most urgent issue now seems to be finding a 
vaccine that will free humankind from the immediate threat of the COVID-19 
virus, but other solutions concerning economic, climate, and all kinds of soci-
etal issues have presented themselves with almost equally great urgency. 
Economic issues refer to the vitality of various kinds of enterprises and the 
related employment problems, and they mingle with climate-related issues 
concerning tourism and global traveling but also relating to commuting and 
household and industrial energy use. Social issues concern the organization of 
health care and, staying closer to home, the nature and organization of educa-
tion and research. Tilburg University’s motto “Understanding Society” seems 
to be more relevant than ever, given that we are a university specialized in the 
field of the social and behavioral sciences and, therefore, fully equipped to 
shed our light on many of the phenomena society is facing. It gives me great 
pleasure that dozens of our scientific staff have put their bright minds together 
to better understand several of the COVID-19 related problems and suggest 
concrete solutions. The book “The New Common” is a collection of their 
contributions.
The contributions help to gain a better understanding, to solve a number 
of societal problems, and, by doing this, to realize the university’s motto. The 
book covers the full range of views and approaches from understanding to 
advancing society. Some of the chapters reflect on the meaning of pandemics 
in relation to the history and culture of humankind, thus unraveling the 
mythical nature of the COVID-19 crisis by increasing our understanding. 
Other chapters propose validated solutions to the problem of handling certain 
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aspects of the crisis in relation to elderly care or to the desired behavioral 
change of adolescents. The COVID-19 crisis has forced universities to trans-
form from physical education to online education at an unprecedented speed. 
The book also provides contributions reflecting on the future of education, 
presenting first insights and solutions to problems encountered in online edu-
cation and online exam proctoring. To conclude, I can safely say that Tilburg 
University has embarked on a journey to move away from the “old common” 
to discover a “new common,” however insecure and whimsical this journey 
may be. I hope the book will provide a challenge to its readers and invite them 
to respond and take the discussion to the next level in an effort to better 
understand and advance society.
Former Rector Magnificus Tilburg University Klaas Sijtsma 
Tilburg, the Netherlands
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At the time of publication of this book, the coronavirus has been disrupting 
our society for almost 6 months. And, although we are not yet sure what the 
social and economic consequences of the coronavirus will be, we already see a 
significant impact on society. In my work as a policy-maker, I observe how the 
measures taken to combat the virus affect the daily lives of people in the 
domains of the economy, the labor market, health care, education, mobility, 
and leisure.
As long as the coronavirus rears its head, life will be completely different 
compared to a few months ago. Our society will not be the same in the years 
to come. And maybe it will never be the same again: “the new normal” is a 
concept you hear a lot about now. Or, as the editors of this book put it, a new 
common is ahead of us. What does this crisis mean for society, now and in the 
future? What should society be like? What is needed to restore the economy 
and keep the social fabric intact, also at the grassroots level? How do we offer 
the different generations hope for work, income, and security and prevent 
generation gaps from widening? How do we prevent vulnerable groups in 
particular from falling victim to the coronavirus crisis?
Although the situation is of great concern, I also see enormous resilience, 
flexibility, and creativity among citizens. People are changing their ways. I see 
fantastic initiatives and inventive solutions, for example, setting up the social 
distancing society and economy. In helping people in vulnerable positions, 
more work is done based on trust, people’s living environment becomes cen-
tral again, more customization is possible, and there is more cooperation 
between different parties, based on solidarity and new connectivity. The coro-




Currently, at the local level of a municipality, we are working hard on 
understanding what this virus means for our society, on repairing and limiting 
the damage, on getting society and communities back on track. We do this 
together with a wide range of stakeholders, including institutes for higher 
education, such as Tilburg University. This crisis, in which both health and 
the economy are affected, is unprecedented. But... Even from this unprece-
dented crisis, new opportunities arise. Emily Dickens wrote, “Not knowing 
when the [new] dawn will come, I open every door.”
Opportunities for a more beautiful, better, and more inclusive society. Let 
us seize these opportunities to emerge better and stronger. When thinking 
about the “new” normal, I would like to plead for a “new” society. A society, 
indeed with a new common, that opens itself up to everyone. A society that 
embodies the principles of equality, accessibility, and connectedness. The feel-
ing that someone is looking after you, no matter what the situation. After all, 
participating always starts with being important. To be taken seriously. This is 
what I learned in my current job.
Especially now, it is more important than ever, if we aim for inclusion, that 
we make every effort to offer everyone perspective, especially for those for 
whom “participation” is not self-evident. This requires strengthening the con-
trol over one’s own life. In order to achieve this, it is necessary to rely on one’s 
own responsibility and on the resilience and solidarity of society. This makes 
it possible to apply more differentiation and customization, so that specific 
circumstances can be better accommodated. Tailor-made approaches are more 
relevant now than ever.
To advance this “new” society, knowledge and innovation are needed, as 
well as a joint effort by people themselves, social organizations, education, 
and governments at all levels. Together we can explore, formulate, implement, 
and hold on to the agenda of this “new” society. That should be our common 
focus and ambition. That is the focus and ambition I share with the authors 
of this book. Together we are stronger!
Alderwoman Tilburg Municipality Esmah Lahlah
Responsible for Labor Participation, Social and  
Economic Security, and Global Awareness 
Tilburg, the Netherlands
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In 1951, the city of Tilburg was national news for weeks because it was hit by 
a highly contagious smallpox epidemic, the last one in the Netherlands. People 
who were potentially infected had to be quarantined and the city was sealed 
off. There is no reference to this profound episode in the historiography of 
Tilburg University. This will be different for the impact of the coronavirus 
outbreak.
After it slowly became clear what was going on at the beginning of March 
2020, the lectures at the university continued for a short time. However, mid- 
March, the government announced an “intelligent” lockdown and the univer-
sities in the Netherlands had to close immediately and almost all staff started 
working from home. With enormous efforts of our lecturers and support 
staff, “off-line” education was replaced by online lectures and examinations, a 
very far-reaching development but also an acceleration of the digitalization 
process that was already taking place.
As committed scientists, we quickly developed a healthy curiosity about the 
ensuing effects of the coronavirus crisis. At Tilburg University, we are con-
stantly debating the positioning of the academy between Understanding 
Society and Advancing Society, i.e., from critically reflexive to ideologically 
constructive or even more simply: from insight into current values and mech-
anisms to new constructs. In that light, the discussion turned to the possible 
transformation in society from an “old common” to a “new common,” and 
soon the idea was born to work out the various insights in a book.
Within 2 weeks, we found about 50 colleagues willing to give their brief 
and concise visions on this theme and to contribute to a collection entitled 
“The New Common.” And this amidst their busy schedules. Thanks to pleas-
ant teamwork, the book was ready in just over 3 months, and we are proud to 
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be able to present it to the reader. What we especially like is the temporary 
character of the book. A year ago, the content would have been seen as pure 
fiction; in a year from now, the content will probably be outdated.
Our New Common project, of which this book is the first product, has a 
focus on and is dedicated to help develop, where deemed necessary and desir-
able, a new common, by contributing our knowledge, conducting research, 
creating impact in co-creation with societal stakeholders, and engaging in 
education and discussions with peers and with students. This book addresses 
the question of the possible development of the new common and its charac-
teristics from a broad scope of viewpoints, including wide range and smaller 
range issues and stressing both opportunities and threats along the way to the 
new common. Fifty scientists, who are all connected to Tilburg University, 
present their scientific views on the topic in a grand total of 31 chapters. They 
discuss the issue from their respective fields of scientific interest and expertise 
including (international) law, behavioral science, humanities, artificial intel-
ligence, economics, theology, and management. All these disciplines together 
constitute the profile of Tilburg University in its capacity and role of a univer-
sity that sets out to advance society.
We wish you a lot of reading pleasure, constructive thoughts, new initia-







This book contains 31 chapters by enthusiastic researchers who are all, with-
out exception, involved in their own scientific research into the COVID-19 
pandemic, including the consequences it has on education.
The chapters are not categorized but, maybe unexpectedly, listed in alpha-
betical order of the first author; we as editors have given this a lot of thought. 
We decided not to introduce a structure in the order or presentation of the 
main titles because we believe that any conceivable structure would not do 
justice to the versatility of the different main titles and the structure that 
might be important to you. After all, the chapters have countless criteria for 
ranking them, and our choice would just be one of those and might not be 
suitable for you as an individual reader.
We would like to invite you to decide for yourself how to read the book. 
The chapters are all stand-alone, and you can start wherever you want and 
choose the order, in any way. The chapters will all have a meaning within a 
structure of your own choice.
The rapid spread of the COVID-19 pandemic and its unforeseeable impact 
on society make this book a snapshot at the time it was finalized in mid- 
August 2020.
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xiii
 1  The Dawn of a New Common   1
Emile Aarts, Hein Fleuren, Margriet Sitskoorn, and Ton Wilthagen
 2  Covid-Spiracy: Old Wine in New Barrels?  17
Peter Achterberg
 3  Do Not Pass Up the Opportunity!  23
Maurice Adams
 4  Internet Access as an Essential Social Good  29
Alfred Archer and Nathan Wildman
 5  In-Work Poverty in Times of COVID-19  35
Sonja Bekker, Johanna Buerkert, Quirine Quirijns, and Ioana Pop
 6  Being a Collective Jeremiah: The Academic Responsibility  
to Clarify How Not All Is Well  41
Erik Borgman
 7  COVID-19 and the Secular Theodicy: On Social Distancing, 
the Death of God and the Book of Job  47
Frank Bosman and Archibald van Wieringen
Contents
xiv Contents
 8  Online Proctoring Put to the Test  53
Colette Cuijpers
 9  Experiences of People with an Intellectual Disability, Their 
Relatives, and Support Staff with COVID-19: The Value  
of Vital Supportive Relationships  59
Petri Embregts
 10  Labor Supply and Well-Being During the Early Stages  
of the COVID-19 Crisis in the Netherlands: Lessons  
from Microdata  67
Hans-Martin von Gaudecker and Bettina Siflinger
 11  The Economy, Nature, and the Meaning of Life After  
the Coronavirus Crisis  75
Paul van Geest, Carlos J. B. de Bourbon de Parme,  
and Sylvester Eijffinger
 12  Litigating the Crisis: Towards a Rebalancing of the Rights  
of Investors Versus Public Interest?  83
Morag Goodwin and Phillip Paiement
 13  Plus Ça Change…? How the COVID-19 Crisis May Lead  
to a Revaluation of the Local  91
Martijn Groenleer and Daniel Bertram
 14  Perspectives on the Common: The Input of Literature  99
Odile Heynders
 15  Shaping the Post-COVID-19 Agenda: A Call for Responsible 
Leadership 105
Ronald de Jong and Mirjam van Reisen




 17  Growing Up in Times of COVID-19: When a Window  
of Opportunity is Temporarily Closed 117
Loes Keijsers and Anne Bülow
 18  To Solve the Coronavirus Crisis: Click Here 125
Esther Keymolen
 19  The Comeback of the Old Theological Narratives During  
the Coronavirus Crisis: A Critical Reflection 131
Jan Loffeld
 20  Rethinking Education in a Crisis: How New Is a New 
Common Really? 137
Max Louwerse, Marie Postma, Maarten Horden,  
and Anton Sluijtman
 21  Involve Residents to Ensure Person-Centered Nursing Home 
Care During Crises Like the COVID-19 Outbreak 145
Katrien Luijkx, Meriam Janssen, Annerieke Stoop, Leonieke van 
Boekel, and Marjolein Verbiest
 22  Crisis Information Management: From Technological 
Potential to Societal Impact 153
Kenny Meesters
 23  Efficient Scientific Self-Correction in Times of Crisis 161
Michèle Nuijten
 24  Fortified Nudges? Protecting the Vulnerable in  
a Post-COVID Society 169
Robin Pierce
 25  Can AI Help to Avert the Environmental Great Filter? 175
Eric Postma and Marie Postma
xvi Contents
 26  Values and Principles as Cornerstones of a Renewed Normal 183
Corien Prins
 27  A New Democratic Norm(al)? Political Legitimacy Amidst  
the COVID-19 Pandemic 189
Tim Reeskens and Quita Muis
 28  Balancing Public Health and Economic Interests Whilst 
Creating New Opportunities for Labor Migrants 197
Conny Rijken
 29  Is COVID-19 a Crime? A Criminological Perspective 203
Toine Spapens
 30  There Is an App for That: Technological Solutionism  
as COVID-19 Policy in the Global North 209
Linnet Taylor





Emile Aarts Department of Econometrics and Operations Research, Tilburg 
School of Economics and Management, Tilburg, The Netherlands
Peter  Achterberg Department of Sociology, Tilburg School of Social and 
Behavioral Sciences, Tilburg, The Netherlands
Maurice  Adams Department of Public Law & Governance, Tilburg Law 
School, Tilburg, The Netherlands
Alfred  Archer Department of Philosophy, Tilburg School of Humanities 
and Digital Sciences, Tilburg, The Netherlands
Sonja Bekker Research Cluster Empirical Research into Institutions for con-
flict resolution, Utrecht University School of Law, Utrecht, The Netherlands
Daniel Bertram St. Cross College, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK
Erik Borgman Tilburg School of Humanities and Digital Sciences, Tilburg, 
The Netherlands
Frank Bosman Department of Systematic Theology and Philosophy, Tilburg 
School of Catholic Theology, Tilburg, The Netherlands
Johanna Buerkert Center for Water Oceans and Sustainability, Law Utrecht 
University, Tilburg, The Netherlands
Contributors
xviii Contributors
Anne Bülow Department of Developmental Psychology, Tilburg School of 
Social and Behavioral Sciences, Tilburg, The Netherlands
Department of Psychology, Education & Child Studies, Erasmus School of 
Social and Behavioural Sciences, Rotterdam, The Netherlands
Colette  Cuijpers Department of Law, Technology, Markets, and Society 
(LTMS), Tilburg Law School, Tilburg, The Netherlands
Carlos J. B. de Bourbon de Parme Compazz, An Independent Organization 
with the Aim of Accelerating the Circular Economy, Sustainable Innovation, 
and Transition, Utrecht, The Netherlands
Ronald de Jong Department of Marketing, Tilburg School of Economics 
and Management, Tilburg, The Netherlands
Sylvester Eijffinger Department of Economics, Tilburg School of Economics 
and Management, Tilburg, The Netherlands
Petri  Embregts Tranzo Scientific Center for Care and Wellbeing, Tilburg 
School of Social and Behavioral Sciences, Tilburg, The Netherlands
Hein  Fleuren Department of Econometrics and Operations Research, 
Tilburg School of Economics and Management, Tilburg, The Netherlands
Morag Goodwin Department of Public Law and Governance, Tilburg Law 
School, Tilburg, The Netherlands
Martijn  Groenleer Department of Public Law and Governance, Tilburg 
Center for Regional Law and Governance, Tilburg Law School, Tilburg 
University, The Netherlands
Odile  Heynders Department of Culture Studies, Tilburg School of 
Humanities and Digital Sciences, Tilburg, The Netherlands
Maarten  Horden DAF Technology Lab, Tilburg University, Tilburg, The 
Netherlands
Meriam Janssen Tranzo Scientific Center for Care and Wellbeing, Tilburg 
School of Social and Behavioral Sciences, Tilburg, The Netherlands
xix Contributors 
Maurits Kaptein Jheronimus Academy of Data Science, Tilburg University, 
Tilburg, The Netherlands
Loes Keijsers Department of Developmental Psychology, Tilburg School of 
Social and Behavioral Sciences, Tilburg, The Netherlands
Department of Psychology, Education & Child Studies, Erasmus School of 
Social and Behavioural Sciences, Rotterdam, The Netherlands
Esther Keymolen Tilburg Institute of Law, Technology and Society, Tilburg 
Law School, Tilburg, The Netherlands
Jan Loffeld Department of Practical Theology and Religious Studies, Tilburg 
School of Catholic Theology, Tilburg, The Netherlands
Max Louwerse Department of Cognitive Science and Artificial Intelligence, 
Tilburg School of Humanities and Digital Science, Tilburg, The Netherlands
DAF Technology Lab, Tilburg University, Tilburg, The Netherlands
Katrien  Luijkx Tranzo Scientific Center for Care and Wellbeing, Tilburg 
School of Social and Behavioral Sciences, Tilburg, The Netherlands
Kenny Meesters Department of Management, Tilburg School of Economics 
and Management, Tilburg, The Netherlands
Quita  Muis Department of Sociology, Tilburg School of Social and 
Behavioral Sciences, Tilburg, The Netherlands
Michèle Nuijten Department of Methodology and Statistics, Tilburg School 
of Social and Behavioral Sciences, Tilburg University, Tilburg, The Netherlands
Phillip Paiement Department of Public Law and Governance, Tilburg Law 
School, Tilburg, The Netherlands
Robin Pierce Tilburg Institute of Law, Technology and Society, Tilburg Law 
School, Tilburg, The Netherlands
Ioana Pop Department of Sociology, Tilburg School of Social and Behavioral 
Sciences, Tilburg, The Netherlands
xx Contributors
Eric  Postma Department of Cognitive Science and Artificial Intelligence, 
Tilburg School of Humanities and Digital Sciences, Tilburg, The Netherlands
Marie Postma Department of Cognitive Science and Artificial Intelligence, 
Tilburg School of Humanities and Digital Science, Tilburg, The Netherlands
Corien Prins Tilburg Institute of Law, Technology and Society, Tilburg Law 
School, Tilburg, The Netherlands
Quirine Quirijns Tilburg Law School, Tilburg, The Netherlands
Tim  Reeskens Department of Sociology, Tilburg School of Social and 
Behavioral Sciences, Tilburg, The Netherlands
Conny Rijken Department of Criminal Law, Tilburg Law School, Tilburg, 
The Netherlands
Bettina  Siflinger Department of Econometrics and Operations Research, 
Tilburg School of Economics and Management, Tilburg, The Netherlands
Margriet  Sitskoorn Department of Cognitive Neuropsychology, Tilburg 
School of Social and Behavioral Sciences, Tilburg, The Netherlands
Anton  Sluijtman DAF Technology Lab, Tilburg University, Tilburg, The 
Netherlands
Toine Spapens Department of Criminal Law, Tilburg Law School, Tilburg, 
The Netherlands
Annerieke Stoop Tranzo Scientific Center for Care and Wellbeing, Tilburg 
School of Social and Behavioral Sciences, Tilburg, The Netherlands
Linnet  Taylor Tilburg Institute of Law, Technology and Society, Tilburg 
Law School, Tilburg, The Netherlands
Leonieke  van  Boekel Tranzo Scientific Center for Care and Wellbeing, 
Tilburg School of Social and Behavioral Sciences, Tilburg, The Netherlands
Wim van de Donk Tilburg University, Tilburg, The Netherlands
xxi Contributors 
Paul  van  Geest Department of Biblical Sciences and Church History, 
Tilburg School of Catholic Theology, Tilburg, The Netherlands
Mirjam  van  Reisen Department of Culture Studies, Tilburg School of 
Humanities and Digital Sciences, Tilburg, The Netherlands
Archibald  van  Wieringen Department of Biblical Sciences and Church 
History, Tilburg School of Catholic Theology, Tilburg, The Netherlands
Marjolein Verbiest Tranzo Scientific Center for Care and Wellbeing, Tilburg 
School of Social and Behavioral Sciences, Tilburg, The Netherlands
Hans-Martin  von  Gaudecker Institute for Applied Microeconomics, 
University of Bonn, Bonn, Germany
Jelte Wicherts Department of Methodology and Statistics, Tilburg School 
of Social and Behavioral Sciences, Tilburg, The Netherlands
Nathan Wildman Department of Philosophy, Tilburg School of Humanities 
and Digital Sciences, Tilburg, The Netherlands
Ton Wilthagen Department of Public Law and Governance, Tilburg Law 
School, Tilburg, The Netherlands
1© The Author(s) 2021
E. Aarts et al. (eds.), The New Common, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-65355-2_1
1
The Dawn of a New Common
Emile Aarts, Hein Fleuren, Margriet Sitskoorn, 
and Ton Wilthagen
Thursday, February 27, 2020. Dutch National television is broadcasting a 
special information program on the COVID-19 virus that has hit several 
countries, also in Europe, after the initial outbreak in the Chinese city of 
Wuhan. So far, no patients have been registered in the Netherlands. It is 09:20 
pm and the program has been running for exactly 50 min. The main guest is 
Minister of Health, Welfare, and Sport Bruno Bruins. After a short video 
about the virus, the program host Rob Trip suddenly says: “Mr. Bruins, you 
are being handed a note!” The minister speaks up: It has just been confirmed 
that a patient with the coronavirus has been identified in the Netherlands. 
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Allegedly, it concerns a man who is placed in isolation in the Elisabeth-
Tweesteden hospital in Tilburg.
This is where the story of our book starts. The hospital mentioned by the 
minister is hardly a kilometer away from our university, Tilburg University. 
Things now start to develop quickly. During several weeks, the region of 
Tilburg becomes the “Corona Capital” of the Netherlands in terms of the 
number of people infected. On March 18, Minister Bruno Bruins collapses 
due to exhaustion during a debate in the Government’s House of 
Representatives. The following day, he resigns and soon after is temporarily 
replaced by a politician of a party that is not part of the current political coali-
tion. Two days earlier, the country had gone into a lockdown after a historical 
speech of Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte.
 It Turns Out to Be a Pandemic and Quite Scary
At the time of writing, July 1, 2020, the official number of persons positively 
tested with COVID-19 in the Netherlands amounted to 50,147; 11,871 per-
sons infected by the virus had been admitted to a hospital; and 6105 persons 
had died. It started as a local breakout in the city of Wuhan in China in 
December last year and developed overwhelmingly rapidly into a worldwide 
disaster. Unlike the SARS epidemic in 2003, COVID-19 spreads around the 
world at an unprecedented pace, and on March 11, 2020, the World Health 
Organization officially declared it a pandemic. By July 15, 2020, people in 
some 190 countries around the world were affected, almost ten million people 
were infected and about half a million persons died.
The common view to fight the coronavirus crisis is to bring the so-called 
reproduction rate R (the average number of people who will contract a conta-
gious disease from one person with that disease) below 1. This can be achieved 
with a vaccine, but we do not have one yet. We stimulate science and the 
pharmaceutical industry to give their utmost effort to find one. In the mean-
time, we have to maintain social distancing, and this has a major impact on 
our society. Worldwide, countries have responded to the COVID-19 pan-
demic in different ways, but quarantines and lockdowns have become general 
response measures taken by authorities at various levels: local, regional, and 
national. It is this type of measure that is impacting our society in all its 
dimensions. Many believe, for example, that this will put an end to globaliza-
tion for a long time. Massive transportation of persons and goods will be 
reduced substantially. Education will change. National governments, and 
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consequently the role of nationalism, might regain significance, and unem-
ployment and poverty numbers will rise.
Paolo Giordano (2020) was one of the first to describe the effects of social 
isolation in his essay Nel Contagioi. He was also one of the first to share the 
concerns that frightened him with a broader audience through his touching 
report of what he experienced during his personal quarantine. He came to the 
conclusion that the worldwide spread of the virus shows that our society has 
become truly global over the past decades, with all its drawbacks. He stresses 
that the coronavirus crisis affects the entire world and that the only way to 
prevail is to come up with a collaborative approach starting at the level of our 
individual lives ranging up to the level of our planet as a global organism.
Clearly, COVID-19 is not the first pandemic that has hit humankind. Our 
memory of pandemics, however, is not well developed because we did not 
experience firsthand what happened in earlier times and do not learn easily 
from descriptions and therefore fail to profit from the lessons that could be 
drawn from earlier pandemics. In her riveting book, the journalist Laura 
Spinney (2018) explains how the Spanish Flue of 1918 has dramatically 
changed the world while it is one of the most widely denied global events of 
the past century costing more lives than both world wars together. As an 
explanation, she argues that we do not like the thought of people dying in a 
terrible way through suffocation and without reason or sensemaking.
Other than during World War I and II, there are no clear and obvious oppo-
nents. The coronavirus acts as an invisible assassinator and equalizer and any-
one can become a victim. Consequently, after the crisis is over, we are all 
survivors. Admittedly, we all understand how it started in December 2019, 
but the way it will end is unclear and that is what people find hard to deal 
with. We resort to science to explain to us what is happening, to tell us which 
of the many scenarios will most likely develop and what to do and what not to 
do, but we feel uncertain and disoriented. Science turns out to be imperfect as 
virologists and epidemiologists produce conflicting theories and statements, or 
some of us, including political leaders, just do not like the implications of their 
advice and go into denial. Whom should we believe in trying to find a way out?
At the same time, states take over control and leadership. Kleinfeld (2020) 
analyses the worldwide difference between the approaches the various coun-
tries take to handle and fight the crisis. There are more or less authoritarian 
states that seem to be successful in their approach, such as China, Singapore, 
and South Korea. On the other hand, there are the democratic states but they 
also show different levels of success in their approaches. The USA, Brazil, and 
the UK fail as their measures are inadequate and late; Italy ran into problems 
very early and was overwhelmingly impacted by the virus whereas Germany 
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and New Zeeland clearly seem to be successful. This brings us to the central 
observation that not only the type of government determines whether the 
approach is successful, but also the trust citizens put in their governments and 
the measures taken.
As we write down these words, the world is expecting one of the deepest 
social and economic recessions in modern history. Apparently, an ecological 
crisis has turned into a health crisis, which, in turn, has transformed into a 
socioeconomic crisis. And again, as the Dutch writer Geert Mak (2020) 
argues with an imaginary student of history in the year 2069, we did not see 
it coming in the Global North being used to our seemingly smooth and 
undisturbed way of living.
 Replacing an “Old Common” 
With a “New Common”
In this introduction, we hypothesize the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic 
as an intervention that affects society as we knew it. As the contributions in 
this volume will show, this intervention may further worsen the current state 
of affairs, accentuating its flaws and deficiencies, or possibly lead to a new and 
better situation. Currently, many people are concerned about the future. The 
introduction of lockdowns and social distancing measures makes people feel-
ing depressed and sometimes overtly resentful of the “new normal” as it is 
currently being referred to. In the Netherlands, the terms “1.5-m society” and 
“1.5-m economy” were coined, indicating the physical requirements and limi-
tations after the initial lockdown that might remain in place for a long time, 
perhaps even permanently, just like wearing a mask on certain occasions. We 
conceptualize the pre-COVID-19 era as the “old common” and explore the 
possible transition to a “new common,” with or without a coronavirus.
The word “common” has several meanings as an adjective and as a noun 
(Merriam Webster Dictionary 2020). It relates to a community at large or 
public work for the common good; to a place or common resource belonging 
to or shared by more individuals; to a familiar insight or widespread general 
knowledge as in common sense; to a piece of land subject to common use, 
such as a general public space like a public open area in a municipality.
In this volume, we use the word common in a variety of meanings as indi-
cated above with a general emphasis on shared values and resources both in an 
abstract metaphorical sense as in a real-life physical sense. We happened to 
find an interesting interpretation of the phrase “new common” in a 
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description of a community space that may be booked by the residents and 
organizations that work in and near St James Town in Toronto. The St. James 
Town website (2020) explains the term New Common as follows.
The name … was chosen to best communicate what we hope will happen in the 
space-people working together for the common good of everyone living in the 
community. This points to how The New Common is also an approach to living 
as a community characterized by relationship, collaboration, diversity, creativity, 
and empowerment.
In fact, from a sociological perspective, humans as a species always have 
something in common, even in a slave society occupied by masters and slaves. 
Therefore, when deliberating a new common, one has to give a view on the 
“old” common. The issue is not about having or not having a common or a 
society, but it is about the quality and scope of that common.
The American ecologist Garret Hardin (1968) wrote about the tragedy of 
the commons arguing that individuals will always try to maximize their own 
gains even at the cost of the common good. He already indicated a typical 
human feature that would later on be called short-termism, the problem of 
balancing the needs of both the long term and the short term. Buck Cox 1985 
criticized Hardin’s tragedy of the commons for its weak historical ground and 
rather terms that the common usage of land had been successful for many 
centuries. She argues that social changes and agricultural innovation, and not 
the behavior of the commoners, led to the demise of the commons. So Cox’s 
remark can be interpreted as a strong belief in the positive attitude of indi-
viduals to contribute to the common good.
Hanging on to the Old Common might be understandable or even ratio-
nal, depending on who you are, where you are from, and where you live. A lot 
of technological, economic, and educational progress has certainly been made 
in human history in the era defined as the Anthropocene, which started with 
the industrial revolution. Various books elaborate on this perspective, includ-
ing the seminal ones by Norberg (2016) and by Rosling et al. (2018). The 
point all these authors make is that we tend to underestimate, by ignoring 
facts and figures, what has actually been achieved over the years and that on 
average we are much healthier, wealthier, and safer than at any point in history.
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 How COVID-19 Challenges the Old Common
Obviously, COVID-19, and the resulting crisis, has revealed a number of 
shortcomings and cracks in the old common. We see the following major ones.
Firstly, our society lacks diversity and inclusion. Many groups are either 
under-represented or treated unequally or even discriminated against. This 
applies to women, people with a migrant background, disabled persons, and 
people with certain sexual orientations. A pandemic crisis is often seen as a 
great “equalizer” as everyone could fall ill. However, in practice, the burden of 
the consequences of a crisis like the COVID-19 pandemic is not equally 
divided and typically falls on the weaker groups as various chapters in this 
book will show. It operates rather selectively.
Even during the lockdown, groups of migrant workers were exposed to 
high risks of COVID-19 infections due to poor working conditions and the 
lack of options to stop working or to work from home, notwithstanding the 
government support to companies and workers. In the Netherlands and 
Germany, for example, this became painfully clear in the meat industry and 
slaughterhouses. Recently, after Spain had lifted large parts of the lockdown 
restrictions, the Ségria region near Barcelona with 200,000 inhabitants had to 
be closed off again due to a new outbreak in sectors with many migrant 
workers.
Secondly, our society appears generation biased. A sociological revolution 
is taking place, which already started before the corona crisis, where for the 
first time in history new generations do not generally have better prospects 
than their parents or grandparents (Putnam 2016). This applies to job secu-
rity, debts, pensions, the ability to buy or rent a house, and as a consequence, 
the impact this all has on forming relationships and families. While the elderly 
were without a doubt hit hardest by COVID-19 in terms of health, morbid-
ity, and loneliness, young people were strongly affected by the restrictions 
regarding going out and getting together, the lockdown of their schools and 
education, and the economic developments. Unemployment among young 
workers in temporary contracts is increasing sharply, as they are the first to be 
made redundant (Eurofound 2020). As a consequence, a “corona generation,” 
“Generation C,” or a cohort of “Coronials” might develop. During one of the 
crisis press conferences, the Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte strongly 
encouraged the young generation to speak up.
Thirdly, our global society is weak when it comes to international solidarity. 
According to UNHCR, by the end of 2018, almost 70.8 million individuals 
were forcibly displaced worldwide because of persecution, conflict, violence, 
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or human rights violations, a record high. The most recent number on world-
wide hunger shows an incredible number of 690 million people going to bed 
hungry every night (FAO 2020). Migrants are at the mercy of Western gov-
ernments that act in an ambivalent, uncoordinated, and self-centered way. 
Often refugees become political playthings. In the coronavirus crisis, many 
countries and regions have insufficient means and too weak an infrastructure 
to be able to counteract the spread of the virus, especially among certain 
groups, including refugees. At the same time, Western countries cannot reach 
consensus on support measures and regulations and some try to buy up stocks 
of medical products and possible medicines and vaccines.
Finally, the old common is, to a high degree, humankind-centered, bluntly 
ignoring the wider ecological system of the planet of which we humans are 
part. Since the commercial introduction of the first versions of the steam 
engine that could transmit continuous power to a machine in 1712 by Thomas 
Newcomen, humankind has entered the industrial era. In the following man-
dominated Anthropocene, much has been achieved, but much has also been 
destroyed, wasted, and irreversibly damaged. The notions of “externalities” 
and ecological footprints of human behavior and the global system we have 
created are of recent origin and still fairly weakly developed. This is why the 
old common is extremely vulnerable despite all the knowledge that has been 
generated. COVID-19 appears a case of zoonotic diseases that start out in 
animals and jump to humans under certain circumstances. Various virologists 
have stated that a virus restores an ecosystem. In other words, the COVID-19 
crisis represents a “systemic” crisis, underpinned by a capitalist, neo-classical 
economic system where, in the analysis of the economist Mazzucato (2019), 
everything that fetches a price is of value, whereas in classical economics 
everything that had value used to get a price.
Many of these shortcomings are rooted in two major seemingly conflicting 
interests or values, which can be described as global versus local and collective 
versus individual issues, respectively. Indeed, Krastev (2020a) recently argued 
that the COVID-19 pandemic is different from earlier worldwide catastrophic 
events because of the level of globalization that has been reached anno 2020 
and because of the unprecedented level of political control that several states 
such as China have imposed upon its citizens. In addition, Krastev points out 
that the crises amplify several paradoxes such as the looming interrelational 
conflicts between generations, the dilemmas states are faced with in their deci-
sions to either stimulate the economy or contain the spread of the virus to 
secure people’s health, and the tendency of the national government to con-
trol its citizens versus the fundamental right of personal freedom.
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Krastev (2020b) terms his findings in the following seven lessons for which 
he assumes a European perspective.
 1. The return of “big governments”: people are inclined to rely on the govern-
ment to organize a collective defense against the pandemic.
 2. The increasing significance of borders: the role of the nation state becomes 
more important to secure national interests.
 3. The growing trust in scientific expertise: people are open to trusting experts 
and heeding the science when their own lives are at stake.
 4. The potential of using big data authoritarianism: states will use digital 
technology to efficiently and effectively control the movement and behav-
ior of people to fight the crisis.
 5. The message leaders have to spread: to contain the pandemic, people 
should drastically change their way of living, and therefore recommenda-
tions to “stay calm” and “get on with life” is the wrong message.
 6. The strong impact on intergenerational dynamics as the older members of 
society are much more vulnerable to COVID-19 and feel threatened by 
millennials’ visible unwillingness to change their way of living.
 7. At a certain point, governments will be forced to choose between contain-
ing the spread of the pandemic at the cost of destroying the economy or 
tolerating a higher human cost to save the economy.
 Towards a New Common
Can we envisage a new common, particularly in these challenging times of a 
pandemic and major socioeconomic crisis? What will it look like and how will 
we get there while preserving the best of the old common? Obviously, the new 
common would and should be the positive mirror image of the old common. 
It would have to be more inclusive, more diverse, less selective, offer more 
leeway for the young generations, be based on the principles of precaution, 
leave no one behind, and acknowledge the wider ecosystem we as humankind 
are inseparably part of.
One optimistic belief is that we as humans will draw lessons from this enor-
mous shock, come to our senses, and change our ways of thinking and doing, 
having learned our lessons well. Many commentators are not that optimistic 
and allude to the previous financial crisis in the years 2008–2014, where some 
things were changed, but many things remained unchanged. Nevertheless, 
the hopes are up for the scenario that the current crisis will give a strong push 
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to developments that were already underway, such as the efforts for an energy 
transition.
In general, the transition from the old to the new common can be charac-
terized as the “Second Deep Transition,” where the industrialization is consid-
ered the “First Deep Transition.” Schot et al. (2020) put it as follows.
We need a massive redirection of our systems towards a low-carbon and circular 
economy, based on a better balance between local and global production, new 
systems of peer-to-peer consumption, a sharing economy, and the development 
of new type of services (and commons) to replace mass production, for example, 
not more automobiles, but mobility as a service.
Clearly, being able to make this transition is a matter of resilience, which 
should not be merely understood as the capacity to “bounce back” to the 
original state, but also the ability to anticipate changes and, in particular, to 
innovate (Wilthagen and Bongers 2020).
A recently published McKinsey report (Sneader and Singhal 2020) outlines 
the path to the next normal beyond the coronavirus crisis in the following five 
phases: resolve, resilience, return, reimagination, and reform. Defining a new 
common is no less than a long-term process of reimagination and reform. It 
is not at all a slam-dunk case. Vested interests and power relations represent 
strong hurdles in taking the next steps.
Various philosophical, legal, and sociological approaches have tried to pin 
down the ideal of a community based on good values. A case in point is “com-
munitarianism” as promoted by authors such as Etzioni (2003) that gained 
attention at the turn of the millennium by stating that
Communitarianism is a social philosophy that maintains that society should 
articulate what is good–that such articulations are both needed and legitimate. 
Communitarianism is often contrasted with classical liberalism, a philosophical 
position that holds each individual should formulate the good on his or her 
own … Communitarians examine the ways shared conceptions of the good 
(values) are formed, transmitted, justified, and enforced.
So where should we place our bets when it comes to shaping a new com-
mon and what are the game changers? Certainly, one of the interesting solu-
tion areas can be found in the potentials of the digital transformation. More 
than a decade ago, Benkler (2006) asserted in his book The Wealth of Networks 
that, with the rise of the Internet and the upcoming digitalization, a new eco-
nomic system based on commons becomes possible again as cheap computing 
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power in conjunction with global communication networks will enable peo-
ple to produce valuable products through non-commercial processes of inter-
action: “as human beings and as social beings, rather than as market actors 
through the price system.” Blenkler coined the term “networked information 
economy” to refer to a “system of production, distribution, and consumption 
of information goods characterized by decentralized individual action carried 
out through widely distributed, nonmarket means that do not depend on 
market strategies.” He also introduced the term “commons-based peer produc-
tion” for collaborative efforts based on sharing information. Current examples 
of commons-based peer productions are free and open source software plat-
forms. We argue that the networked information economy will become the 
driver of the digital transformation in the new common. The ubiquitous 
availability of data in combination with the unlimited power of smart algo-
rithms creates the possibility to drive the development of a new and unprec-
edented form of artificial intelligence, which will shape the new common.
The “Big Data Revolution” as described by Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier 
(2013) and Kolb (2013) embodies a promise that may help us as humans to 
transcend our disabilities. We have severe limitations in observing gradual and 
longitudinal change, rather than sudden shocks. The inroads SARS and coro-
naviruses have been making represent an example. In addition, our capacity 
to consider and understand interaction effects among a huge number of vari-
ables is low, just like our speed of calculating. Watson, the IBM supercom-
puter, and the game computers Deep Blue and AlphaGo have made this 
painfully clear. Big data and smart technologies might help us to avoid the 
tragedy of the commons, by showing us real time, or even ex-ante, what the 
collective—say common—the impact is of our individual preferences and 
actions, rather than the dramatic ex-post evaluations that we are making now.
We rapidly develop a digital society by virtue of all the smart devices, appli-
cations, and platforms the digital technology enables. We work from home 
using collaborative working environments like MS Teams, Zoom, Skype, and 
what have you. Smart mobile apps are rolled out with tracking and tracing 
functionalities. Predictive analytics are used to predict local breakouts and 
forecast potential scenarios. Robots are currently positioned at airfields and 
hospitals to check people’s temperatures. Wearable devices are introduced to 
alert workers when they get too close to each other. Social media are applied 
to replace face-to-face and physical contact with novel ways to share our emo-
tions and feelings with our beloved ones but also with a larger, often anony-
mous crowd.
To put it in general terms, the coronavirus crisis is accelerating the digital 
transformation, at the level of individuals, at the level of our society, and even 
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at the level of our planet. Harari (2017) convincingly argues in his most recent 
book Homo Deus that the powers of big data and smart algorithms are cur-
rently at work and that they will shape the twenty-first century into an all-
encompassing information society.
Lovelock (2019) takes the ideas of a future information society even fur-
ther, alluding to the power of the digital transformation at a global systems 
level. He recognizes that artificial intelligence and its supreme power and 
knowledge carry the potential to lead us from the current Anthropocene into 
the new age of the “Novacene.” For the time being, “cyborgs” will work side 
by side with us humans—a new and very uncommon common—but at a 
given moment, they will take over our tasks to best service our old planet’s 
ecosystem, “keeping Earth cool to fend off the heat of the sun and safe us 
from the worst effects of future catastrophes.” Eventually, Lovelock forecasts 
that the cyborg will take over the planet and leave it because life on earth is no 
longer possible due to the increasing heat of the evolution of the sun as a 
dying star.
All these ideas of a new common are compelling and frightening at the 
same time as the all-encompassing artificial superintelligence might not turn 
out to be a “blessing in device,” but could merely prove to be a “devil in 
device” (Wilthagen and Schoots 2019). We have to ensure that the digital 
transformation serves our lives as long as possible by enhancing our well-
being and welfare. In his seminal book, Bostrom (2014) elaborates on the 
dangers of this human-made superintelligence from an ethical, legal, and soci-
etal perspective in order to stimulate the debate on a human-centric artificial 
intelligence. An essential precondition for a new common that will turn out 
better than the old common, even in a society that faces severe restrictions due 
to the current virus or new viruses, concerns the alignment of technology and 
human values, resulting in “responsible AI” (Dignum 2019).
The final question for now is how to proceed from here? There is no readily 
available roadmap for the new common, but we might want to use the seven-
teen Sustainable Development Goals (2020) defined by the United Nations 
in 2015 as a benchmark and guideline. The Sustainable Development Goals 
(SDGs) are the blueprint to achieve a better and more sustainable future for 
all. They address the global challenges we face, including those related to pov-
erty, hunger, water management, inequality, climate change, environmental 
degradation, peace, and justice. They are all interconnected, and, in order to 
leave no one behind, it is important that we achieve them all by 2030. 
Evidently, these goals can serve the purpose of providing humankind with a 
meaningful pathway into the future (O’Connor 2018). The indicators con-
nected with the SDGs should be translated into strategic program and action 
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perspectives for all relevant societal organizations to guarantee the possibility 
of a significant contribution to a new common.
The SDGs can drive change and offer a narrative and an opportunity for all 
to speak in one language on sustainability in the broadest sense. By following 
the SDGs, opportunities abound for business and capital to unlock markets 
that offer endless potential for profit and prosperity while at the same time 
working towards a sustainable future. Hoek (2018) describes how this much 
needed “Trillion Dollar Shift” can be achieved. Vinuesa et al. (2020) discuss 
the critical role of human-centric artificial intelligence in achieving the 
Sustainable Development Goals.
Other non-exhaustive strategies for the pathway to a new common might 
include a further stress on the role of the region in the political, economic, 
and social governance of society (“glocalization”), taking the human measure 
and scale as the point of departure and recognizing that people are currently 
not well served by fragmented and non-integral systems. These systems ignore 
that a person performs different roles—being an inhabitant of a region, but 
also a worker, a parent, a patient, a consumer, et cetera—but is in essence 
indivisible (de Sousa Santos 2002).
For universities, there is a special role with respect to Goal 17 “Partnerships 
for the goals” as they can play an excellent role as drivers of regional innova-
tion ecosystems connecting local governments, industry, citizens, and knowl-
edge institutions in so-called quadruple or multi-helix configurations 
(Etzkowitz and Zhou 2013; Peris-Ortiz et al. 2016). We see this as a new 
primary function of so-called “fourth generation universities” in addition to 
the existing three primary functions education, scientific research, and impact 
creation.
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Covid-Spiracy: Old Wine in New Barrels?
Peter Achterberg
How to make sense of the current COVID-19 crisis? While many people rely 
on official statements made by governments, scientific institutions, and 
experts for answering this question, others do not. Recently, the Dutch news-
paper NRC Handelsblad1 reported on people who adhere to the conspira-
tional theory that the current COVID-19 crisis is linked to the introduction 
of 5G technology. These people point, for example, to so-called 5G experi-
ments in the province of Wuhan, China, where the current COVID-19 crisis 
started in 2019. The “covid-spiracy” theory suggests that behind the societal 
curtains, elites are trying to deal with the problem of overpopulation by means 
of introducing 5G and blaming COVID-19 for the negative side effects. On 
Facebook and Twitter, people are actively discussing these theories with 
increasing momentum. And, inspired by theories on the adverse effects of 5G, 
people have tried to destroy 5G technology and hinder the spread of this 
technology in the Netherlands.
Meanwhile, the mainstream media (MSM) have been directing their atten-
tion to this newly developing phenomenon—the Volkskrant, NRC 
1 https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2020/04/19/nana-denkt-dat-de-overheid-ons-uitdunt-met-5g-tijdens- 
corona-a3997217
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Handelsblad, De Telegraaf, Nieuwsuur, RTL-nieuws, and the NOS have all 
been reporting on people who link the current COVID-19 crisis to 5G. In 
many of these MSM reports, people with affinity to conspiracy theories are 
portrayed alongside some contextual information—fact checking the infor-
mation provided by the covid spiracists or explaining their behavior. In this 
chapter, I analyze public reactions on Twitter to those MSM reports. Below, I 
first provide some background on research on conspiracy theories and then 
show how people perceive the covid-spiracy theory reports in the main-
stream media.
 Research on Conspiracy Theories
Conspiracy theories can come in many guises, and, to their fundamental core, 
they are a set of beliefs that behind the societal curtains evil, malevolent groups 
are indoctrinating individuals and/or governing societies (Aupers 2012). In 
the last decade, scholarly attention for conspiracy theories (Aupers 2012; 
Douglas et al. 2019; Letort 2017; Locke 2009), and public support for such 
theories (Oliver and Wood 2014; Stempel et al. 2007) has risen.
These recent efforts have pointed out how much certain publics of Western 
societies actually believe in conspiracy theories (e.g., Oliver and Wood have 
shown that roughly one-quarter of the USA has an affinity with such theories) 
and point to two major factors that underlie beliefs in conspiracy theories. 
The first is that people are trying to make sense of the world they live in 
(Butter 2014; Grenier 1992; Popper 1945). As processes of individualization, 
globalization, and secularization rob people of their feelings of security, it is 
proposed that those who feel insecure are culturally rationalizing (Campbell 
2015) and are trying to find the meaning and purpose of the things that are 
happening (Aupers 2012; Harambam and Aupers 2017).
The second factor in explaining affinity with conspiracy theories is modern- 
day anti- institutionalism (Elchardus and De Keere 2013; Melley 2008). 
Because people no longer trust the institutional backbone of modern societ-
ies, politics, science, the media, and the judiciary system, they start relying on 
themselves for finding out the truth and explaining what is going on.
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 The Debate on Twitter
In the wake of MSM reports on the covid-spiracy theory on Twitter, people 
have been speaking their minds about such reports. In the following section, 
I will discuss public reactions to six of those reports.2
Among those who do not adhere to covid-spiracy theories, reactions can be 
divided into two camps. The first camp ridicules those who believe in the 
conspiracy theories, for instance, by implying that these people’s IQs need to 
be tested3 and that they are mentally deranged.4 One person mockingly asks 
“whether it would be worthwhile investigating the linkage between pizza 
Hawaii and the Coronavirus.”5 The second camp of opponents of the covid- 
spiracy diverge in their reactions to the MSM reporting in that some argue 
that the MSM are doing a great job in reporting on and debunking of 
 conspirational thinkers6 whilst others argue that the MSM have crossed the 
line in giving conspirational thinkers a platform.7
Conspirational thinkers’ reactions can be divided into three overarching 
themes. The first is their expressed concern about 5G technology and 
COVID-19. They argue against having a source of electromagnetic radiation 
in their proximity and draw parallels to the “proven” negative effects of elec-
tricity pylons,8 and they point to the danger that lies within the adaptation of 
5G technology.9 Note, however, that the focus of these arguments concerns 
the danger of 5G technology. Secondly, the covid-spiracy theory supporters 
react strongly against the MSM reports that, in their view, are making a mock-
ery of conspirational thinkers. They argue that the MSM are “demonizing the 
truth” and that those who are really looking for the truth are portrayed as 
2 Reactions to these six reports were included here: (1) Telegraaf: https://www.telegraaf.nl/
nieuws/715118123/weer-incident-bij-mast-verzet-5-g-wordt-militant, (2) Telegraaf: https://www.
telegraaf.nl/nieuws/1762273884/complotdenkers-zien-verband-tussen-5-g-masten-en-corona?utm_
source=twitter&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=seeding-telegraaf, (3) RTLNieuws: https://www.
rtlnieuws.nl/editienl/laatste-videos-editienl/video/5118871/kritische-arts-gaat-viral?fbclid=IwAR0qwJH
L1U7yNDdBD516H5bmtDLluO4L5StkckTi74KS8Q2WLYaKjBJFpM4, (4) NRC Handelsblad: 
https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2020/04/19/nana-denkt-dat-de-overheid-ons-uitdunt-met-5g-tijdens-coro-
na- a3997217, (5) NOS: https://nos.nl/artikel/2330065-brand-bij-vier-zendmasten-heel-sterk- 
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“nutcases”10 and that those who merely ask questions are being attacked 
unjustly.11 In addition, they complain that MSM reports are rude and too 
generalizing and they state that they should be “falsely accusing their own 
mothers.”12 Hence, it is safe to conclude that, in their eyes, the MSM are 
doing a particularly poor job. Thirdly and related to the foregoing, they state 
that the MSM are “slaves of the elite,”13,14 fully in line with the “current dic-
tatorship of leftist political correctness” and dependent on a “dictatorial 
state”15 or on Bill Gates.16 They argue that “in view of the growing opposition 
pushing the introduction of 5G could be called militant”17 and others argue 
that there is just too little militancy in our country18—suggesting that demol-
ishing a 5G antenna should be seen as a promising start of rising up against 
the elites.
 Conclusion
From my short and anecdotal discussion of responses to MSM reporting 
about the association between COVID-19 and 5G, it becomes clear that there 
are a lot of constants in the societal debates, which also thrived before the 
COVID-19 crisis started (Aupers 2012; Melley 2008). The first is that the 
MSM’s attention to conspirational thinkers who link the current COVID-19 
crisis to 5G does not cause these conspirational thinkers to trust the MSM 
more. If anything, the attention paid by the MSM seems to cause more dis-
trust. The more attention they pay to it, as they are doing it now, the more 
critical people with strong affinities with conspiracy theories will become. 
This reflects recent scholarship that suggests that a “rational” and balanced 
approach to conspiracy theories can be compared to pouring water on a grease 
fire (Palmer 2018).
The second is the anti-institutional perspective, which not only seems to 












who do not adhere to the theory. On both sides of the isle, people are critical 
to MSM reports, albeit for different reasons. Those with more affinity with 
the covid-spiracy link their rather critical view about the media to larger anti- 
institutionalist worldviews and see the victimization and demonization of 
conspirational thinkers portrayed in the MSM reports as a consequence of the 
media’s servitude to a corrupt and dictatorial elite. This suggests that the same 
mechanisms that underlie affinity with other conspiracy theories are at work 
here too. People try to make sense of what is going on (Aupers 2012) and 
combine it with an almost inflammatory anti-institutionalism (Melley 2008). 
In this sense, this covid-spiracy theory may be nothing but a theory based on 
the same mechanisms. Like old wine in new barrels.
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Do Not Pass Up the Opportunity!
Maurice Adams
A much-cited article on the website “Inside Higher ED” outlines fifteen sce-
narios for higher education in the coming period (Malony and Kim 2020). 
The continuum ranges from education completely back to normal to educa-
tion completely at a distance. Full return to normal is not on the horizon; full 
distance education is possible but not optimal for most educational programs; 
and somewhere in between is quite a challenge. However, it is striking that the 
continuum focuses entirely on official educational activities and that there is 
no attention for informal educational activities: a neglect that is reflected in 
the current discussions about the future of our education. This chapter is 
about this neglect and the proposition is that the coronavirus crisis offers sig-
nificant opportunities for a “new educational common” at Tilburg University 
in this respect.
M. Adams (*) 
Department of Public Law & Governance, Tilburg Law School,  
Tilburg, The Netherlands
e-mail: M.Adams@tilburguniversity.edu
COVID-19, a New Educational Common and the Informal Aspects of Higher Education.
This contribution develops a line of thought presented in a May 2020 report by a task force consisting 
of Tilburg University colleagues on the future of education at Tilburg University.
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 The Socialization Function
The Dutch educationalist Gert Biesta argues that education is not just about 
the transfer of knowledge and about skills training. Socialization also plays a 
crucial role.1 Indeed, students should be prepared for their future professions 
through knowledge and skills. But they should also be initiated into values 
and traditions, enabling them to participate in existing and future social, cul-
tural, and political structures.
The efforts of Dutch higher education institutions in recent months have 
focused mainly on knowledge transfer. Moreover, an enormous effort has 
been made to ensure that all exams were properly conducted. The prevention 
of study delays and the ambition to guarantee the quality of our diplomas 
played a crucial role in all of this. Now that the new academic year is approach-
ing, it is important to think about the aforementioned socialization function 
of education. It is a theme that, until recently, was beyond the horizon of 
higher education: in the old common, we took socialization for granted all 
too easily. And to some extent it indeed was sort of easy: as (a) a self-evident 
part of regular educational processes and (b) a bycatch of a well-developed 
student life.
In a recent report of the Dutch Education Council—an advisory body for 
Dutch government—the “socialization challenge” is also addressed through 
this two-pronged approach (Onderwijsraad 2020). The Education Council 
emphasizes that although the coronavirus crisis brings students many new 
and unique life experiences, social distancing and distance learning are crip-
pling the relationships and interactions that promote a profound educational 
experience. With reference to the above-mentioned Biesta, among others, the 
Council states that
…precisely by learning with each other, by interacting with each other and with 
their teachers/lecturers, and by being part of a group, students develop them-
selves. The fact that (…) young people now meet their peers a lot less often 
affects them in their cognitive and socio-emotional development and the devel-
opment of their brains (Onderwijsraad 2020).
While the Education Council, in the above-mentioned quote, mainly 
points out how the socialization aspects of education are shaped through the 
1 Biesta (2006) also identifies subjectification as a main aim of education: this refers to emancipation and 
freedom and the responsibility attached.
 M. Adams
25
official route, it also reminds us that studying is about discussions in the coffee 
corner and about an active student life as well:
It is precisely the activities of student and study associations and other extra- 
curricular activities that contribute to social bonding, to deepening and broad-
ening the content of their studies, to an international experience, to career and 
professional orientation, and to the formation of future professional networks 
(Onderwijsraad 2020).
Here, the Council is referring to the university as a social meeting place, 
outside the curriculum. And hopefully across social dividing lines too: the 
coronavirus crisis indeed made abundantly clear that diversity and inclusion 
is still a huge challenge for the weaker groups in society (Aarts et al. 2020).
 Enhancing Our Educational Profile
Group formation and social bonding are thus established within and outside 
the official frameworks of education. As far as I am concerned, the current 
situation reveals just how much we have lost sight of the extracurricular 
aspects of education in the past. It is, therefore, also no coincidence that the 
extracurricular aspect of education in the public and academic debate on the 
future of our education is currently almost completely out of sight. In other 
words, and on a positive note, there is now an opportunity to take responsibil-
ity for stimulating and facilitating the more informal socialization aspects of 
education.
Such an ambition could fit nicely into TEP: the Tilburg Educational Profile 
(Tilburg University 2017), with which Tilburg University positions itself in 
the educational landscape. TEP stands for an educational vision in which 
knowledge, skills, and character are central. Whereas knowledge transfer and 
skills training are self-evident in an environment of higher education, the 
character aspect focuses on the development of the critical, self-aware attitude 
of our students towards the society in which they function (Understanding 
Society). It is about students who are committed and socially critical, who are 
able to work together in various professional settings (as citizens of this world 
as it were), and who are able to fit into existing structures as citizens.
However, TEP focuses primarily on what we do within the official and 
formal frameworks of education. My proposal is, therefore, to now develop 
TEP through a process of extracurricular activities; you could call it the living 
or sticky campus: a place where students want to spend time, even if they do 
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not have formal education! Precisely such a living campus offers opportunities 
for creating an environment outside the official frameworks in which we, as a 
university, can live up to what it means to educate critically committed 
students.
Let me give some examples: it could be about better facilitating a culture of 
debate and discussion about the major societal challenges we are facing; it 
could be about better-facilitating networks in which students coach and sup-
port each other; we could develop stronger cooperation with regional or 
national cultural institutions (museums, music centers). Connecting and col-
laborating with the city of Tilburg and other Tilburg institutes of higher edu-
cation should be a high priority too! It may also be about offering hands-on 
skills that make it possible for graduates to enter professional life effectively: 
language skills for all students (including Dutch language and culture for 
international students), digital literacy, and labor market orientation. We 
should also include alumni and career services in all of this. In addition, inter-
national students can be linked to teams of Dutch students for a cultural 
exchange and for help with planning and interaction with the university, et 
cetera. In any case, study and student associations must be intensively involved 
in all of this or even be in charge. When developing ideas it would be helpful 
to start mapping the existing activities via a matrix: on the one hand with 
respect to formal and informal, physical and digital activities, on the other 
hand in terms of study program, School, or university. From there, gaps can 
be identified, ideas developed, and structures build. In any event, because of 
its size and compactness, the Tilburg University campus offers unique oppor-
tunities to profile itself vis-a-vis other universities in this regard. This of course 
requires an investment, but character building can then really become a dis-
tinctive feature. I add that it could also result in students feeling more involved 
with their university, with ultimately fewer dropouts (Tinto 1993; 
Connolly 2016).
An important question is still lingering in the air: what to do when health 
risks might force us to continue functioning online in the foreseeable future? 
What if the campus is still a physically quiet place, like in the spring of 2020? 
As far as activities outside the curriculum are concerned, there is no reason 
why the examples I gave in a previous paragraph of this contribution cannot 
serve, mutatis mutandis, as inspiration here. Although suboptimal, most if 
not all of the examples can be realized through developing a virtual environ-
ment (Last 2020; Kappe 2020).
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 Democracy and the Rule of Law
For those who now think that socialization is a sort of training in conform-
ism2: that is not the point here. For me, the above relates to what constitutes 
the threshold of a society that is truly committed to democracy and the rule 
of law. Socialization is not about conformism or about ensuring that there are 
no tensions between people, cultures, groups, religions, or generations. On 
the contrary, a democracy unavoidably leads to vigorous discussion and debate 
and to the cacophony and false notes. It is a permanent exercise in trial and 
error. However, we must use these tensions positively and deal with them in a 
non-violent manner. Making that possible is at the heart of any democracy 
that is committed to the rule of law. Simply because only under that condi-
tion can we have a common future in a world that is inevitably divided. Seen 
in this way, socialization is a true learning experience. It is not just about the 
joys of reaching your aims and success in collaborating with others. It is also 
about experiencing that you are always dependent on others, that you cannot 
always get your way, and that you can be disappointed when working together, 
but that, in spite of these, you can still have a shared and worthwhile future.
To conclude: we have to invest in the logical next steps that will enable us 
to make a qualitative leap in education in the medium and long term. 
Socialization in the context of education, stimulated through formal but cer-
tainly also informal or extracurricular means, is an inseparable part of this. As 
the editors of this volume write in their introduction, the capacity to antici-
pate changes is of the utmost importance now (Aarts et al. 2020). Do not pass 
up the opportunity!
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Internet Access as an Essential Social Good
Alfred Archer and Nathan Wildman
During the coronavirus crisis, educational activities and nearly all social con-
tact with friends and family were conducted via online communication tools. 
Such tools can only be used effectively if an individual has suitable inter-
net access.
Thankfully, the Netherlands is one of the EU leaders when it comes to Next 
Generation Access (NGA) coverage,1 with 98% of Dutch households having 
access to these high-speed connections; this is well above the USA (94%) and 
EU (87%) averages.2 However, this still means that nearly 344,000 individu-
als living in the Netherlands lack a strong internet connection.
Here, we contend that the coronavirus crisis, and especially the associated 
lockdown wherein individuals were strongly encouraged to not leave their 
homes, has made it clear that high-speed internet access is a necessary good 
for modern social living.
1 Defined to include technologies like FTTH, FTTB, Cable Docsis 3.0, VDSL, or other broadband con-
nections of at least 30 Mbps downloads.
2 European Commission Report on Digital Economy and Social Index 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/news-
room/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=67079 (accessed July, 01, 2020); FCC eighth Broadband Progress 
Report, https://www.fcc.gov/reports-research/reports/broadband-progress-reports/eighth-broadband- 
progress-report (accessed July, 01, 2020).
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 Internet Access as a Pragmatic Necessity 
for Other Rights
One key reason for thinking that internet access is an essential social good is 
because it is “pragmatically essential” for protecting, promoting, and in many 
cases, exercising certain human rights (Reglitz 2020: 316).
Consider the right to freedom of expression—that is, the right to “seek, 
receive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers” 
(International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 19, §2). 
Exercising this right essentially involves having a platform for putting forward 
one’s ideas in a public sphere. Pre-crisis, this could be done via some broadly 
physical means, or online. The crisis, and in particular the subsequent lock-
down, effectively eliminated the option of doing so physically—for public 
health reasons, all public discourse shifted onto the internet. In this way, inter-
net access became necessary to effectively exercise one’s right to free expression.
Similarly for the right to assembly: once we were unable to physically congre-
gate, the only means of properly exercising this right was via online association.
More generally, suitable internet access looks like a prerequisite for engag-
ing in political life during the coronavirus crisis. Consequently, not having 
suitable internet access “excludes people from the forums and platforms in 
which much of today’s political debate takes place, and in which most of the 
politically relevant information is shared” (Reglitz 2020: 320). The upshot is 
that a properly functioning post-crisis democracy requires citizens to have 
viable access to the internet.
The status of internet access as an essential social good is illustrated by 
reports from organizations that aid refugees. The UNHCR, for instance, 
reports that refugees, some of the world’s most vulnerable people in desperate 
need of life’s basic needs, find internet access absolutely essential (UNHCR 
2016). This is because the internet allowed them to communicate with loved 
ones from whom they were separated and let each other know if they were 
safe. As one aid worker noted, “What we are hearing is that technology [inter-
net] is regarded by the people we are here to serve as a need as important as 
food or clothes” (UNHCR 2016). The UNHCR goes on to note the critical 
role of internet access in enabling refugees to exercise a right to education, 
health care, and to work via online entrepreneurship opportunities.
Recognizing the connection between internet access and the exercise of 
certain rights may have implications for thinking about how access is man-
aged for certain groups. For example, prisoners in the Netherlands have lim-
ited access to the internet. This access is driven by an interest in providing 
entertainment and educational opportunities (Tighe 2016). If internet access 
 A. Archer and N. Wildman
31
is thought of as an essential social good, however, this would give reason to 
revise this attitude: internet access would not be a luxury or a perk but a 
necessity for exercising certain rights, particularly given the physical restric-
tions prisoners are subject to.
 Poverty
Thinking about the nature of poverty gives us another important reason to 
think that internet access is an essential social good. In his discussion about 
taxation in The Wealth of Nations (1776), Adam Smith distinguishes between 
two kinds of goods: necessaries and luxuries. Notably, he claimed that neces-
sities include not only those goods that are needed for basic survival, such as 
food, water, and shelter but also “whatever the custom of the country renders 
it indecent for creditable people [...] to be without” (Smith 1776, Book V, 
Chap. 2, part II, article 4). That is, necessaries as those goods that people 
would be ashamed to be seen in public without.
Building on this, sociologists like Peter Townsend (1962) have claimed that 
poverty should be understood in relation to a particular society at a particular 
time; i.e., poverty involves lacking the resources needed to have a social life in 
your contemporary society.
While in Smith’s society (eighteenth Century Scotland) these goods 
included leather shoes and linen shirts, in contemporary western societies, 
internet access is plausibly one such necessary: many of those without internet 
access are likely to be ashamed or embarrassed to admit their deprivation. 
Further, as noted above, during the lockdown, internet access is not only 
needed to appear in public without shame but is necessary to appear in public 
at all. More generally, if internet access is needed to have a social life in con-
temporary western societies, then those who cannot afford internet access 
should be counted as living in poverty.
 Social Deprivation
Additionally, the need for internet access to participate in social life during 
lockdown is itself a reason to think that internet access is an essential social 
good. According to philosopher Kimberley Brownlee (2013), the right not to 
experience social deprivation should be accepted as a human right. As social 
creatures, human beings need social interaction in order to have a minimally 
decent life. Being deprived of decent social interaction leads to lower well- 
being, poorer mental, and physical health, and in extreme cases, amounts to a 
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form of torture. For people living alone during lockdown, internet access was 
the only option available for social interaction and so was essential for protect-
ing human right against social deprivation. Of course, this was (hopefully) a 
temporary situation. However, as more and more social interaction takes 
place online, those without internet access will find themselves locked out 
from an increasing number of social spaces. Providing internet access is 
needed, then, to protect people’s rights against social deprivation.
 Education
Finally, unequal access to the internet also runs the risk of making existing 
educational inequalities worse. During periods of lockdown, the vast majority 
of educational activities moved online. A significant proportion of these will 
continue to be online for the foreseeable future. Those who lack good quality 
internet access will be disadvantaged by this and, unfortunately, these are 
often students who already face other educational disadvantages. All students 
must be given good quality internet access, then, to help prevent the widening 
of these educational inequalities. This will be especially important for as long 
as schools and universities continue to deliver much of their education online 
but will continue to be an important issue beyond this point as well.
 Conclusion
In the above, we have argued that, without suitable internet access, individu-
als are unable to properly exercise a number of their fundamental human 
rights, cannot fully participate in democratic political institutions, can (argu-
ably) be said to be living in poverty, and are being made to suffer from social 
deprivation. Further, unequal access exacerbates educational inequalities. 
Taken together, these reasons make a strong case for thinking that internet 
access is an essential social good. And, as a knock-on consequence, govern-
ments have a clear responsibility to ensure that citizens have suitable access, 
e.g., via nationalization3 or sufficient regulation.
3 For example, in the UK, the Jeremy Corbyn-led Labour Party set out plans to ensure UK-wide high- 
speed internet access by nationalizing BT and creating a new British Broadband public service. Labour 
claimed that this could ‘boost productivity by £59 billion by 2025; bring half a million people back into 
the workforce; and boost rural economies, with an estimated 270,000 people more able to move to rural 
areas’ (Labor Party press release November 14, 2019, https://labour.org.uk/press/british-broadband- 
labour-sets-out-mission-to-connect-communities-across-britain-by-delivering-free-full-fibre-broadband- -
for-all/, accessed on July, 27, 2020).
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In-Work Poverty in Times of COVID-19
Sonja Bekker, Johanna Buerkert, Quirine Quirijns, 
and Ioana Pop
The corona crisis has an unequal impact on worker’s income. Workers with 
unstable jobs prior to the crisis, have been affected hardest due to the loss of 
work and income (Börner 2020). An example is the group of workers who 
cannot make ends meet, despite having a job. In order to explore the impact 
of the coronavirus crisis on in-work poverty, it is relevant to get a better insight 
into how low income is defined because in the Netherlands low income and 
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poverty are calculated in various ways. For this chapter, we use two indicators 
(Statistics Netherlands 2018a; SCP 2018). The first is the poverty threshold, 
indicating whether or not the income is sufficient to meet basic needs such as 
buying food, housing, and participating in social activities. This amounted to 
€1135 per month for a single person household in 2017. The second is the 
low-income threshold, representing stable purchasing power over time, which 
amounted to €1060 per month for a single person household in 2018 
(Statistics Netherlands 2018b, 2019a; SCP 2018). Data shows that 7.9% of 
Dutch households earned below this low-income threshold. Within the group 
of workers, 2.4% was part of a household earning below the low-income 
threshold. This means that having an income from work (instead of from 
social security) decreases the likelihood of having a very low income (Statistics 
Netherlands 2019b). Using the poverty threshold, in 2017, 5.7% of the 
Dutch population lived in a household experiencing poverty. From this per-
spective, being employed also decreases the likelihood of being poor, with 
only 2% of employees compared to 8% of self-employed having an income 
below the poverty threshold (SCP 2020).
Overall, in-work poverty in the Netherlands is quite low, especially com-
pared to the other 28 EU countries (Eurostat 2020). As a result, the problem 
is not always seen as significant. Still, in numbers, 125,000 employees and 
95,000 self-employed lived in a poor household in 2017. Moreover, some 
groups of workers have a much higher chance to experience in-work poverty. 
In general, two factors contribute to in-work poverty: a low hourly income 
and a low number of working hours per week (SCP 2018, 2020).
 Flexible Workers Have a Higher Chance at 
In-Work Poverty
Regarding the poverty threshold, the data show that the solo self-employed 
people (12.6%), on-call workers (10.2%), self-employed people with person-
nel (8.3%), people with small part-time jobs (6.5%), and temporary agency 
workers (8%) have a much higher risk at in-work poverty or social exclusion 
than employees with a full-time open-ended employment contract (0.7%) 
(data 2014) (SCP 2018). Similarly, being covered by a collective labor agree-
ment lowers the likelihood of in-work poverty.
Young people, particularly those working in the retail and hospitality sec-
tors, are more likely to experience in-work poverty (Van Deurzen et al. 2018). 
Most workers in these two sectors are under the age of 30 (in retail even under 
the age of 25) and often only employed part-time (Statistics Netherlands 
2018c; WerkNL 2018). Due to the layered Minimum Wage System in the 
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Netherlands (which includes lower minimum wages for youth aged below 
21), young people have quite low incomes even if they work full time. For 
instance, a 19-year-old earning at minimum wage level in 2020 would have a 
gross income of €1008 per month, which is below the low-income threshold. 
The solo self-employed workers are especially vulnerable to the changing 
economy as they largely fall outside of the Dutch social security system. 
Besides income insecurities, this group is at a higher risk when they become 
ill or reach the pensionable age (Statistics Netherlands 2018c).
An important vulnerability for young people and flexible workers is that 
they often are the first ones to become redundant during economic crises 
while having built little entitlements to social security. The next section 
explores whether the groups mentioned in this section are indeed affected the 
most due to the coronavirus crisis.
 Effects of the Crisis on the Income 
of Vulnerable Groups
The immediate effects of the coronavirus crisis on the loss of jobs and income 
have not been translated into current statistics yet. However, first explorations 
suggest that the most vulnerable groups on the labor market have been affected 
the most. In March 2020, the overall number of jobs decreased by 23,000, 
with large job losses in the hospitality and financial services sectors although 
in education and health care the number of jobs is still growing (Statistics 
Netherlands 2020a).
Especially “flexible” jobs disappeared in March 2020: on-call jobs 
(–65,000), temporary agency jobs (–8000), and fixed-term jobs (–7000). 
Notably, people with flexible jobs in professions that could not be carried out 
due to the lockdown have lost their employment. Examples are sales employ-
ees in retail and waiters in bars and restaurants (Statistics Netherlands 2020b). 
Regarding self-employed workers, the coronavirus impact on their work may 
be sketched by the use of the Temporary Subsidy for Self-Employed (Tozo: 
Tijdelijke overbruggingsregeling zelfstandig ondernemers). Tozo has been 
designed by the government specially to give income support to self-employed 
people who lost their income due to the coronavirus crisis. By April 30, about 
343,000 Tozo applications were submitted (FNV 2020). This shows that the 
need for it is high. In May 2020, the organization Wijzer in geldzaken also 
looked at income loss due to the coronavirus (Wijzer in geldzaken 2020). 
Based on a sample of 1219 respondents (A population representative sample 
of 532 combined with a sample of 687 participants from six financially vul-
nerable groups), the results emphasize that the effects of the coronavirus crisis 
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are different across groups. For instance, low-income employees with a per-
manent contract report either lower (22%) or more (8%) working hours. In 
contrast, low-income employees with a flexible contract say that they receive 
fewer assignments (41%) and that they work fewer hours (19%). Those who 
are self-employed report that they receive fewer assignments (40% of those 
with low incomes and 31% of those with high incomes).
This situation is reflected in the financial situation of these workers, with 
several groups reporting a stronger decrease of their income, in comparison to 
other groups of workers, i.e., those under payment employment: 62% of the 
low-income employees with flexible contracts, 69% of the low-income self-
employed workers, and 49% of the high-income self-employed workers. It 
seems that the groups who already struggled to make ends meet prior to the 
crisis are often also the groups who are hit hardest by the loss of employment 
and income due to COVID-19.
 Conclusion
Now that the COVID-19 pandemic is turning from a health crisis into an 
economic and social crisis, the flaws in the labor market and social security 
have become acutely visible. In particular, the groups of workers who already 
had a vulnerable position on the labor market have been hit hardest by the 
first shocks of the crisis. This includes workers with unstable jobs and a low 
income prior to the crisis, such as low-income workers with flexible jobs and 
solo self-employed workers.
This links back to some of the main failures of the “old common”: persisting 
inequalities and a generational divide. Young people and “flex workers” are 
amongst those suffering most from the current crisis in terms of financial con-
sequences. Therefore, the crisis exacerbates the already existing weaknesses of 
the old common. In relations to the New Common, this means that those 
outside the traditional standard employment contracts must not be forgotten 
when reforming the labor market. Especially in the light of ongoing digital 
transformation, ways to secure the livelihood of all workers need to be found. 
The current findings show that even in modern labor markets, workers with a 
standard employment contract are protected best: full-time employed workers 
with an open-ended contract and covered by a collective labor agreement. This 
seemed already valid prior to the crisis and has become more urgently visible 
within this first phase of the pandemic. Deviating from the full-time and 
open-ended contract standard is a risky affair, especially for those who already 
have a low income to begin with. Moving towards a new and more inclusive 
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common would thus entail an encompassing labor market reform, ensuring 
that all workers—irrespective of their employment relationship, age, or profes-
sion—have an income that meets basic needs, both within and after the crisis.
References
Börner S (2020) Lessons from the pandemic for the conservative welfare state, Social 
Europe, June 2
EUROSTAT (2020) People at risk of poverty or social exclusion by age and sex. 
http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/submitViewTableAction.do
FNV (2020) Beroep op Tijdelijke Overbruggingsregeling Zelfstandig Ondernemers 
(Tozo) Groeit. https://fnvzzp.nl/nieuws/2020/04/beroep-op-tijdelijke- 
overbruggingsregelingzelfstandig-ondernemers-tozo-groei
SCP (2018) Als werk weinig opbrengt, werkende armen in vijf Europese landen en 
twintig Nederlandse gemeenten. SCP, The Hague
SCP (2020) Kansrijk armoedebeleid. SCP, The Hague
Statistics Netherlands (2018a) Armoede en sociale uitsluiting 2018. CBS, The Hague. 
https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/publicatie/2018/03/armoede-en-sociale-uitsluiting-2018
Statistics Netherlands (2018b) Bijna 1 op de 10 zzp’ers loopt risico op armoede. 
https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/nieuws/2018/03/bijna-1-op-de-10-zzp-ers-loopt-risico- 
op-armoede
Statistics Netherlands (2018c) Retreived from Statline. https://opendata.cbs.nl/stat-
line/#/CBS/nl/
Statistics Netherlands (2019a) Armoede en sociale uitsluiting 2019. CBS, The Hague. 
https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/publicatie/2019/50/armoede-en-sociale-uitsluiting-2019
Statistics Netherlands (2019b) Armoede & Sociale Uitsluiting 2019. https://longreads.
cbs.nl/armoede-en-sociale-uitsluiting-2019/werkenden-met-risico-op-armoede/
Statistics Netherlands (2020a) Aantal werknemersbanen krimpt met 23 duizend in 
maart. https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/nieuws/2020/26/aantal-werknemersbanen-krimpt- 
met-23-duizend-in-maart
Statistics Netherlands (2020b) Vooral uitzendkrachten in eerste kwartaal vaker zonder 
Werk. https://www.tno.nl/nl/over-tno/nieuws/2020/5/vooral-uitzendkrachten- 
in-eerste-kwartaal-vaker-zonder-werk/
Van Deurzen I, Bekker S, Buerkert J, Quirijns Q (2018) Low-wage labour and social 
security: case study: The Netherlands, internal report prepared on behalf of Oxford 
Research Helsinki, for the Prime Minister’s Office in Finland
WerkNL (2018) Retail factsheet labour market. https://www.werk.nl/xpsim-
age/wdo217773
Wijzer in Geldzaken (2020) Rapportage flitspeiling financiële kwetsbaarheid. https://
www.wijzeringeldzaken.nl/platform-wijzeringeldzaken/publicaties/rapportage-
flitspeiling-financiele-kwetsbaarheid-definitief.pdf
5 In-Work Poverty in Times of COVID-19 
40
Open Access  This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons 
Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), 
which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium 
or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the 
source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence and indicate if changes 
were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chap-
ter’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the 
material. If material is not included in the chapter’s Creative Commons licence and 
your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted 
use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.
 S. Bekker et al.
41© The Author(s) 2021
E. Aarts et al. (eds.), The New Common, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-65355-2_6
6
Being a Collective Jeremiah: The Academic 
Responsibility to Clarify How Not All Is 
Well
Erik Borgman
COVID-19 has been frequently described as a great equalizer. The reality, 
however, is that long-standing inequities have been further exacerbated. The 
result is a lack of presence of a lot of stories on the impact of the coronavirus 
pandemic on societies and people. Thus speaks the website of Voice of Witness 
(2020), a San Francisco based organization with a mission to advance human 
rights “by amplifying the voices of people impacted by injustice.” They are 
driven by a belief in “the transformative power of the story” and by the con-
viction “that an understanding of crucial issues is incomplete without deep 
listening and learning from people who have experienced injustice firsthand.”
 All Souls Matter
Recognizing that, to really understand the impact of COVID-19, we should 
focus on the untold and unheard stories about hidden lives means that we 
connect the pandemic to that other crisis that has come to the fore: systemic 
racism in Western culture. Following the killing of 44-year-old Georg Floyd 
by—now ex-police officer Derek Chauvin on May 25, 2020 in Minneapolis, 
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we have seen a worldwide wave of protests, stating what should be obvious: 
black lives matter. The phrase not just implies that black lives should not be 
treated with the appalling contempt Chauvin showed by casually keeping his 
left hand in his trouser pocket while kneeling on Floyds neck and chocking 
him to death. The phrase also means black lives deserve to be fully noticed. As 
educationalist Parker Palmer (2016) wrote in a blog speaking from his own 
experience in a situation of clinical depression:
The human soul doesn’t want to be advised or fixed or saved. It simply wants to 
be witnessed—to be seen, heard and companioned exactly as it is. When we 
make that kind of deep bow to the soul of a suffering person, our respect rein-
forces the soul’s healing resources, the only resources that can help the sufferer 
make it through.
At Floyd’s memorial service, the congregation was silent for 8 min and 46 s, 
the time Chauvin had his knee on Floyd’s neck. Ritually, they made space for 
the untold story of his life and death. It is crucial to make this space part of 
the public sphere.
For obvious reasons, during the COVID-19 pandemic, public attention 
went almost exclusively to saving lives and overcoming problems in doing so. 
As a result, people felt their souls were left behind in the limbo of uncertainty 
without accompaniment. There was some marginal room in the media for 
people’s anxieties: losing their jobs or businesses, not being able to start col-
lege, not being allowed to visit the aging and the sick, or decently burying the 
death. But this is not the same as having the lived anxieties of the soul attended 
to (cf. Bennison 2020).
In this short chapter, I take the starting point of Voice of Witness: an 
understanding of any crucial issue is incomplete without deep listening and 
learning from people who have experienced it firsthand. We have hardly 
started to listen to our own stories as they resonate in our souls or even to 
realize that we have souls in which these stories resonate and that long to be 
seen, heard, and accompanied. Let alone that we have tried to hear the voices 
that are routinely neglected. This implies that our understanding of the 
COVID-19 pandemic is still hugely incomplete. First, I will explain that sim-
ply trying to move forward after the end of the lockdown is not a good idea. 
I will then argue that especially academic institutions have the responsibility 
to behave as collective Jeremiahs. We should take the risk of being mocked as 
“Terror is all around,” like Jeremiah was (Jer. 20: 10).
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 The Centrality of Hope
With the lockdown lifted, there is a strong pressure to leave behind the experi-
ences of anxiety and uncertainty. This is in line with a dominant tendency 
during the lockdown. Rich countries tried to generate trust by investing huge 
amounts of money in loans, guarantees, and even gifts to keep small, medium- 
sized, and big businesses from bankruptcy. The language was that of combat: 
we are at war and will be victorious. Leaders of poorer countries did not have 
the means to buy the trust of their citizens in this manner. Their strategy usu-
ally came down to simply bragging. In both cases is could be said, in Jeremiah’s 
words: “They have been treating the wound of my people carelessly, saying: 
‘Peace, peace’, where there was no peace” (Jer. 6,13). For those in precarious 
situations, participating in the lockdown was not a realistic option. It is 
impossible for the homeless to stay at home! And, more broadly, for many, the 
choice between either depriving one’s family of even the basic necessities or 
taking the chance of being infected with SARS-CoV-2 was obvious. As a 
result, in some cases, they were fined or arrested for not submitting to regula-
tions that were unable to protect them to begin with. Their only choice left 
was to survive by staying hopeful.
In affluent societies, there is a strong pressure to be optimistic in order to 
get the economy going again and to adapt smoothly to what in this book and 
elsewhere is called “the new normal.” This threatens the strategy of survival by 
staying hopeful, probably the only strategy not involving self-deception. 
Optimism is not the same thing as hope. In fact, it is something totally differ-
ent. Vaclav Havel, then still a dissident Czech playwright, in an interview in 
the 1980s, clearly stated that hope is not “the conviction that something will 
turn out well, but the certainty that something makes sense, regardless of how 
it turns out.” This hope, Havel believes, gives us the strength to live and to try 
new things, even in conditions that seem as hopeless as they were in Central 
Europe under communist occupation.
Considering himself an agnostic, Havel (1990: 181–182) uses quasi- 
religious language in his description of hope:
It transcends the world that is immediately experienced, and is anchored some-
where beyond its horizons. I feel that its deepest roots are in the transcendental, 
just as the roots of human responsibility are, though of course I can’t—unlike 
Christians, for instance—say anything about the transcendental…
Hope frees the bearers of hope from the dictatorship of the possible and 
opens the gate for real change.
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Following this line of thought, Czech psychologist, philosopher, and theo-
logian Tomáš Halík, who worked with Havel and was converted to Roman 
Catholicism and clandestinely ordained a priest under communism, calls 
hope a crack in the supposed closeness of our reality “through which a ray of 
light from the future falls into the present.” Halík (2009) follows into the 
footsteps of French poet and essayist Charles Péguy (1873–1914), who con-
sidered hope an aspect of God in which the hope of people participates. 
Giving hope, God shirks human categories, breaks through human expecta-
tions, appeals to people in an unprecedented way, and makes them enter the 
realm of what, from the dominant perspectives, is impossible.
 The Prophetic Role of Universities
In order to gain hope, according to Halík, we first have to lose our false expec-
tations—for instance, in our current case, that we can build a human society 
by simply adapting to “a new normal.” The latter will inevitably mean re- 
installing a society “that is hurting,” as Pope Francis (2016) said of our current 
one, a society “that is bleeding, and the price of its wounds normally ends up 
being paid by the most vulnerable.” Hope lives in the most vulnerable and 
their wounds require a healing that no restoration or adaption can provide. 
The pressure to be optimistic implies the pressure to silence their voices 
because, otherwise, they would be disturbing the illusionary peace. This is, 
however, exactly why these voices are important. The stories of the most vul-
nerable express what is silenced to enable the belief that our economies, soci-
eties, and cultures are free of systemic injustices. Thus, they represent hope 
that these injustices will be properly addressed and our commons, new and 
old, will truly become our common property.
Universities, therefore, will have to resist the call to optimism in order to 
foster true hope. It is impossible to elaborate here on what this would entail. 
But let us take some advice from Ignacio Ellacuría (1930–1989), who was the 
rector of the Universidad Centroamericana “José Simeón Cañas” (UCA) in El 
Salvador until he was assassinated together with five fellow Jesuits, their house-
keeper, and her daughter. Following his mentor, Spanish philosopher Xavier 
Zubiri (1898–1983), Ellacuría considered humans sentient beings participat-
ing in reality. They have the responsibility to truly know their reality in order 
to judge in what state it is and to further the changes that announce them-
selves in it. This requires a university that is historical both in the sense of 
participating in history and of making history, in the view of Ellacuría (1975, 
1982, 1989; cf. Lassalle-Klein 2014: 53–184; Hassett and Lacey (1991)). 
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Pope Francis recently (Francis 2017: no. 4d; cf. Francis 2013: en no. 71) envi-
sioned a university cultivating “a way of making history in a life setting where 
conflicts, tensions and oppositions can achieve the diversified and life-giving 
unity” needed to go forward.
We need the voices of protest and lament and have to be collective Jeremiahs 
in amplifying them. To fully know reality in its current historicity, special 
attention should be given to voices that are silenced and views that are disre-
garded; Ellacuría calls this “a preferential option for the poor.” Through their 
place in reality, the marginalized embody the hope for a change firmly rooted 
in the real and reaching out towards what seems impossible and what is 
unimaginable as yet. Thus, they open up a possible future in which black lives 
self-evidently matter, threats are addressed regardless of whom is threatened, 
and ways are searched and found to live with the SARS-CoV-2 virus and the 
new variants that will undoubtedly evolve, instead of constantly waging war 
against them. Ultimately, to be a Jeremiah in response to being chosen.
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COVID-19 and the Secular Theodicy: 
On Social Distancing, the Death of God 
and the Book of Job
Frank Bosman and Archibald van Wieringen
In times of great distress, like in the case of the COVID-19 pandemic, people 
look for relief from the existential threat by searching for some kind of inter-
pretation of the crisis. Some people will look for scapegoats to put the blame 
on, while others will search for ways by which the crisis can also be perceived 
as something beneficial.
As far as the COVID-19 pandemic goes, earlier this year, media and politi-
cians pointed towards China, where the pandemic started, or to Italy, from 
where the virus spread over the European continent. The Chinese and the 
Italians became COVID-19’s scapegoats. Others even re-kindled old conspir-
acy theories involving Freemasons, the Vatican, and the CIA.
Since the beginning of the crisis, we have also been flooded with gurus, 
motivational speakers, and mindfulness coaches who stimulate us to view the 
new common as an unexpected but much needed “reboot” of our day-to-day 
life, an escape from the rat race of postmodern life, or as a spiritual detox of 
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our material existence (Bezemer 2020; Cappelle 2020; Mascini 2020; van 
Raaij 2020).
 Classical Theodicy
Intriguingly enough, these two individuals and collective coping strategies are 
very familiar to those who are acquainted with the Christian philosophical 
and theological traditions. When confronted with the apparent paradox 
between the idea of an omnipotent and omnibenevolent deity on the one 
hand and the experience of everyday pain and suffering, on the other hand, 
Christians have sought for ways to find a satisfactory solution. This is known 
as theodicy. As the Roman and Christian philosopher Boethius summarized 
the problem: si Deus, unde malum? “If God exists, wherefrom evil?”
In monotheistic religions, the problem of evil was contextualized differ-
ently. In religions with two or more godheads, suffering could easily be attrib-
uted to one divine source while the good could be attributed to the other one.
In dualistic circles, such as those of the Manichean and the Cathars, the 
reality could be divided into a “good principle” and a “bad” one. In doing so, 
the “good” could be held separately from the “bad.” In monotheist thinking, 
this option is impossible.
In later Christian philosophy and theology, the two most important schools 
of thought were the Irenaean and the Augustinian theodicies, named after 
Irenaeus of Lyon (c. 130–202) and Augustine of Hippo (354–430) (Hick 
1996). The Irenaean solution is to “excuse” evil and suffering by relating them 
to a higher and better goal. Suffering is indeed caused by God but for the 
benefit of humankind: to learn a truth, to grow spiritually, or to prove the 
persistence of one’s faith. The Augustinian approach is to excuse God, redi-
recting the cause of suffering to humanity’s free will. God will not stop human 
suffering, because it is our responsibility to prevent it and to cope with its 
consequences.
 Secular Theodicy
In our times, after the well-known proclamation of the “death of God” by 
Friedrich Nietzsche and many others, the question of the theodicy has, per-
haps strangely at first sight, not vanished although it has been modified to fit 
within an atheist, secular framework (Bosman 2019: 125–149). The question 
now is si non Deus, unde malum? “If God does not exist, wherefrom evil?” 
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The world did not stop being a place of pain and suffering when its creator 
was declared obsolete. More strongly, in this chapter, we argue that the same 
theodicean hermeneutics can even be traced in society’s approach and reaction 
to the COVID-19 pandemic.
Some of us want to excuse COVID-19’s perceived evil by drawing atten-
tion to its perceived benefits, such as the aforementioned spiritual detox or 
escape from the rate race. The evil—the pandemic—still exists and is still 
causing a lot of pain, suffering, and death, but its downsides are thought to 
outweigh its counter-benefits. We can learn something from COVID-19, we 
can benefit from insights obtained from the crisis, and we get the opportunity 
to do things radically differently—and better—in the near future.
God, on the other hand, cannot be excused from anything since we have 
declared God obsolete in the secular domain of our Western European societ-
ies. This creates a new problem of its own. If there is not a supernatural, divine 
entity who can be blamed for a pandemic, then who is to blame? This scape-
goat mechanism takes its name from a text found in the Old Testament: once 
a year a goat is burdened with all the sins of the people of Israel and is sent 
into the desert, symbolically atoning for the sins of the collective (Leviticus 16).
In our times, in the case of COVID-19, multiple scapegoats have been 
identified, ranging from the Chinese and the Italians, to blundering govern-
ments and singing church congregations. Stigmatizing some groups of people 
will not help us to overcome COVID-19. From history, we know of too many 
examples of how the stigmatization of groups can lead to inhumane disasters.
 Deification
From a philosophical point of view, another possible risk in our present situ-
ation is the deification of protocols, or in other words, the substitution of the 
old transcendental God of monotheism for an immanent uncritical belief in 
the human possibilities of controlling our life and containing all harm threat-
ening it. Words like “Social Distancing Society” or the “New Normal” are not 
only spelled in capitals because of a specific custom found in written English 
but also because they testify to a new belief system that is (pre) supposed to 
free us of the imminent danger.
If these protocols fail—and they will, in the sense that no protocol can 
guarantee a hundred percent success rate—we will not blame the deified pro-
tocols themselves like we do not blame God in the Augustinian theodicy, but 
we will blame individual (groups of ) people who are not able or not willing to 
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obey and strictly follow all the instructions. We will not blame our new deity, 
but we will, once again, blame our free will.
 The Biblical Book of Job
Although the Bible does not contain the word theodicy, it does consider the 
question “why does evil strike innocent people?” In fact, the entire biblical 
Book of Job is dedicated to this question of theodicy: Job, a very righteous 
human being, is struck by one calamity after another—how is that possible?
Although the two theodicean hermeneutics we discussed above are present 
in this book, they are both rejected. Job’s friends represent the first hermeneu-
tic focusing on evil. They try to convince Job that he should learn from this 
evil afflicting him, that he is a sinner. A sinner against what? The friends have 
no idea, but Job should realize from his being struck by the evil that he is a 
sinner anyway. Job refuses. This implies that the Book of Job rejects the idea 
advocated by all of Job’s friends. Job himself struggles with the second herme-
neutic, focusing on God, and blames God for the evil he is experiencing. Not 
only does he hold God responsible for evil but he also wishes to hold God 
accountable for it. Therefore, Job wants to sue God.
However, the trial is not continued, not because Job’s protest against evil is 
unjustified or because God cannot be held accountable for his own responsi-
bilities but because Job’s accusation came to the wrong shop. In the Book of 
Job, God does not reveal himself as the one responsible for evil, but as the one 
who, together with Job, is against evil and who is combating it by construct-
ing creation amidst a chaotic environment, which is continuously prone to 
falling into deconstruction. And thus, the Book of Job also rejects the second 
hermeneutic (Schuman 2011).
 Concluding Thoughts
From the perspective of Job and of the Christian theodicy philosophies and 
theologies, a real theodicy answer to the COVID-19 crisis, secular or not, is 
neither blaming others (or the Other) nor whitewashing the pandemic by 
underscoring its perceived blessings in disguise. The creation of a new god-
head will not save us either. Instead, the real answer is fighting the evil itself, 
i.e., COVID-19. The two hermeneutics, whether they are expressed in a reli-
gious or in a secular context, are counter-productive. This theological insight 
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could benefit our society in general and our university in particular in com-
bating the COVID-19 crisis, respecting all human dimensions.
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Online Proctoring Put to the Test
Colette Cuijpers
Traditionally, universities are places where students and professors physically 
interact. Knowledge and skills of students are generally tested in oral and writ-
ten forms, on campus. In times of COVID-19, however, a new common in 
education is called for as students are unable to be physically present on cam-
pus. Both education and assessments need to take place at a distance. This 
development creates opportunities. It becomes easier and cheaper for students 
to participate in Bachelor’s and Master’s programs across the globe. Moreover, 
the flexibility of online education also offers opportunities for students who 
want to combine their studies with a job.
However, education at a distance also bears risks, such as the risk of fraud. 
Universities are responsible for safeguarding the quality of education, assess-
ments, and diplomas. Only students who actually master the learning objec-
tives should receive a diploma. Online proctoring systems can help to achieve 
this. Online proctoring is surveillance at a distance, for which many different 
systems are available. Most of these systems can be characterized by several 
common functionalities: detecting and disabling computer functionalities 
such as copy-paste and downloading, taking images off and recording both 
screen and student, and analyzing the gathered data to signal irregularities 
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that may indicate fraud. A challenging issue is that some students oppose 
these systems from the perspective of privacy and data protection. In view of 
the key focus of this book, moving towards a new common while preserving 
the best of the old common, it is thus important to put online proctoring 
systems to the test and consider their impact on human rights.
 Privacy: The Need for a Fair Balance
The right to private life is vested in Article 8 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR): “Everyone has the right to respect for his private and 
family life, his home and his correspondence.”1 The second paragraph of 
Article 8 makes it clear that infringements of privacy can be justified if certain 
criteria are met. These criteria are “in accordance with the law” and “in the 
interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the 
country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health 
or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” 
Moreover, the interference must be “necessary in a democratic society.”
Universities have a legal duty to provide education, assessments, and diplo-
mas. This is important for the economic well-being of a country and in the 
interest of the right to education (Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 ECHR). The 
crux of the privacy test is thus whether online proctoring is necessary for a 
democratic society. From case law, it becomes apparent that this test concerns 
the reasonableness of the infringement in relation to the social interest it 
serves (Council of Europe 2019). This is assessed on the basis of the principles 
of proportionality and subsidiarity. Proportionality requires that the mea-
sure—online proctoring—can achieve the purposes of identification and 
fraud prevention. This seems to be the case in view of the functionalities of 
online proctoring systems. The principle of subsidiarity requires an assess-
ment whether these aims can be achieved in a less privacy-invasive manner. 
This means careful consideration must be given to the types of assessment that 
justify online proctoring, as well as the functionalities of such a system. For 
many exams, alternative options are available, such as papers, oral exams, and 
take-home exams. Online proctoring only seems necessary for large-scale 
exams of great importance, consisting of multiple-choice questions and closed 
questions at the level of remembering and understanding (Surf 2020).
Monitoring the screen, disabling certain functionalities, or detecting sec-
ond screens do impact a student’s private sphere. However, these measures 
1 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) (2020).
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seem necessary and justified as during an exam these functionalities are not 
allowed either. If restricted for the duration of the exam, there is no unjust 
breach of privacy. For recordings and images, I am not entirely convinced. 
Scanning the entire room seems unnecessary, only showing the workspace is 
sufficient.2 But what about continuous monitoring: is this actually required? 
Are several snapshots sufficient to verify identity and detect fraud, or still 
images combined with a blurred video stream? To satisfy the principle of sub-
sidiarity, and thus to create a fair balance between the need to detect fraud and 
the right to privacy, the least invasive settings of the system should be applied.
For fraud detection, several alternatives are available to online proctoring 
such as plagiarism checks and randomization of exam questions. Alternatives 
for verifying the identity of a student at a distance are less obvious. The only 
way to really check the identity of a student at a distance is visibility via a 
webcam, as login credentials can easily be shared. There certainly is a valid 
reason to check the student’s identity during exams. The question that arises 
is whether the identity of students is sufficiently safeguarded with alternative 
assessment methods, such as take-home exams and papers. If this is not the 
case, what does this mean for the argument that it is necessary for online- 
proctored exams? In my opinion, this is a problem that needs to be further 
investigated, not only from the perspective of privacy but also from the per-
spective of safeguarding the quality of education.
 Lawful Processing of Personal Data
In the EU, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) contains the 
rules on how to process personal data. Noncompliance can lead to high fines. 
The main principles for processing of personal data—any information relat-
ing to an identified or identifiable natural person (Article 4 (1) GDPR)—can 
be found in Articles 5 and 6 of the GDPR.3 Article 5 states that personal data 
can only be processed if several principles are taken into account: the process-
ing is based on a specified purpose, no more data may be processed than 
necessary to achieve that purpose, data must be of good quality, it must be 
transparent why and how personal data are being processed, data must be 
properly secured, data subjects must be granted certain rights—such as access, 
rectification, and erasure—and the data controller must demonstrate that he/
2 This was also concluded in a Dutch court case regarding online proctoring. Court Amsterdam, 
11-06-2020. C/13/684665/KG ZA 20-481, ECLI: NL: RBAMS: 2020: 2917.
3 General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) (2020).
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she adheres to these principles, also known as the principle of accountability. 
Online proctoring is only possible if these principles are taken into account. 
Moreover, Article 6 of the GDPR requires a legitimate ground for the process-
ing of personal data. Universities can base online proctoring on the ground 
“necessary to perform a public task.” A Dutch court recently ruled this ground 
applicable as, by law, universities are required to guarantee the quality of edu-
cation, assessments, and diplomas.4 What could be relevant in relation to 
online proctoring is that the GDPR only allows the processing of special 
categories of data on the basis of consent.5 It might very well be that such data 
are being processed with online proctoring. Even though the Dutch court 
concluded this not to be the case, the reasoning of the court is very limited 
and inconclusive. The court merely states no biometric data are processed in 
online proctoring. However, the GDPR definition of biometric data explic-
itly refers to facial images. These are being processed by online proctoring 
systems.
If this leads to the conclusion that online proctoring is only allowed on the 
basis of consent, a problem arises. According to the GDPR, consent needs to 
be freely given (Article 7 GDPR). In a hierarchical relationship—such as 
between university and student—consent is not freely given if no real opt-out 
possibility exists, meaning that the student can decline taking part in the 
online proctoring exam. This requires the university to offer students an 
assessment alternative to online proctoring—e.g., an oral exam—without 
there being any negative consequences for the student, such as study delay.
 Conclusion
When exams on university premises are impossible, online proctoring can be 
a valid alternative if compliant with the rights to privacy and data protection. 
From a privacy perspective, the key question concerns subsidiarity: are there 
other less invasive alternatives available for a specific assessment? To answer 
this question, both the type of assessment and the functionalities of the proc-
toring system are relevant to consider. From the perspective of data protec-
tion, the main question seems to be the need for consent when processing 
facial images for identification purposes and the problem of freely given 
4 Court Amsterdam (2020)
5 Article 9 GDPR states “Processing of personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, 
religious or philosophical beliefs, or trade union membership, and the processing of genetic data, biomet-
ric data for the purpose of uniquely identifying a natural person, data concerning health or data concern-
ing a natural person’s sex life or sexual orientation shall be prohibited.”
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consent in hierarchical relationships. For the time being, the safest approach 
is online proctoring as an option. Offering an equal alternative to online proc-
toring—without negative implications for students who want to opt-out—
meets the “freely given” requirement of consent and the principle of 
subsidiarity.
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Experiences of People with an Intellectual 
Disability, Their Relatives, and Support 
Staff with COVID-19: The Value of Vital 
Supportive Relationships
Petri Embregts
As pointed at in the introduction of this book, COVID-19 and the resulting 
crisis has revealed a number of shortcomings in the old common, such as an 
insufficient level of diversity in society in general and inclusion of people with 
intellectual disabilities in particular. Moreover, the consequences of a crisis are 
not equally divided either, with the COVID-19 pandemic and the subse-
quent governmental measures having a major impact on people with intel-
lectual disabilities. Since a higher proportion of people with an intellectual 
disability have underlying health conditions (Courtenay and Perera 2020), 
they are in particular vulnerable to the consequences of COVID-19 (World 
Health Organization 2020). Moreover, due to their cognitive impairment, 
they rely on relatives and care professionals for lifelong and life-wide care and 
support, often in group settings, which results in a higher risk of getting 
infected by the coronavirus (Tummers et al. 2020). In an attempt to reduce 
the risk of infections, various rigorous measures have come into play with the 
aim to protect people with an intellectual disability, their relatives, and the 
care professionals. These measures, such as prohibitions in receiving relatives 
and the closure of work and day-care activities for people with intellectual 
disabilities, are likely to have a significant effect on the lives of all parties 
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involved. First inventories point at decreased well-being of and substantial 
psychological effects in people with intellectual disabilities, such as the 
increased risk of loneliness, agitation, and distress (Courtenay 2020) and 
increased mental burden amongst care professionals (Inspectie Gezondheidzorg 
en Jeugd 2020). The COVID-19 pandemic and subsequent measures are 
expected to enhance the already existing feelings of lack of control for people 
with intellectual disabilities (Ribeiro et al. 2017), feelings of overburden and 
stress in relatives (Luijkx et al. 2019), and above-average sick leave and burn-
out amongst care professionals (Smyth et al. 2015).
 The Academic Collaborative Center Living 
with an Intellectual Disability
The Academic Collaborative Center Living with an Intellectual Disability 
(Tranzo, Tilburg School of Social and Behavioral Sciences) is a structural col-
laboration amongst fourteen care organizations for people with an intellectual 
disability throughout the Netherlands, the Dutch advocacy group for people 
with intellectual disabilities, and Tilburg University. In this partnership, we 
combine scientific knowledge with professional and experiential knowledge 
from services users themselves in order to contribute to the quality of long- 
term care. Based on information about the impact of COVID-19 on daily 
care we received from our partners in intellectual disability care, we started 
explorative qualitative studies amongst people with intellectual disabilities, 
their mothers, and care professionals directly following the entry into force of 
the so-called intelligent lockdown. In these studies, we conducted interviews 
once a week with all respondents for a period of 7 weeks, in which we asked 
them about their experiences in receiving and/or providing care and support 
in this period of the COVID-19 pandemic and the subsequent impact on 
their well-being.
 Experiences and Needs
Outcomes are under review in academic journals, though the results give us 
the impression various themes arose from the interviews with people with 
intellectual disabilities, mothers, and direct support staff. First, all partici-
pants described their fear of becoming infected with the coronavirus. 
Furthermore, people with intellectual disabilities reported trouble in 
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understanding and dealing with the new reality, in which social distancing 
and keeping 1.5 m distance at all times is the norm. For example, most people 
with intellectual disabilities wanted to stay well informed about the situation 
by regularly watching the news reports, but they experienced confusion and 
stress due to the large amount of information, the use of difficult language, 
and all the rules they had to remember. As one person with an intellectual 
disability put it: “So much has changed, there are many new rules. Because of 
that, I have lost a bit of my normal, everyday life. So I need to find that again. 
Yes, it is quite difficult at this moment to obey to all rules.” A central theme 
in the interviews with mothers was that their lives were focused on the health 
and well-being of their children with intellectual disabilities during the 
COVID-19 pandemic, even more so than usually, and they all seemed to have 
put aside most of their aspirations and personal needs, including their need 
for social contacts outside the house, to meet their children’s needs. 
Notwithstanding, the mothers felt strong and positive bonds within their 
families contributing positively to the situation. A significant theme in the 
interviews with direct support staff was their increased sense of responsibility 
during the COVID-19 pandemic towards the vulnerable people they sup-
port. This sense of responsibility was related to both the physical and mental 
health of the people they support. In the words of one direct support worker: 
“I don’t want to have it on my conscience that people with intellectual dis-
abilities might become infected because of my actions, I would feel really bad 
about that.” In addition, although they experienced time pressure due to the 
new situation, they all tried to reduce the fears and stress of the people they 
support, for example, by facilitating a video call between an infected person 
with an intellectual disability and his family. Finally, it is important to empha-
size that the COVID-19 pandemic and the measures taken also seem to have 
positive effects on well-being. For example, mothers and direct support work-
ers emphasized that people with intellectual disabilities experienced more rest, 
and, consequently, they displayed substantially fewer behavioral problems. 
One mother, for example, observed that her daughter’s temper tantrums 
stopped during the COVID-19 pandemic, which can be explained, according 
to the mother, by the fact that her daughter has difficulties with processing the 
amount of stimuli in her normal daily routine. In addition, direct support 
staff reported space for personal creativity and improvisation in order to meet 
the needs and wishes of people with an intellectual disability. They expressed 
the hope that this space for creativity would remain, also after the COVID-19 
pandemic. Finally, all participants stressed that they missed direct physical 
contact and the presence of people in their immediate vicinity given the very 
strict visitor arrangements. However, they stressed the benefits of eHealth. In 
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the words of a person with an intellectual disability: “Yes, of course, I prefer 
face-to-face contact, but that is not possible now. Therefore, as a replacement, 
I’m very happy I can use Skype and WhatsApp to maintain contact with my 
family and friends. It is not the same as face-to-face contact, but it is much 
better than no contact at all.”
 Supportive Relationships
Our explorative studies provide valuable insights into the experiences and 
needs of people with an intellectual disability, their mothers, and care profes-
sionals during the COVID-19 pandemic in the Netherlands and relate to the 
key role of social supportive networks in the lives of people with an intellec-
tual disability. Earlier research found social supportive networks of people 
with intellectual disabilities to be relatively small (e.g., van Asselt-Goverts 
et al. 2013), and families, and especially parents, often proved to be the main 
provider of informal support to people with an intellectual disability (e.g., 
Giesbers et al. 2020). Professionals also play a key role in the support of peo-
ple with intellectual disabilities, which is not only the case for people with 
intellectual disabilities living in more segregated residential facilities but also 
for those receiving community-based residential support or living indepen-
dently in the community. High-quality interpersonal relationships between 
people with intellectual disabilities, their families, and care professionals are 
mandatory for quality of care and support (Hermsen and Embregts 2015). 
Based on kindness and attentive involvement, one receives and contributes 
support, which is important in preventing loneliness and (mental) health 
problems (Bigby et al. 2009) and thus contributes to a person’s quality of life. 
The COVID-19 pandemic emphasizes the importance of these supportive 
relationships for people with an intellectual disability as their well-being 
depends on this, but also relatives felt that their strong family bonds played a 
crucial part in dealing with the changed circumstances they faced during this 
pandemic.
 Equal Collaboration Between Science and Practice
The major impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and subsequent measures on 
the lives of people with an intellectual disability, their relatives, and care pro-
fessionals in general and supportive networks in particular is beyond doubt. 
Due to their cognitive impairment, people with an intellectual disability rely 
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on relatives and care professionals for lifelong and life-wide care and support. 
Various COVID-19 measures had profound implications for collaborations 
within these necessary supportive relationships, such as prohibitions in receiv-
ing visiting relatives and the closure of work and day-care activities of people 
with an intellectual disability. However, the current crisis boosts creativity 
with respect to the development and valorization of knowledge towards a new 
common, in which vulnerable people such as persons with an intellectual dis-
ability will be empowered in such a way that they attain full societal participa-
tion. Experiments with eHealth in the care and support for people with 
intellectual disabilities that have emerged during the period of so-called intel-
ligent lockdown are promising in this respect. Although scientific research is 
in its early stage and further high-quality research is needed, eHealth offers 
opportunities to support people with (mild) intellectual disabilities in various 
different contexts of daily life (Oudshoorn-Smit et al. 2020), such as learning 
how to purchase groceries, using a video call to ask for help, or remote coach-
ing via a Bluetooth earpiece. Questions from our partner care organizations 
(www.academischewerkplaatsen- vb.nl/kennisvragen- covid- 19) and the 
explorative studies and rapid literature reviews (Embregts et al. 2020) we con-
ducted exposed the absence of or shortcomings in scientific knowledge in 
areas such as eHealth in the support of people with intellectual disabilities, 
but also the impact of an infection outbreak on care professionals, and the 
impact of the long-term absence of visitors and consequent support. Partner 
care organizations have expressed interest in jointly examining the long-term 
impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and measures in clients, relatives, and 
care professionals and the supportive networks they constitute, and they are 
keen to investigate how to hold on to the positive effects in stimulating care 
professionals’ creativity, for example. Finally, in contributing to the valoriza-
tion of knowledge and contributing to the resilience of people with intellec-
tual disabilities in this complex situation, we have published (in collaboration 
with the University of Glasgow) booklets with so-called easy-read informa-
tion on COVID-19 and related psychological effects such as fears and trouble 
sleeping. Related to the role so-called “fourth generation universities” can play 
as drivers of regional innovation, we can contribute to knowledge creation 
and valorization in these challenging times based on equal collaboration 
between science and practice.
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Like many other countries, the Netherlands shut down large parts of eco-
nomic and social life in the spring of 2020 in response to the COVID-19 
pandemic. Between late March and early May, schools and childcare facilities 
as well as restaurants, cafes, and bars were shut down; contact-related occupa-
tions were closed; gatherings were prohibited; and employees were advised to 
work from home as much as possible. While these regulations represented a 
sharp cut in individuals’ personal lives they were more relaxed in the 
Netherlands than in many other European countries.1 At the same time, the 
Netherlands has enacted large-scale economic relief programs.
1 Regarding these regulations, the Oxford Response Stringency Index (Hale et al. 2020) assigns the 
Netherlands scores between 81 and 86 for the second half of March 2020, placing it close to Germany. 
It is well below countries like Italy and France that enacted stricter lockdowns and above countries like 
the UK or the USA, which pursued less stringent policies at that point in time.
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This chapter gives an overview of how labor supply and well-being have 
changed in the Netherlands in the early stage of the COVID-19 pandemic. 
We show that changes in the labor market have affected different groups of 
people differently and we discuss reasons for these differences. In addition, we 
illustrate how the consequences of the lockdown have altered the well-being 
of Dutch workers.
 Data: The LISS Panel
To investigate the consequences of the COVID-19 crisis for the Dutch popu-
lation, we designed and fielded several questionnaires asking members of the 
Longitudinal Internet Studies for the Social Sciences (LISS) panel about 
behaviors, beliefs, and expectations during the COVID-19 crisis. The first 
module was fielded between March 20 and March 31, 2020, a few days into 
the lockdown. Three modules followed in April, May, and June. In addition, 
we collected time use and consumption data to analyze how individuals had 
allocated time and money during the lockdown. The LISS panel is based on a 
probability sample of individuals registered by Statistics Netherlands; it has 
been running since 2007 and constitutes roughly 4000 Dutch households 
comprising about 7000 individuals. It is administered by CentERdata, a sur-
vey research institute affiliated with Tilburg University. For all modules fielded 
so far, response rates for our questionnaire were in excess of 80%, which trans-
lates into a longitudinal sample of about 5000 individuals.
 The Number of Working Hours
All over the world, social distancing measures led to an immediate increase in 
unemployment rates and a decrease in working hours. Studies analyzing sam-
ples of workers in the United States and the United Kingdom show that about 
60% of respondents claim to have worked fewer hours. The share of workers 
who lost their employment (probably or definitely) due to the virus was 12% 
(US) and 9% (UK) (see e.g., Adams-Prassl et al. 2020b; Coibion et al. 2020; 
Bick and Blandin 2020). In the Netherlands, these numbers are much lower: 
about 27% of the respondents reported to work fewer hours, and about 3% 
of the respondents worked zero hours in late March 2020. While overall these 
numbers suggest a less severe early impact of the pandemic on labor supply, 
we find remarkable differences by education.
Figure 10.1 shows that the least-educated group in our sample is most 
likely to work zero hours. Almost 10% of the low-educated work zero hours, 
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which is twice as high as in the middle education group and almost four times 
higher than among those with a tertiary degree. By contrast, the share of 
workers with reduced hours is at around 13.5% for the least educated and 
rises in education. Working more hours is more prevalent among those with 
upper secondary education (a bit more than 11%) than in the other groups 
(von Gaudecker et al. 2020).
Figure 10.2 breaks down the change in total working hours by those per-
formed at the usual workplace and at home by education. The COVID-19 


























Fig. 10.1 Share of workers with different changes in the number of working hours, by 
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Fig. 10.2 Working hours at the workplace and at home, by the level of education 
(data source: LISS)
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from home and the total weekly working hours between low, medium, and 
highly educated individuals. This pattern intensifies differences in the total 
hours worked among education groups. While both low- and medium- 
educated individuals worked a bit more than 8% of their hours from home 
before the COVID-19 pandemic, the highly educated had a share in excess of 
15%. During the onset of the COVID-19 crisis, all groups increased their 
home office shares. However, hours worked from home almost quadrupled 
among the highly educated (+16 h), while they tripled for the medium edu-
cated (+6.5 h) and not even doubled for the low educated (+2.2 h).
Investigating the reduction in working hours reveals a similar divide. Pre- 
crisis working hours are lowest among low educated, and highest among 
highly educated, with the medium educated somewhere in between (low: 
29.8, medium: 32, high: 34.9 weekly hours). The onset of the COVID-19 
pandemic strongly magnifies this division. Low-educated workers experience 
the largest decrease in terms of absolute and relative working hours (–21%), 
medium-educated workers the second-largest decrease (–13%), while the 
decrease is less than 10% for highly educated workers. A logical explanation 
for the stronger reduction in total working hours for lower-educated indi-
viduals is that their jobs are associated with a lower flexibility to work from 
home. Three mechanisms come to mind. First, differences in the task compo-
sitions of the respective jobs can explain why some jobs can be done from 
home more easily compared to others. Second, if set-up costs are involved 
(e.g., laptop by the employer) and/or facilities to work from home are limited 
(VPN connections); employers might be forced to allow only a part of the 
workforce to work from home. Third, the share of essential workers (“essenti-
ele beroepen en cruciale sectoren”) rises in education (von Gaudecker 
et al. 2020).
 The Differences Between Men and Women
One question that naturally arises in the analysis of labor supply is whether 
men and women react in different ways. When analyzing women’s labor sup-
ply, we find that their total working hours dropped from 30.4 to 25.5 (–17%) 
since the beginning of the crisis. Men worked 38.8 h on average before 
COVID-19 and 34.8 h afterwards (–10%). The gender difference in the 
decrease in hours worked is 0.87 h in absolute terms and 7% in relative terms. 
An additional analysis reveals that women are affected more strongly by the 
pandemic in both extremes: 13% worked longer hours in late March, but, at 
the same time, 22% reported a reduction in their working hours or do not 
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work at all. For men, these numbers are 7% and 17%, respectively. Put differ-
ently, less than two-thirds of the women but more than three-quarters of the 
men worked the same hours in late March as they did before. While very large 
reductions in absolute loss of hours occur mainly for men, a larger share of 
women faced smaller reductions.
We propose two potential explanations for the observed changes in female 
working hours. First, women disproportionally work in sectors and occupa-
tions that are considered “essential” and this thus raises female working hours. 
Our data indicate that 20% of the men and 34% of the women work in 
essential occupations. These are mostly concentrated in the health care and 
welfare sector and in education, sectors in which women make up a particu-
larly large share of the workers (82% in health care and welfare, 63% in edu-
cation). Second, mothers may work less in total during the lockdown because 
they have childcare responsibilities. However, our time use data do not show 
that this latter explanation concerns large numbers in quantitative terms—we 
do not find meaningful differences in total hours worked between mothers of 
young children and other women. However, the share of home office work 
does react to the presence of young children for both genders.
 Well-Being and Mental Health
Combining childcare and work is stressful. Together with the extraordinary 
amount of economic uncertainty, this could be a perfect storm for impairing 
parents’ well-being and mental health. We thus turn to showing the develop-
ment of mental health between November 2019 and May 2020 among the 
working population, zooming in on working parents with young children 
below. Mental health is measured using the five-item mental health inventory 
(MHI-5), a validated instrument for assessing mental health in adults. It 
ranges from 0 to 100, with higher values representing better mental health. 
Respondents with a value of below 60 are considered to be at risk for mental 
health problems. We use this cut-off to illustrate the development of mental 
health problems in November 2019, late March 2020, and May 2020.
Figure 10.3 shows the development of mental health problems for employed 
and self-employed respondents. In November 2019, 12.4% of the self-
employed and 15% of the employees experienced mental health problems. 
Shortly after the lockdown (March 2020), the share of self-employed people 
with mental health problems almost doubled (24.3%), exceeding the fraction 
of employed people with mental health problems (20.3%). After about 
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2 months into the lockdown, mental health problems reverted to pre- crisis 
levels for both groups of workers. The following picture is drawn in Fig. 10.3.
While the COVID-19 crisis suddenly increased economic uncertainty and 
stress for the working population, workers learned about their situation over 
the course of the crisis, and the governmental programs announced took 
effect. This probably led to a reduction in stress and uncertainty, such that the 
mental health problems decreased to pre-crisis levels in the working popula-
tion overall.
As mentioned before, the closure of schools and childcare facilities forced 
parents to find alternative care arrangements or to take care of the children 
themselves while working from home. This double burden may have created 
an enormous amount of stress for working parents. Figure 10.4 shows the 
share of mental health problems among mothers and fathers who took care of 
their young children (below the age of 12). In November 2019, no father in 
our sample reported signs of mental health problems while about 19% of the 
mothers experienced mental health problems. These shares were significantly 
higher in March 2020. The share of mothers with mental health problems 
increased to 27%. Fathers experienced an even stronger increase in mental 
health problems, almost catching up with mothers (21%). Later during the 
crisis, mental health problems decreased for both groups. Still, the fraction of 
fathers and mothers with mental health problems is higher than in November 
2019 (5% and 24%).
Fig. 10.3 Mental health problems before and during the lockdown, employed and 
self- employed respondents (data source: LISS)
 H. von Gaudecker and B. Siflinger
73
Thus, even 2 months after the lockdown was enacted parents still suffered 
from the double burden of working from home and taking care of their 
children.2
 Conclusion
Unlike other crises, the COVID-19 pandemic had a very sharp onset. Literally 
overnight, it led to dramatic shifts in the way work and childcare was orga-
nized. Using data collected at high frequency over the first weeks and months 
of the crisis, we have documented the huge shift towards working from home 
and the heterogeneity across population groups. After a huge spike in late 
March, the mental well-being of the overall working population reverted to 
pre-crisis levels in May. However, for parents with young children, mental 
health problems continued to be significantly more frequent than before the 
crisis. It will be important to track these and other developments in the 
months and years to come.
2 For the USA, Adams-Prassl et al. (2020a) find negative mental health effects of the lockdown for 
women only.
Fig. 10.4 Mental health problems before and during the lockdown, working parents 
with young children (data source: LISS)
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The Economy, Nature, and the Meaning 
of Life After the Coronavirus Crisis
Paul van Geest, Carlos J. B. de Bourbon de Parme, 
and Sylvester Eijffinger
“Christians still regularly tell you that nature is so beautiful and testifies of 
God’s greatness and goodness. Oh, dear people, nature is downright terrible, 
nature is one great suffering… What is ‘very good’ about a creation in which 
the most terrible parasites live in humans and animals…? What is ‘very good’ 
about a creation in which all organisms are terrorized by parasites, including 
parasites themselves?” (‘t Hart 1997).1 The words by Maarten ‘t Hart seem 
1 “Nog steeds krijg je van christenen regelmatig te horen dat de natuur zo wondermooi is en getuigt van Gods 
grootheid en goedheid. Ach, lieve mensen, de natuur is ronduit verschrikkelijk, de natuur is één groot lijden… 
Wat is er ‘zeer goed’ aan een schepping waarin de vreselijkste parasieten in mens en dier huizen…? Wat is er 
‘zeer goed’ aan een schepping waarin alle organismen geterroriseerd worden door parasieten, dus ook parasi-
eten zelf?”
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irrefutable. Now that the coronavirus causes a disease that makes us realize 
that life is not as malleable in everything as we wish, they would have been 
almost prophetic if he had added the word “viruses” after “the most terrible 
parasites.”
Long before Maarten ‘t Hart, ancient philosophers refused to accept the 
idea that creation is only cruel and chaotic. In a sermon and in his short trea-
tise De providentia Dei (On God’s Providence), Augustine observed that a 
flea is perfectly articulated, a human body is a beautiful system, and every-
thing and all have a logical place in the order of creation and the order of 
nature. At a time when “God” had not yet disappeared from the scientific 
hypotheses, they refused to believe that creation was a botch job by some 
disturbed god, as Gnostics thought, or that everything was a coincidence. At 
the same time, they observed that life in the dimensions of time and space, the 
saeculum, also had something very tragic: everything in it is transient, change-
able, and everything eventually collapses (Augustine, de Ciuitate Dei). For 
Cicero and Augustine, creation and history formed a fabric (textura) in which 
ugly and beautiful threads accentuated each other, on the understanding that 
it was the task of ugly and bad threads to acknowledge the goodness and 
beauty of the rest all the better (Augustine, sermo 360A). Badness is, in their 
idea, useful and necessary to be all the more thankful for goodness.
Seen in this light, every crisis is an opportunity to continue to grow, either 
personally or collectively, or to come to a deeper understanding. Bearing this 
in mind, the question arises as to how we can learn from the present corona-
virus crisis. How should society be rearranged? How should we deal with the 
nature of which humankind is a part?
 Towards a New Social Order
The coronavirus crisis shows how disruptive the effects of nature can be on 
society. The rearrangement of society will be a major challenge in the post- 
corona era. There are a number of visions that might be important in this 
rearrangement; visions that each require a certain attitude to life.
First, we see that the coronavirus crisis has given rise to discussions about 
the conditions that Northern European countries want to impose on the 
European Recovery Fund in the post-corona era. These conditions are aimed 
at ensuring that Southern European countries generate higher growth through 
structural reforms so that these countries can emerge from their national debt. 
As the coronavirus pandemic has been assessed as a temporary emergency, 
they have been formulated to provide temporary solutions. Because the need 
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in Southern European countries became acute and very great, the coronavirus 
crisis offered an opportunity for Northern European countries to become as 
good as the father in the New Testament parable awaiting his prodigal son, 
who led a profligate life, with forgiveness and open arms, much to the frustra-
tion of his faithful eldest son. The Northern European countries can be com-
pared to the eldest son, who has always faithfully fulfilled his duties and holds 
it against his little brother that he has not done so. Even though the eldest son 
has never been short of anything, he still feels aggrieved; so aggrieved that 
someone who is in acute trouble—even if it is his own fault—is denied help. 
The parable teaches that this is understandable, but that it ultimately damages 
relationships. It teaches us to first show mercy and justice after that.
However, if needs are less acute, a balance between mercy and justice, 
between rights and duties in the long term seems more plausible. As a result 
of the coronavirus crisis, common bonds, which are always a form of debt 
sharing, are back on the agenda within the framework of a European Recovery 
Fund that is more focused on the long term. Both temporary and long-term 
measures are again part of a broader debate on the future shape of the 
Economic and Monetary Union. The aim is always to strike a balance between 
rights and obligations within a European fiscal union in the long term. A fis-
cal union has a structure in which a decision on structural reforms in the 
Eurozone is taken jointly to increase the growth potential, thereby reducing 
the national debt. A European fiscal policy should thus be aimed at structur-
ally increasing Europe’s growth potential. Higher growth levels make it easier 
to bear debt. On this path of traditional longer term structural reforms, which 
will still have a positive impact on growth, the quest for justice must prevail. 
For all parties in the Eurozone discussing the European fiscal union and a 
European fiscal policy, it will be important, according to us, to strive “to do 
right by others” first: so to seek justice, however utopian this may sound. This 
is where the crisis offers an opportunity to sincerely strive to do justice to each 
other. Putting mercy first on this path would mean reaping injustice and 
aggrievement.
The disruptive coronavirus crisis can be understood as the prelude to a 
process of creative destruction. In his magisterial Capitalism, Socialism, and 
Democracy (1942) Schumpeter argues that creative destruction, the process 
in which old techniques have to make way for new ones, is useful and even 
necessary to structurally increase productivity and, ultimately, the only source 
of economic growth (Schumpeter 1982). The coronavirus crisis offers unex-
pected opportunities for economic growth through the increase of, for exam-
ple, digitalization, artificial intelligence, and robotization. Society was forced 
to do this because the coronavirus was not allowed to spread and real contact 
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was therefore undesirable. Companies should not try to save their old busi-
ness models but embrace the new ones that emerge in and thanks to (sic) the 
coronavirus crisis. Schumpeter also argues in this context that governments 
would do well to stimulate these new business models in companies.
Moreover, in his idea, creative destruction leads to the need for a new social 
contract for the labor market because the segmentation of the labor market 
into flexible and permanent employees is not only socially unjust but also 
economically inefficient. Now the coronavirus crisis has exposed the differ-
ence between vital and non-vital institutions and professions. Suddenly, it 
became poignantly clear that the vital professions (care, security, and educa-
tion) have shown deficits precisely in recent decades due to cuts in terms of 
employment and budgets. The social system in which this could happen will 
be subject to creative destruction if the vital institutions and professions in the 
post-corona era will be advantaged again. Preludes to creative destruction will 
also be reflected in newly formulated guarantees for the resilience of our eco-
nomic and social infrastructure, in which the vital professions will be valued 
more highly. Although non-vital businesses and institutions should be helped 
with a bridge loan for their transition to the new revenue models they cannot 
be sustained against market forces in the long term and must ultimately accept 
their entrepreneurial risks. If Europe were to succeed in making positive use 
of the power of Schumpeter’s creative destruction in the post-corona era, then 
the human drama of the coronavirus crisis could be a blessing in disguise.
 Nature as a Teacher
The coronavirus also shows us that our relationship with nature needs to 
change. What insights does the coronavirus crisis give us with regard to our 
relationship with the nature of which humankind is a part?
In Verde brillante. Sensibilità e intelligenzia del mondo vegetale, neurobi-
ologist Stefano Mancuso confirmed what Darwin already suspected. Plants 
have amazing skills. They communicate with each other and help each other 
find food. They warn each other with fragrances of hostile herbivores and lure 
other animals to defend them. And although, according to Mancuso, defores-
tation and other climate-disrupting activities cause the demise of many plant 
species, plants will survive us: also because they account for 99% of the Earth’s 
biomass. Humans need vegetative life. It is not the other way around. Also 
because humans are quantitatively insignificant (quantitativamente ininflu-
enti), Mancuso, and many with him, have for years advocated embracing a 
worldview that is less anthropocentric (Mancuso and Viola 2015).
 P. van Geest et al.
79
Mancuso could also have substantiated this insight with an intuition from 
the Scripture. In Genesis, a distinction is made between chayyah—the life of 
plants—and chayyah fakehesh—the life of animals and humans (Gen. 1: 20, 
21, 24, 30; Gen. 2: 7). Although there is a difference between the lives of 
plants and animals (humans), chayyah is used for both forms of life, stressing 
their unity in diversity. Animals and humans inhale oxygen and exhale carbon 
dioxide; plants inhale carbon dioxide and exhale oxygen. But everything 
breathes. In the Scripture, plants, animals, and humans are seen as parts of a 
natural system in which everything needs one another and in which human 
beings are the crowning glory of creation but are not central.
Mancuso’s vision has many common grounds with that of the philosophers 
of the Stoa, a pope and, a psychiatrist. They all help us to see a very decisive 
cause of the coronavirus crisis sharply. The stoics already called upon human-
kind to regard itself as part of a given whole, nature, and not as the culmina-
tion of an exhaustive creation. The idea of oikeiosis was based on the assumption 
that it is precisely when people live according to the laws of universal nature 
that they can make the greatest contribution to the preservation of this nature 
of all living beings in the cosmos. But the opposite is also true. As an exten-
sion of this reverse, Pope Francis, in his encyclical Laudato si’, criticized the 
devastating effects of human activity on the balance of the planet. The pas-
sages about the release of several gases, such as methane gas and carbon diox-
ide, which result in the so-called greenhouse effect; about the loss of 
biodiversity through the destruction of tropical forests; and about the acidifi-
cation of the oceans by our industries are lamentable complaints to which 
those of the prophet Jeremiah about the misery of his people fade away (Pope 
Francis 2015).
In line with the Pope, psychiatrist Damiaan Denys added to this thought 
by making a link between the spread of the coronavirus and the exploitation 
of the earth. He traces the spread of the virus back to non-compliance with 
hygiene regulations in a market where live and dead dogs, armadillos, and 
bats were offered for sale. But the main cause lies in the “unbridled appetite to 
travel” of the richer citizens of the world, who, at the expense of nature, claim 
the right to fly around the world by the millions every day. Denys does not 
hesitate to reduce the spread of the coronavirus to our megalomania (Denys 
2020a, b). The fact that people are dying of a virus is due to that virus. There 
are good viruses and bad viruses in the ordo naturae. Those bad viruses can 
spread and many more people die than necessary is not a punishment from 
God but a consequence of the megalomania of the phenomenon humankind, 
who no longer knows his place in this ordo naturae.
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As in a pas de deux, pope and psychiatrist expose another wrongdoing. The 
“haves,” who travel, buy, and consume a lot, place an enormous ecological 
footprint on mother earth: a footprint that—if all seven billion human earth-
lings claimed it—would take as many as seven mother earths to meet the 
demand for raw materials. Long before the coronavirus erupted, Pope Francis 
clearly stated in his much-discussed encyclical Laudato si’ that climate change, 
the scarcity of drinking water, and declining biodiversity are and will continue 
to affect the poor most. Scarcity of water means, among other things, lower 
crop yields for them. He considered the behavior of the rich to be intolerable, 
even more so, because these climate changes are also caused by the unbridled 
need of people in rich countries to consume. Ecology and social justice there-
fore have a direct link. The ecological crisis, according to the Pope, is actually 
rooted in a moral crisis in the hearts of people in rich countries. Those hearts 
are sometimes empty, and the need to consume is the result. Unfortunately, 
this happens too much without taking into account the consequences for the 
rest of the world. The coronavirus crisis is also a consequence of this moral crisis.
Psychiatrist and pope confront us with our inability to put the stoic ne quid 
nimis (nothing in excess) principle into practice. Stoics emphasized that peo-
ple do not become happy when they have something to an extreme degree. 
On the temple of Apollo in Thebes it already said: Mèden agan (in nothing 
too much!). Moderation is a remedy against megalomania. But it is also a path 
to happiness. In his self-help book The Happy Life (!), Augustine writes that 
someone who is extremely poor knows fear because he or she is afraid of hav-
ing too little food for those who need to be cared for. However, someone who 
is far too rich also knows a fear: the fear of losing possessions. The right mea-
sure of possession gives peace and inner balance to his notion (Augustine, De 
beata vita).
 Epilog
Because of the lockdown, nature has taken back part of its former place. This 
was for the benefit of humankind. The air quality in Hong Kong, China, the 
Po Valley, and in many other regions improved. Emissions of harmful sub-
stances decreased. In cities like Venice, dolphins returned and fish were seen. 
But the lockdown, which was self-inflicted, brought much doom to mankind. 
Businesses collapsed, people died alone in the hospital, without anyone being 
able to comfort them or even say goodbye. Would this have been the case if 
we had been more respectful of nature?
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Entrepreneurship and initiative have brought enormous gains and poverty 
reduction worldwide. At the same time, it has fed immoderation and brought 
about the idea of limitlessness. It has often been written in recent weeks that 
“the virus conquered the whole world,” or that “the virus had again claimed 
many victims.” In a formal biological sense, these are corrective statements. 
However, by attributing human characteristics to the virus, we may be con-
cealing the even more important second cause of the coronavirus crisis. The 
virus was able to spread so rapidly because globally oriented people from the 
wealthy part of the world developed an unbridled need to travel, and an exces-
sive desire for meat. The effect of the latter desire is not only that humankind 
is increasingly encroaching on the habitat of animals but also that the rate of 
zoonoses, the transmittance of viruses of (wild) animals to humans, increases 
very rapidly. The greatest threat to humankind is caused by Western people’s 
need to travel, operate globally, and consume unrestrainedly, and a lifestyle in 
which moderation is practiced is at least as adequate a medicine as a good vac-
cine. What we are learning the hard way is that all living beings live in the 
same world and that for people sharing space with everything and all is a 
necessary condition of life. Ultimately, an attitude of life in which people are 
more willing to share possessions altruistically brings about the well-being 
that people seek through the gathering of possessions.
Paradoxically, this altruism is not altruistic. Augustine was well aware that 
the pursuit of altruism would ideally result in a harmonious community. The 
coronavirus sharpened our awareness that life is still not as malleable and 
controllable as we thought after the invention of penicillin or the lightning 
rod. This is a learning opportunity. Knowing our dependence on an uncon-
trollable nature provokes feelings of fear and insecurity. At best, we do not 
remain trapped in these feelings, but see the world and ourselves differently. 
In the awareness that we are not the only ones whose “turn” it is, we become 
less complacent at least. In an even more favorable case, we start to worry 
deeply about older loved ones. In doing so, we develop empathy and compas-
sion. And because there is a pandemic, we suddenly realize that we are con-
nected to people whom we will never meet but whose miserable circumstances 
suddenly begin to affect us in such a way that we want to do something 
for them.
Nature releases in us the spirit of mercy. Fear of the unknown, insecurity, 
and the awareness of our own vulnerability can be the prelude to seeing peo-
ple differently and to doing things differently. Sometimes life forces us to do 
this. That, actually, is “very good.”
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Litigating the Crisis: Towards 
a Rebalancing of the Rights of Investors 
Versus Public Interest?
Morag Goodwin and Phillip Paiement
This chapter reflects on the anticipated rush by private corporations to seek 
compensation from states for emergency measures taken to address the cur-
rent health crisis. Where states have, for example, commandeered privately 
run health facilities, foreign corporations can claim for any negative impact 
on their current and future profits. This anticipated wave of state-investor liti-
gation draws upon the web of bilateral investment treaties that span the globe 
and on Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) mechanisms. In place of a 
“new normal,” this short paper suggests that these threats represent an inten-
sification of an existing trend, with the main difference being that states of the 
Global North are increasingly finding themselves disciplined by instruments 
that they created to protect their own companies abroad. If this happens, as 
seems likely, this crisis will add to the growing calls to rethink how we regulate 
the boundary between the public interest and private investors.
At the heart of this type of transnational litigation is a dispute about the 
relationship between notions of public and private and the definition of “pub-
lic interest” that acts as a check on the freedom of action of both states and 
private actors. The legal basis is the system of Investor-State Dispute Settlement 
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and the complex web of bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and the occasional 
multilateral trade treaty that constitute the rules of interaction between for-
eign corporations and investors and the public authorities that host the invest-
ment. The system is part of international law and is therefore governed by its 
general rules. The basic principle of the system is that states protect the inter-
ests of companies and investors incorporated in their state when those com-
panies and investors act abroad, by laying down shared—bilateral—rules that 
prohibit discriminatory action, such as expropriation.
There are many 1000s of BITs currently in operation, most of which were 
drafted in the 1980s and 1990s. What gives these treaties their bite are the 
provisions they contain that exclude the domestic courts of the host state 
from any role in regulating disputes between investors and the state in favor 
of international arbitration. Yet while BITs are—as the name suggests—a 
bilateral agreement between two states, it has increasingly been recognized 
that they are, in practice, unbalanced, and are unfair towards states of the 
Global South.
In place of a guarantee of mutual interests, BITs have worsened the power 
imbalance upon which they are based in favor of corporate interests over the 
public authorities of poorer states (Peronne 2016a, b). The practice of dispute 
resolution guaranteed by BITs has led to a dramatic expansion of investor 
rights under the notion of “indirect expropriation,” which covers any mea-
sures taken by governments that have a negative impact on investment 
(UNCTAD 2000). These claims see host governments subjected to claims by 
foreign firms that frequently result in huge payouts that, in turn, have an 
equally huge impact on the ability of developing countries to improve public 
welfare. As such, it has been argued, that the ISDS system promotes the rights 
of Western-based corporations over those of developing states (Gallacher and 
Shrestha 2011). This has led to calls for a moratorium on investor-state cases 
within the ISDS system and a re-writing of the rules of the game (Columbia 
Center on Sustainable Investment 2020; Kahale III 2018).
 The Current Crisis
The dramatic nature of the policy responses by governments in the face of the 
COVID-19 pandemic gives rise to a myriad of potential liabilities for states 
stemming from their obligations towards foreign investors under their inter-
national investment agreements. These liabilities concern both public health 
measures taken to quell the spread and health consequences of the pandemic 
as well as subsidiary measures taken in response to the pandemic’s social and 
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economic consequences, including those flowing from corresponding public 
health restrictions. Examples of direct public health measures that may pose 
harmful consequences to the undertakings of foreign investors include: the 
nationalization of private medical care facilities; compulsory licensing for pat-
ented drugs and medical devices; the reduction or prohibition of the exporta-
tion of medical materials; requisitioning hotels to serve as health clinics or 
quarantine sites; and compelling manufacturers to produce medical supplies.
In addition, the following social and economic policies intended to limit 
the consequences of the pandemic could also impact foreign investors in a 
manner that would give rise to ISDS arbitration: moratoriums on toll-roads, 
rent payments, and utilities payments; the introduction of limitations on con-
tractual liabilities and other creditor protections; limitations of foreign invest-
ments to protect against buyouts of distressed assets; moratoriums on 
bankruptcy proceedings; suspension of mortgage payments; moratoriums on 
utilities connection cancelations; tax relief measures to support businesses 
particularly affected by the pandemic; and the prohibition of companies 
domiciled in tax havens from receiving financial aid. In a “damned if you do, 
damned if you don’t” manner, states might even be exposed to liability if they 
fail to take sufficient measures to ensure public order. Based on the concept of 
indirect expropriation, such governments could face claims if looting or other 
social unrest affects foreign investors, as was the case in Egypt during the Arab 
Spring when disruptions and theft from gas pipelines led Ampal-American 
Israel Corporation to initiate ISDS proceedings against Egypt for $535 mil-
lion, a procedure which is still pending. It is quite possible to imagine ISDS 
claims arising both for a failure by governments to prevent a subsequent wave 
of infections due to a lifting of restrictions too quickly or because they failed 
to enforce restrictions sufficiently well; and because they implemented lock-
down rules in the first place. Simply put, the complexity of policy responses 
to the pandemic presents countless opportunities for ISDS to arise.
Already in late March, while the pandemic was in its worst stages in Europe 
with thousands of deaths each day, attorneys from ArbLit in Milan were pub-
licly contemplating the potential investment claims that may come out of the 
pandemic (Benedetteli et al. 2020). Since then, numerous law firms special-
ized in investment arbitration have been contacting potential clients in order 
to raise awareness about the types of claims that they may be able to pursue 
against states whose measures have impacted their businesses.
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 Fighting Back
Despite it long being accepted by many scholars, countries, and international 
institutions that the ISDS system is detrimental to the interests of the Global 
South, the system perseveres. Previous government crises, such as Argentina’s 
15 year-long financial crisis of 1998–2002, or the Arab Spring—while they 
led to calls for reform—did not lead to change. Nor has the permanent gov-
ernance crisis of many Global South states created sufficient momentum for a 
rebalancing of investors’ rights in favor of the public interest. The system is 
not unchallenged, however. Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela have all with-
drawn from the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID) Convention this century (in 2007, 2009 and 2012, respectively) 
(Voon and Mitchell 2016). Other efforts to fight back include the termina-
tion of older generation BIT agreements: for example, Venezuela terminated 
its BIT with The Netherlands in 2008 after it was used as the basis for ICSID 
jurisdiction in 10 cases (Fach Gómez 2010), Bolivia has terminated 10 of its 
23 BITs, and Indonesia has terminated 26 of its 71 BITs (Ranjan 2019).
However, the fight back is not limited to states of the Global South. In 
recent years, a number of wealthy countries have recognized that the system 
does not serve their interests either. In 2009, the Australian government 
requested the Productivity Commission—a governmental advisory body—to 
investigate the impact of Australia’s bilateral and trade agreements on 
Australia’s economic performance. Its 2010 report found no evidence that 
ISDS provisions increase foreign investor inflow and held that, in contrast, 
ISDS provisions represented “considerable policy and financial risks” to the 
Australian state. Its conclusion, that “the Australian government should seek 
to avoid the inclusion of investor state dispute settlement provisions in bilat-
eral and regional trade agreements,” led to a rethink of Australian trade policy 
(Productivity Commission 2010; Ranald 2011). Notably, the report immedi-
ately preceded a lengthy and costly ISDS claim filed by tobacco conglomerate 
Philip Morris’s Hong Kong subsidiary against Australia for its 2011 tobacco 
plain packaging legislation, a dispute in which Australia ultimately prevailed, 
paving the way for similar legislation in developing countries.
Similarly, the Dutch government decided in 2018 to create a new BIT 
model treaty to serve as the basis for the renegotiation of all 79 BITs between 
the Dutch state and non-EU countries. The new model is designed to create 
a fairer balance by introducing stricter eligibility criteria for investors to be 
able to make claims against states. One significant change is that claims of 
indirect expropriation will now require “fundamental attributes of property” 
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to be taken, which means, for example, that fluctuations in prices as a result 
of government measures will no longer be claimable (Marsman 2018). These 
changes by the Dutch government are important, as Dutch BITs are the sec-
ond most invoked by investors globally, and the old model is widely viewed as 
offering “the gold standard” of investor protection. This change of heart by 
the Dutch government is prompted by recognition of the need to rebalance 
the rights of investors against state interests. More importantly, it follows the 
realization that power shifts in the global economy entail that the Netherlands—
traditionally an investment-exporting country—is now primarily a capital- 
importing state. For example, 36% of residential rental properties sold in the 
Netherlands in 2019 were purchased by foreign investors (Rachid 2019). 
Strict investor protection is increasingly viewed by the Dutch state as detri-
mental to its interests in place of protecting them (Duggal and van de Ven 
2019). It is not alone amongst Northern states.
 Litigating This Crisis
Should states be faced with investment arbitration in response to their 
COVID-19 policy measures, they have two general pathways to defend their 
actions (Martinez 2010). First, they can rely on the defense of necessity as 
developed in customary international law. However, exceptions under neces-
sity or emergency scenarios are not usually recognized in international invest-
ment agreements, which raises the risk that an arbitration panel will not 
accept such a defense. Second, they may rely on regulation in the public inter-
est exception clauses, which are increasingly common in international invest-
ment agreements, yet fairly uncommon in older agreements. This justification, 
if available, would be subject to proportionality testing by an arbitration panel 
to determine whether measures less harmful for foreign investors would have 
been possible. There is a fair chance that many states could successfully defend 
their actions in this manner. Yet the prospect of proportionality evaluations 
and potential massive payouts to foreign investors for government actions in 
a pandemic that has taken the lives of hundreds of thousands of Europeans 
and North Americans is likely to be deeply unpalatable to these governments 
and their voters. We should not anticipate that actions by corporations in 
response to the pandemic could lead to the development of a “new common” 
amongst states—competition is, after all, the beating heart of capitalism and 
hence of the global economy. The most that can be hoped is that the pan-
demic gives powerful states the incentive to initiate reforms to the 
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international investment treaty system and hence continue the trend towards 
a rebalancing of public interest and investors’ rights.
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Plus Ça Change…? How the COVID-19 
Crisis May Lead to a Revaluation 
of the Local
Martijn Groenleer and Daniel Bertram
 The normality of global flows - and crises
Who is to blame for the catastrophic economic and social damages (beyond the 
untold human suffering) that COVID-19 may cause and has already caused? 
While some have jumped to scapegoating one country (China) or one institu-
tion (the WHO), somewhat more sophisticated arguments point in the direc-
tion of globalization. Although the economy has been operating in cross- border 
production chains for centuries as part of a global division of labor, these chains 
have become increasingly complex and tightly linked in recent decades. As a 
result, the potential for failure—a chain reaction or even an “infarct”—is con-
siderable, and crises with cross-border effects are inevitable. To some extent, 
such transboundary crises have become the new common (Boin 2019).
With COVID-19 unfolding its deadly and disruptive force, calls from all 
across the political spectrum for putting an end to globalization are becoming 
louder. But will the pandemic really constitute a stumbling block to the inex-
orable machinery of growing interconnection? We argue that, as with 
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previous global crises such as the financial crisis, it is not obvious that the 
COVID-19 crisis will lead to a process of de-globalization, however disastrous 
the consequences of international cross-linking may be for economies and 
societies. It is much more likely that the new common will see an acceleration 
of the process of localization, already occurring as part of globalization in the 
old common.
In the 1990s, sociologist Manuel Castells (1989) spoke in this regard about 
the creation of a so-called “space of flows.” In the network society, territories 
and their borders lose much of their importance. As a result of continuous 
innovations in information and communication technology, locations, or 
places, are increasingly connected. This phenomenon is mostly economic in 
nature, but by no means exclusively so. People also organize themselves across 
borders via the Internet and social media in global social movements: for 
entertainment, for political purposes, for spiritual themes, and indeed for all 
kinds of protests. Digital connectivity, therefore, seems to have largely replaced 
geographical proximity.
 The Enduring Importance of Place
However, it turns out time and time again: the world is not “placeless” sud-
denly. Even in a globalized society—in spatial terms—concrete places are still 
linked together. Those loci are the regions, cities, and neighborhoods where 
we lead our daily lives, derive our identity from, and build communities 
around. From its very origin, the ravaging COVID-19 crisis illustrates both 
the importance of the local, and how and where we live forms part of a larger, 
global whole. After all, the virus was likely first transmitted from animal to 
human in Wuhan, one of China’s sprawling metropoles and an important 
national and international hub, from where it quickly conquered all corners 
of the world. Ever since, cities and urban areas appear at the epicenter of the 
crisis (Keil et al. 2020).
The result is localization—not so much as the antagonist to globalization, 
but as part of it. This holds true for both economic and social processes. The 
crisis has not only propelled the further rise of global players like Amazon and 
Google but it has also led many to appreciate the availability and indispens-
ability of local goods and services in an unprecedented manner (Vijn 2020). 
Rarely have the bakery around the corner, the florist next door, and the vari-
ous local mom-and-pop businesses received this much love and attention. A 
similar pattern is discernible for social processes. In spite of students and col-
leagues now being dispersed around the world, their social connections are 
soaring over distance—thanks to Zoom, Teams, and Hangouts & Co. Such 
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global connectivity has not come at the cost of local solidarity: there is an 
overwhelming number of genuinely heartwarming news stories of people 
stepping in for each other (see, e.g., Stewart 2020).
These dynamics have also impacted the sphere of governance. Even though 
we seem to be witnessing a return of the territorial state during the acute crisis 
phase, cities, and regions are only gaining weight as scale levels. Behind the 
scenes, powers have been shifted downwards, e.g., to the 25 mayors of the 
Dutch security regions (Marijnissen 2020). Beyond implementing and enforc-
ing national measures, cities, and regions shape distinctive responses to global-
ized issues. The wicked problems and grand challenges of our times may 
primarily operate at an international level, but the consequences are felt locally, 
and differently. In the case of COVID-19, starting with differences in death 
tolls as a result of the virus but going all the way to differences in bankruptcies, 
unemployment rates, and social conditions. The tragic examples of Wuhan, 
Milan, New York, Sao Paulo, and, indeed, the Dutch province of Brabant and 
the German Land of Bavaria have made it clear that not only certain sectors or 
certain groups but also specific places are being affected unequally.
 The Need for a Differentiated Response
Hence, differentiated policy measures and regulatory responses become neces-
sary to limit contextually specific adverse effects. A one-size-fits-all approach 
neglects the unique geographic trajectory of COVID-19. It may well result in 
a one-size-fits-none situation where central measures are insufficient to limit 
the spread of the virus in some places while, in other places, impose an exces-
sive, unnecessary burden on the local population. This explains the significant 
variation found globally, within the countries of the European Union, and 
even within a small country such as the Netherlands in tackling COVID-19. 
In the Dutch case, the initial response occurred regionally, in the province of 
Brabant, where the virus made its first nationwide appearance. After increas-
ingly centralized measures were taken by the national authorities during the 
most severe phases in late March and April 2020, the approach shifted to 
regional differentiation and local customization. Throughout the summer, 
Amsterdam had stricter regulations in place than other parts of the country, 
citing the high population density and the inflow of foreign tourists as aggra-
vating risk factors (Muller 2020).
The Netherlands is hardly an isolated example in this regard. In Germany, 
the United States, Brazil, and even in France, to name just a few, the regional 
and local levels have exercised significant influence in the handling of the 
COVID-19 crisis—on occasion in direct opposition to national positions 
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(Der Spiegel 2020). Sometimes, this depends on institutional factors, such as 
differing degrees of federalism in Germany, the United States, and Brazil. In 
addition, local and regional bearing seems to vary in time, just like in the 
Netherlands: from local measures at the start to centralized restrictions as the 
crisis develops, and back to local responses when case numbers have somewhat 
declined and outbreaks can be locally monitored and controlled. But even across 
different political systems and across different stages in the infamous curve of 
infections, subnational voices are loud and their actions decisive.
The same dynamic extends beyond immediate policies to measures targeted 
at the virus’s more mediate impacts. Whereas national governments are busy 
saving multinational businesses from bankruptcy, this is the time for local and 
regional authorities to shine as policy entrepreneurs. Urban governments in 
Berlin, Milan, Brussels, and elsewhere are now designating new bike lanes in 
reaction to decreased car traffic (Curry 2020). The Ecuadorian capital of 
Quito enacted new rules for the city’s critical food markets to safeguard urban 
food security while limiting the risk of infection for the many consumers and 
workers (Rodríguez 2020). The city of San Francisco, like many others, is 
providing emergency shelters to the homeless in an effort to improve sanitary 
conditions and enable effective social distancing (Ho 2020).
 The Local as Part of the Global: Glocality
It was another sociologist, Roland Robertson (1995), who was one of the first 
to use the term “glocalization” in the mid-1990s to describe the simultaneous 
occurrence of processes of globalization and localization. Many developments 
in our economy are aimed at standardization and upscaling. At the same time, 
there is an increasing need to develop customized solutions and to adapt to 
local conditions, also socially and politically. Indeed, the term glocalization 
has its origins in the business world and the adaptation of standardized prod-
ucts and services to local needs. Think of the “McKroket,” a special food 
product launched by the globally operating fast-food chain McDonalds to 
serve the Dutch affinity for the deep-fried snack.
The counterintuitive beauty of this dynamic is that the global is not so 
much the opposite of the local. On the contrary, what is often called the local 
is essentially part of the global. Globalization can thus be seen as the shrinking 
of the world by connecting places. In fact, we are seeing that this is acceler-
ated. A notable example is the initiative of regional and local leaders to share 
knowledge and facilitate mutual policy learning during the pandemic, across 
national, cultural, and language borders, as in UNESCO’s (2020) Global 
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Network of Learning Cities, the Harvard Bloomberg City Leadership 
Initiative (Harvard Kennedy School 2020), or the City of Amsterdam’s (2020) 
“International Monitor”. Incidentally, it is by no means fixed or predeter-
mined what constitutes a place: the process of localization also includes the 
“(re)invention of place.” And this is what we currently seem to be witnessing, 
by both citizens and those responsible for designing and implementing policy 
measures and regulatory responses.
Hence, glocalization links two apparently contradictory processes and 
emphasizes this form of complexity in contemporary society. The term can 
also help to interpret current processes related to the COVID-19 crisis, 
including in governance. The tasks faced are generic and transboundary in 
various respects, while locally specific and context-dependent in others. 
Essentially, the various local and regional responses, similar but different, are 
the socio-political McKrokets of a world in crisis.
 In Sum: … Plus C’est la Même Chose?
The spread of the coronavirus around the world once again confronts us with 
the vulnerability of a globalized economy and society. Even though globaliza-
tion may have contributed to the spread of the virus, it is far from obvious 
that this will lead to a process of de-globalization in the longer term. At the 
moment, there may be a significant dip in global economic interactions, but 
the space of flows is likely to keep growing. In line with this, COVID-19 
seems to enhance the simultaneous localization process that has been ongoing 
for much longer as part of a concerted attack on the authority of the territorial 
state. The space of places has returned, or rather it has never gone away. If 
anything, the struggle to grapple with the current situation could contribute 
to a revaluation of the local in a global context. In this sense, rather than a 
disruption, the new common may actually turn out to be no more (and no 
less) than a slightly altered, yet considerably accelerated version of the 
old common.
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Perspectives on the Common: The Input 
of Literature
Odile Heynders
In the COVID-19 context, journalists and columnists frequently refer to lit-
erary texts in order to demonstrate that what is happening under the current 
circumstances has already been described by writers of fiction. The idea is that 
literature opens a window to the real world, that, in imagination, we can find 
a representation of factual events. Various historical and contemporary works 
of fiction, such as A Journal of the Plague Year (1722) by Daniel Defoe, The 
Betrothed (1827) by Alessandro Manzoni, The Plague (1947) by Albert 
Camus, Blindness (1995) by José Saramago, The Rumors (1996) by Hugo 
Claus, or Ruyan@sars.com (2006) by Hu Fayun, describe societies infected 
with all sorts of contagious diseases from the bubonic plague in London to 
AIDS in Africa. Most of these novels can be read as allegories; they demon-
strate how people react to illness, social panic, and isolation. They confirm 
that, although times are changing, the impact of pandemics on individuals 
does not differ that much. All these works underline that communities can 
only be based on a humanist approach and solidarity. But they also describe 
individuals that do not always strive for the common good. The violence in 
the novels by Saramago and Claus is illustrative; the norms and values of 
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social groups become permeated when people get weak or invalid due to a 
spreading disease.
The novel is a democratic space, Turkish writer Elif Shafak claims in an 
interview (Anjum 2019). The idea is that, in a novel, various characters and 
perspectives can be brought to the fore and scenarios can be worked out. In 
May 2020, Shafak further contends that it is in the unreliable narrative per-
spective of literature that something can be taught about the uncertainties and 
fragmentation of the current public sphere (Shafak & Piri 2020). We cannot 
go back to the “normal” that we lived in before the coronavirus crisis, Shafak 
states. We have, with the help of literature, to rethink the world we are living in.
The issue that will be discussed in this contribution is how literature indeed 
helps to rethink the current situation, how it gives insight, and what roles 
literary authors take in the ongoing debate. If we agree that the global world 
should be organized differently after the coronavirus crisis, what then would 
be the input of literature and writers? To answer this question, I will first focus 
on a specific literary text and subsequently on the role two writers performed 
lately. In conclusion, I will argue that the old and the new common should 
not be distinguished as separate eras but could be understood from a synchro-
nous perspective. Literature typically affirms the interrelationship of times for 
which the Russian philologist M. Bakhtin (2008 [1981]) used the term 
contemporaneity.
 The Insight of the Novel
In many media contributions (such as columns in newspapers and television 
talk shows) of the last months, La Peste, translated as The Plague, was men-
tioned as a pivotal description of the current situation. Camus’s most success-
ful novel tells us about doctor Rieux, living in the coastal town of Oran 
(Algeria), who, one day in spring, finds a rat on his doorstep. Soon after, he 
sees the animals, dead and alive, everywhere. Local people get swellings and 
start to die. The phase of surprise is followed by one of panic. “Our fellow- 
citizens, as they now realized, had never thought that our little town might be 
a place particularly chosen as one where rats die in the sun and concierges 
perish from peculiar illnesses” (Camus 2013: 20). The city authorities order 
everyone to stay home, and, later, the place is completely closed off while, at 
night, trains bring the many dead to mass graves elsewhere. The administra-
tion refuses to take responsibility. It is up to individuals to participate in 




Camus develops several characters and shows their perspectives and opin-
ions under the circumstances of suffering and death. Doctor Rieux, the jour-
nalist Rambert, the clerk Grand, and the writer Tarrou work, meet, and 
communicate together, as such providing the reader with a number of conver-
sations, thoughts, and difficult dilemmas. How to show solidarity without 
playing the hero, how to resist inertia and ignorance, how to act? As Rieux 
explains: “This whole thing is not about heroism. It’s about decency. It may 
seem a ridiculous idea, but the only way to fight the plague is with decency” 
(Camus 2013: 125).
When columnists refer to Camus’s allegorical work, they mainly pay atten-
tion to the themes and the plot: the events of the spreading illness and its 
disquieting social consequences in the isolated city. The thematic comparisons 
between circumstances described in the novel and the COVID-19 reality of 
quarantine and social distancing are striking indeed. But what might also be 
taken into account when the novel is used in a reflection on today’s global 
coronavirus crisis is the complexity of the narration: the polyphony of voices 
and the way in which “the narrator” is explicitly mentioned but, at the same 
time, disappears behind the characters. As a consequence, the narrator is 
someone who is there but who cannot be identified, someone who observes 
but does not judge. Sentences such as “once the gates were closed, they all 
noticed that they were in the same boat, including the narrator himself, and 
that they had to adjust to the fact” (Camus 2013: 53) underline that the nar-
rating voice does not give an ultimate perspective. As if to say, that no one 
orchestrates the times we are in. Camus’s text provides insight into how peo-
ple behave under the circumstances of epidemic disease. It is not only in the 
theme and the plot but also in the narrative construction—in the play with 
the narrator position—that the reader of The Plague gets an understanding of 
how disturbing the quarantine of a city can be.
One of the sources of the book was the cholera epidemic of 1849, destroy-
ing many lives in Algeria. When The Plague was published in 1947, many 
readers interpreted the novel as a commentary on the fascist “disease” of World 
War II. The novel, we could argue, tells the story of a different kind of illness 
as well: that of a destructive, hyper-materialist, neoliberal capitalism (Vulliamy 
2015). This poly-interpretability can be considered a characteristic of many 
canonical novels: they can function as the applied contemporary commentary 
in different times. Even though written almost 90 years ago, The Plague pro-
vides insight into current circumstances and ideas.
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 The Role of the Author as Spokesperson
When we talk about the relevance of literature, we should not only put the 
light on novels, but also on other types of text and on the roles that literary 
writers take in the societal debate. Often, writers intervene in the public 
sphere as critical spokespersons who, from a position of both engagement and 
distance, speak out on current events (Habermas 2009; Heynders 2016). Two 
examples could be mentioned here.
First, Indian writer Arundhati Roy, writing in the Financial Times (April 3, 
2020) about how the coronavirus threatens India. As a consequence of the 
lockdown, the wealthy and the middle classes enclosed themselves in gated 
colonies, while towns and megacities began to “extrude their working-class 
citizens—their migrant workers—like so much unwanted accrual” (Roy 
2020). The social distancing resulted in the opposite: “physical compression 
on an unthinkable scale … The main roads might be empty, but the poor are 
sealed into cramped quarters in slums and shanties” (Roy 2020). Roy’s critical 
voice judges India’s central government, which did not take the adequate steps 
at the right time, not having the cash available for the emergency measures 
needed. Roy not only describes the negative consequences but also considers 
the pandemic a portal to a new future. “In the midst of this terrible despair” 
she writes, “the coronavirus offers us a chance to rethink the doomsday 
machine we have built for ourselves. Nothing could be worse than a return to 
normality” (Roy 2020).
The second example of a literary writer intervening in the real world while 
commenting on the coronavirus crisis is Dutch writer Ilja Leonard Pfeijffer. 
From March 9 until June 27, Pfeijffer, who lives in Genova (Italy), published 
daily reportages in the NRC newspaper on the situation in the Italian city 
under coronavirus quarantine. This viral diary describes everyday life under 
very peculiar and depressing circumstances. Observation, detail, and reflec-
tion as the skills of the writer are combined. The daily columns do not count 
as the regular news but add a subjective perception to it. They provide a more 
meticulous and spherical description than whatever journalistic piece about 
Italy at the time.
Writers taking up a role as spokesperson or even activist—such as in the 
case of Roy—underline an existential commitment while also confirming that 
authorship functions in an attention framework. Operating as a public intel-
lectual implies being visible, deploying one’s cultural authority, and being able 
to set issues in a wider frame. Both Roy and Pfeijffer, as literary writers, address 
the momentous moment of COVID-19, realizing the new state of emergency.
 O. Heynders
103
 The Contemporaneity of Literature
The ethical demand of the new common is important in the context of glo-
balization and digitalization. COVID-19 shapes a momentum that we cannot 
but take very seriously. Common implies community and communication. 
Therefore, it very much relates to literature since literary artifacts only exist as 
communication: sharing words, perceptions, and ideas. Literature functions 
in a community, a space in which languages, cultures, and collective memo-
ries are shared. The crucial point, then, is that in the current societal and 
educational infrastructures, there should be space carved out for literary 
thinking, for meaning creation and reflection based on a heuristic method. In 
academia, we are often preoccupied with quantitative methods that do not 
leave room for researching what is not immediately caught in clear hypotheses 
and aims.
The new common suggests that the old common is passé; that we can do 
better; that we will be more sustainable, collaborative, and participating in an 
all-encompassing network society. I would say that we need literary authors 
and fiction to help us keep our feet on the ground. What a reading of The 
Plague demonstrates is that the nineteenth century cholera epidemic, the 
author’s political ideas in the 1940s, and the reader’s perception in 2020 
establish a smooth connection. The reading encapsulates contemporaneity, 
the recognition that there is a multiplicity of ways to exist within a given 
moment of time. In literature, we acknowledge that times and places are con-
nected and disrupt the linear idea of the “before” and “after.” Literature 
teaches us that the old common cannot just be replaced by the new common. 
The new common will only be established if we are aware of time and space 
and stay morally conscious of the mistakes we made, of the ideas and attitudes 
we had, and of the memories and traditions that we should keep in mind.
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Shaping the Post-COVID-19 Agenda: A Call 
for Responsible Leadership
How the COVID-19 Crisis Could Accelerate the 
Transition to a New Era for Society When Its 
Leaders Take Responsibility to Establish the New 
Common
Ronald de Jong and Mirjam van Reisen
In 1970, the late economist and Nobel Prize Winner Milton Friedman spread 
a doctrine that has dominated the business world ever since: that a company’s 
solitary purpose is to increase financial value for its shareholders. Author dur-
ing the height of the Cold War, Friedman tied in with the narrative that eco-
nomic freedom is essential to political freedom.
Friedman died in 2006, but his mantra did not. From the beginning of the 
1990s until the financial crisis in 2007, the business world increasingly wit-
nessed a movement towards the “Anglo-American” or “neo liberal” model, 
based upon Friedman’s doctrine. In the period after the collapse of Lehmann 
Brothers, leaders in the public and the private sector tried to fight the 
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financials crisis by holding on to the very same measures and instruments 
that—arguably—caused the financial crisis in the first place. The last convul-
sions of Friedman’s doctrine?
 The Need to Challenge Capitalism in Its 
Current Form
There are many symptoms indicating the end of the industrial age as we know 
it. We seem to begin to realize that shareholders’ interests are not necessarily 
and not always aligned with the interests of other stakeholders and of society 
at large. Value creation at the expense of instead of in harmony with is increas-
ingly seen as unacceptable and wrong. It is increasingly inescapable to con-
clude that applying the paradigms of the last century to welfare creation will 
lead to big and potentially irreversible problems such as social unrest, increas-
ing economic inequality, extreme poverty, and climate change destruction. 
This, in turn, undermines the long-term relevance of “capitalism” as the dom-
inant economic doctrine.
 The COVID-19 Crisis as Trigger
The COVID-19 crisis is a focusing event. We have suddenly landed in a new 
universe. Unexpectedly and in a brief moment, what is essential to our societ-
ies has been redefined. The author John Kingdon (1984) saw such moments 
in time as windows when new issues could enter the policy agenda. We have 
come to realize that vital workers (e.g., health workers, teachers, and the 
police) are among those that had been subject to cuts in the public sector for 
decades; that health and education are vital public institutions that might not 
be best managed by the market; that the collective is more important than the 
individual; and that we are all dependent upon each other and the world 
around us, so we all need to be well in order to be well on an individual level.
A moment in time when all existing “certainties” are up in the air should 
lead to a disruption of existing doctrines and paradigms. The COVID-19 
crisis, with the images of sickness and death, suddenly reveals that life, dig-
nity, and care for family and communities are values of a higher order than the 
value of financial gains alone. The crisis forces business leaders to rethink the 
purpose of their organizations. This intensifies the debate around the role of 
corporate enterprise vis à vis its stakeholders. Shareholder capitalism is deeply 
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at odds with what has become essential in the COVID-19 crisis. There is no 
alternative but for capitalism to reinvent its underlying paradigms and param-
eters and to become inclusive.
 Towards Inclusive Capitalism
Inclusive capitalism is based upon the conviction that conventional economic 
thinking will have to be disrupted rather than finding a justification for the 
enormous and increasing inequality. Value creation will have to be redefined 
and realized along three core dimensions: social, environmental, and eco-
nomic sustainability. Business leaders will need to lead the transition to a new 
reality where we share everything more fairly and equally and where we live 
within the means of what this planet and its people have to offer. The extrac-
tive and exploitative system must make way for a new economic logic where 
we responsibly and purposefully lead our organizations to serve all stakehold-
ers, where we aim to create ecological and social value alongside economic 
value, and where we share the latter more fairly and equally. A system change 
is needed, geared to protecting the commons: the common resources that we 
share as a society. We need to actively protect these.
This idealism is realism. Perhaps we need to rethink fossil fuel with a nega-
tive price on the market since we all know that we need to end the fossil fuel 
economy. Perhaps we need to rethink the provision of subsidies by the 
International Monetary Fund to the fossil fuel industries of 5000 million 
USD a year (Coady et al. 2019). Perhaps we need to rethink the state support 
provided to airlines because these are some of the bigger contributors to CO2 
pollution. And perhaps we need to rethink the tax derogation to big internet 
platform companies, so that we can support wealth redistribution. Companies 
need to become part of the solution. It is time for the public and private sec-
tors to join forces and unite around the common purpose of assuming respon-
sibility. The Paris Climate Treaty helps set the objectives. This includes taking 
accountability for assisting vulnerable people and countries and to provide 
sustainable solutions for the current problems that are mere symptoms of 
much bigger—underlying—issues.
The business world needs to orient itself to addressing the big wicked prob-
lems society is now facing by aligning their missions, visions, ambitions, and 
strategies to contribute to their solutions. The execution will require innova-
tive business models. Business and performance management systems, tools, 
and methodologies will have to be reinvented to support a new way of defin-
ing, measuring, and managing business performance based on the three core 
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dimensions. The Sustainable Development Goals of the United Nations pro-
vide a compass for this. Instead of exclusion and polarization, Europe should 
focus on working with others beyond its borders, particularly with Africa, to 
strengthen a joint mission of international responsibility to eradicate poverty, 
protect the earth, and create inclusive wealth.
 Joining Forces to Create the New Common
A new generation of responsible leaders is already redefining the role of a cor-
poration in society. In 2019, the most powerful US corporate lobby, the 
Business Roundtable, jettisoned the “Friedman model.” The chief executives 
of 181 public companies pledged to care for the environment and create value 
for all their stakeholders (customers, employees, suppliers, and society) as well 
as distribute the created value more equally (to be fair is to share).
We see the societal impact of COVID-19 unfolding as demonstrations for 
social justice grip our world. The depth of the crisis could be either an obstacle 
or an accelerator. This crisis is therefore a litmus test to proof that the intent 
of corporations to creating shared value is real. There are concerns that put-
ting purpose before profit will fall by the wayside when economies are on the 
brink. However, a return to shareholder capitalism, as we know it, will be a 
colossal mistake and a missed opportunity to accelerate the transition to a 
new era, which we so desperately need.
No one can do this alone. We need governments, multi-lateral organiza-
tions, universities, non-governmental organizations, multinational corpora-
tions, and small and medium-sized enterprises to join forces. Amongst all of 
this, the COVID-19 crisis shows that we might need governments to take a 
more proactive and prominent role in changing the rules that help businesses 
to contribute to shared value for our societies. Three points are critical to 
achieving this:
 1. A reorientation of the role of the market as a regulator for the common 
good and general purpose. Inclusive capitalism needs to ensure we correct 
the flaws of shareholder capitalism and critically review the role of govern-
ments as regulators of critical public sectors, such as health care, energy, 
education, and public transportation.
 2. A transition to a strong European common, in which individual countries 
overcome their differences and join forces as we enter this new era. 
European countries have a special obligation and duty in this context and 
“Team Europe” has a unique obligation to play a leading role in shaping 
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the new common and filling the void, as this is the first time in modern 
history that the United States is not assuming a leading role on a global 
scale. Traditional European values, in which businesses, governments, and 
citizens are stakeholders seeking to balance interests (commonly known as 
the Rhineland model) is much needed in this transition.
 3. A conditionality of economic state support given to enterprises that ran 
into trouble due to COVID-19 to prevent supporting the status quo or 
return to the “old normal” but instead using such support to accelerate the 
transition to a new common guided by the Sustainable Development 
Goals and the Paris Climate Treaty.
 A Call for Responsible Leadership
With respect to corporations, there is a growing sense that profit and purpose 
can no longer exist in isolation: alignment will ensure success both now and 
in the future. Creating shared value is a moral imperative, but it has a strong 
business case too. An indication is the resilience of ethical investment funds 
with more than half of them outperforming their benchmark in March in the 
earlier stages of the coronavirus pandemic and attracting inflows despite the 
uncertainties.
Responsible leaders are accountable for more than just the short-term indi-
vidual financial results of their organizations or their short-term gains. They 
understand their obligation to help society protect the vulnerable. They take 
responsibility for the greater good in the longer term and preserve the planet 
for future generations. New leaders can learn from the COVID-19 crisis that 
there is a need to put the collective interest above the individual interest. To 
quote another Nobel Prize Winner, Nelson Mandela: “For to be free is (…) to 
live in a way that respects and enhances the freedom of others.”
The challenge for the leaders of today and tomorrow is to navigate the 
myriad of interests of the various stakeholders’ responsibly. Universities have 
a critical contribution to make in educating the next generation of leaders to 
critically reflect on the pressing issues that confront us all. Tilburg University 
has a starring role to play in producing the responsible leaders of tomorrow, 
who will purposely lead the acceleration to the new common.
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The Sciences During the New Common: 
A Missed Opportunity?
Maurits Kaptein
By Wednesday, July 22, 2020, the coronavirus had killed over 611,000 people 
and infected over 14 million globally (World Health Organization 2020). It 
devastated lives and will continue to do so for a long time to come; the eco-
nomic consequences of the pandemic are only just starting to materialize. 
This makes it a challenging time to write about the new common. However, 
we need to start somewhere. At some point, we need to reflect on our own 
roles, the roles of our institutions, the importance of our economy, and the 
future fabric of everyday life. Here I will discuss one minor—and compared 
to the current crisis seemingly inconsequential—aspect of the new common: 
I will discuss my worry that we are on the verge of missing the opportunity to 
properly (re-)define the role of the sciences as we move from our old to our 
new common.
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 What Is Science?
Many have discussed the role of the sciences during and after the current cri-
sis. Most scientists have been positive: the crisis has highlighted the impor-
tance of the sciences for policymaking, and the general audience is more and 
more relying on science to develop new solutions (Nature Methods Editorial 
Team 2020). However, despite this, I personally fear the current crisis is rein-
forcing a narrow view of the sciences that will hinder the scientific commu-
nity, and our society, in going forward. To clarify, I need a definition of the 
sciences, or simply an answer to the question “What is science?” This is admit-
tedly tricky. However, luckily, some of the giants of the sciences—Richard 
Feynman in this case—have provided an answer (Feynman 2009):
The word is usually used to mean one of three things… Science means, some-
times, a special method of finding things out. Sometimes it means the body of 
knowledge arising from the things found out. It may also mean the new things 
you can do when you have found something out.
Starting from the final meaning, yes, the current crisis has amplified our 
collective belief in the use of the sciences relating to the “new things we can 
do.” Our confidence that we will be able to develop a vaccine demonstrates 
this point (Yamey et al. 2020). Regarding the second meaning, the crisis has 
also amplified the role of the sciences in relationship to the knowledge it cre-
ates. Policymakers have en masse turned to the sciences for answers. How 
quickly will the virus spread? How can we stop the spread of the virus? How 
will the spread of the virus be affected if we open up our schools? All of these 
are questions that policymakers have asked scientists to answer (see, e.g., 
Gatto et al. 2020).
However, the first, and foremost, meaning of the word science as identified 
by Feynman seems not to have been reinforced during the current crises and, 
consequently, risks losing importance in the new common. As people turn to 
the sciences for answers and solutions, we run the risk of losing its value as a 
special method of finding things out.
Omission of this first-mentioned role of the sciences (a) poses a threat to 
the societal confidence in the sciences and (b) hinders the efficiency by which 
we find answers to important problems. The first consequence is easily moti-
vated: if we pretend science has the correct answer to every question—whereas 
in reality it only has uncertain answers or none at all—we easily damage the 
confidence of society in the sciences. Currently, this scenario seems to be 
unfolding in the case of hydroxychloroquine (Mehra et al. 2020, now 
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retracted). As the answers science is providing are understandably mixed, 
regretfully, the heated debate regarding its efficacy leaves the general popula-
tion with a diminished trust in the sciences as a whole.
The second consequence is less well understood or appreciated, even by 
some scientists. If we pretend the sciences have direct access to the truth, we 
ignore a large part of the sciences that has focused on finding out these truths 
to begin with. The honest answer scientists should give to many questions 
should be, “we don’t know, but we do know how to find out.” Such honesty 
will not only prevent a diminished trust in the sciences, it would also speed up 
and improve our decision-making. Allow me to illustrate.
 A Special Method of Finding Things Out
A recently fiercely debated question was “How will the spread of the virus be 
affected if we open up our schools?” We have settled for opening up our 
schools as the answer provided by the sciences was that the spread will only be 
affected in a limited way. The honest answer, however, is highly uncertain, as 
was, in this case, understood even by a large group of schoolteachers who 
argued against “being experimented upon.” These teachers understandably 
did not want to be part of the informal trial of finding out the effects of open-
ing up our schools (see, Kuiper 2020).
I say understandably here because I would side with the school teachers 
that they do not want to be part of an experiment. Or, more precisely, they 
should not want to be part of the current poorly designed experiment. The 
current experiment is poorly designed because we are opening up the schools 
in the whole country in one go, and we are simultaneously changing a myriad 
of other policies. Hence, no matter the outcome, we will never truly learn 
anything about the effects of opening up the schools as the only variable. Any 
observed effect could easily be attributed to other policy changes (or even 
simply to the passing of time). We are not really finding things out.
If we had not ignored our special methods of finding things out, we would 
have acted differently (see, e.g., Robbins 1952). We could easily have set up a 
much more controlled experiment in which some schools opened up and 
some did not: an experiment in which we carefully sampled these schools, and 
carefully administered the “treatment”; an experiment in which we carefully 
designed the outcome measure and monitored the effect of our intervention; 
by all means, simply an experiment that did not willfully ignore the “special 
method of finding things out.”
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 The Societal Value of Efficiently Finding 
Things Out
It is often argued that people do not want to be part of the experiment that I 
just described simply because they do not want to be experimented upon (ter 
Weijden 2020). People turn to the sciences for answers and facts, not for 
“ways of finding things out.” However, I think this is true only because scien-
tists fail to properly explain the value of efficiently finding things out, which, 
in the case of the COVID-19 policy, seems easy enough to do as, in reality, it 
is not just the opening of schools that we are poorly experimenting with. We 
are carrying out the same poorly designed experiments with a myriad of other 
policies. Conversely, a well-designed experiment would be greatly beneficial 
for all involved (see, e.g., Eckles and Kaptein 2019).
Assuming we all want to “open up” as much as possible, and further assum-
ing that each policy change takes 1 month before its effects are known, we are 
currently on the following path:
• Month 1: Total lockdown. The spread halts.
• Month 2: Make 6 policy changes that ease the restrictions simultaneously. 
The spread seems not to pick up.
• (Hypothetical) Month 3: Make 6 additional policy changes. The spread 
picks up again.
• (Hypothetical) Month 4: Reverse the last 6 changes. The spread 
decreases again.
• (Hypothetical) Month 5: re-instantiate 4 policies. The spread does 
not pick up.
• (Hypothetical) Month 6 and the beginning of winter: The spread picks up, 
and we have no clue which policy measure had which effect. Let us go to 
lockdown again.
In the end, we will have spent months in semi-lockdowns, having learned 
very little. Alternatively, we could have been on this path:
• Month 1: Total lockdown. The spread halts.
• Month 2: We carry out carefully designed experiments with varying poli-
cies in multiple, mutually comparable regions in the Netherlands (or 




• (Hypothetical) Month 3: We roll out the optimal policy according to our 
estimates.
This latter process saves months and brings us valuable knowledge. It safely 
opens up our society faster, at smaller costs. And, by the time winter hits, we 
would know exactly which policies to re-instate.1
I have no doubt that, given our ability to convince our whole society to stay 
indoors for months, we should be able to communicate the societal benefits 
of carrying out carefully designed experiments. This is especially true if we had 
not sold our current poorly designed experiment as the “the best decision 
based on the facts,” but if we had initiated the general public into this all too 
often overlooked use of the sciences: that of finding things out.
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Growing Up in Times of COVID-19: When 
a Window of Opportunity is Temporarily 
Closed
Loes Keijsers and Anne Bülow
In the spring of 2020, COVID-19 spread across the globe and many govern-
ments took restrictive measures to prevent a further spread. Even though ado-
lescents, here defined as youths aged 12–25 years, are not a high-risk group 
from an epidemiological viewpoint, school closures and social distancing 
measures had a tremendous impact on their daily lives. Adolescence is charac-
terized by opportunities for personal growth, for establishing friendships that 
last a lifetime, for falling in love for the very first time, and for learning how 
to cope with stress. Simultaneously, adolescents are vulnerable for psychologi-
cal problems, with approximately one out of five facing emotional problems, 
such as anxiety problems or depression (Kessler et al. 2005). In terms of social 
health, loneliness affects adolescents more than any other age group (Qualter 
et al. 2015). This chapter reflects on the psychological and social consequences 
of COVID-19 on adolescents while we are in the midst of the first wave. The 
aim is to provide concrete advice on how society, parents, and professionals 
can create optimal circumstances for promoting the growth of the next gen-
erations in a new common.
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 Attainment of Developmental Tasks
When the body is ripe, and society requires, and the self is ready to achieve a 
certain task, the teachable moment has come. (Havighurst 1948)
Adolescents mature by the accomplishment of developmental tasks, by societ-
ies’ predefined stepping stones (Havighurst 1948). These tasks include form-
ing friendships and romantic relationships, achieving independence from 
parents, rituals of entry into adulthood (e.g., graduation), and selecting and 
preparing for an occupation. Society as a whole and also parents and adoles-
cents themselves have a timetable of expectations regarding when a child 
should be able to accomplish these tasks (Dekovic et al. 1997). For instance, 
15 year olds should be able to maintain friendships and solve a conflict on 
their own. Being “on schedule” provides youths with a sense of pride and 
meaning in life and is related to emotional well-being. Delay on the other 
hand, comes with a price of increased psychological problems and lower self-
esteem (Seiffge-Krenke and Gelhaar 2008). Hence, even in times of a crisis, 
society, educators, and parents need to allow for these critical maturation tasks 
to be attained at the right moment.
 Social Deprivation
As any other human being, adolescents have a fundamental need to belong, 
that is, to form and maintain high-quality, intimate, and stable relationships 
with others (Baumeister and Leary 1995). Whereas adults typically rely on 
their romantic partners for comfort, intimacy, and understanding, close 
friends play this pivotal role in the lives of teens (De Goede et al. 2009). In 
the context of close friendships, adolescents develop a set of social skills 
needed to function later in life, such as keeping promises, solving conflicts, 
and disclosing secrets (Frijns et al. 2013). Through the exploration of sexual-
ity and romance with age-mates adolescents, they gradually learn how to 
engage in intimate relationships that are pleasant and long-lasting (van de 
Bongardt 2019). Moreover, in the ongoing search for the self, conversations 
with friends help an adolescent to form a stable identity (Reis and Youniss 
2004). Friendships, in sum, are not only a source of great joy in adolescents’ 
lives, they are fundamental for learning how to cope with stress, how to main-
tain relationships, and form the basis for future growth and maturation.
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During the COVID-19 outbreak in 2020, we assessed how the lockdown 
had affected friendships as part of the ADAPT project (Keijsers et al. 2017). 
Among 178 Dutch middle adolescents (age = 14.25 (SD = 1.63), 31% boys), 
we observed strong declines in time spent with friends, from 8 hours of face- 
to- face contact during weekdays before the lockdown to 2 hours after and, 
during weekend days, from 6.5 to 2 hours. Adolescents rapidly adapted to the 
new situation, as online contact with friends increased from 3 hours/day to 
5.5 hours. Although this online communication may compensate for some of 
the negative effects of the sharp decrease in face-to-face contacts (Orben et al. 
2020), it is still likely that adolescents missed important opportunities to 
obtain support and comfort from friends and romantic partners, in circum-
stances when these social resources were needed most. Social deprivation may 
also have affected their well-being. A rapid systematic review highlighted that 
30–50% of the adolescents aged 12–24 were lonely during the COVID-19 
lockdown (Loades et al. 2020). Feelings of loneliness may increase the risk of 
developing mental health problems especially when they last longer (Qualter 
et al. 2015; van Roekel et al. 2013). For this reason, scholars have warned of 
a steep increase in mental health problems in the upcoming period, including 
anxiety and depression (Golberstein et al. 2020; Loades et al. 2020).
 Independence from Parents
Parents play a pivotal role in helping adolescents to become adults who are 
resilient to stress and who function adaptively in society. During adolescence, 
families are challenged by the increasing developmental need of adolescents to 
decide things for themselves. Conflicts can easily emerge on topics such as 
tidying the bedroom, spending time on social media, or adhering to curfews. 
These negative interactions are in fact helpful in pushing the parent–child 
relationship from a hierarchically structured relationship in which the parent 
has the final say to a more horizontally structured relationship with the more 
democratic decision-making (Branje et al. 2011). Hence, developmental 
growth and maturation take place when parents release control and trust their 
children to make wise decisions on their own (Keijsers and Poulin 2013).
In the ADAPT project (Keijsers et al. 2017), we observed the opposite 
change pattern. During the lockdown, instead of releasing control, parents 
became more protective and controlling. New rules were established by par-
ents, mostly to reinforce governmental rules of hygiene and social distancing, 
such as not being allowed to see friends. Parents also introduced rules to struc-
ture the lives of their children, such as doing homework and getting up in 
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time. Longitudinal analyses of eight repeated assessments indeed revealed a 
significant decrease in autonomy-supportive parenting during the lockdown 
(Bülow et al. 2020). As prohibition of contacts with friends and restriction of 
autonomy directly undermine the opportunities for growth, we anticipated a 
rise in conflicts and opposition (Van Petegem et al. 2017). However, this was 
only found for some families. Apparently, most parents manage to introduce 
and explain rules in a democratic way, and children find most of the novel 
rules legitimate. In fact, in some families, the increase in time spent together 
may have created opportunities to reinforce the relationship and improve 
communication (Keijsers et al. 2010). On the other hand, stress due to health 
or financial concerns may also trigger the use of a repressive parenting strat-
egy, including guilt induction and love withdrawal (Van Der Kaap-Deeder 
et al. 2019). Such psychological control may impede on maturation processes 
and lead to internalizing problems, such as depressive feelings or anxiety, 
among adolescents. C’est la ton qui fait la musique when it comes to finding 
the balance between protection and promoting independence.
 Promoting Developmental Growth 
in the New Common
Adolescents are in the midst of establishing an important foundation for 
developmental growth and future well-being. Adolescents need friendships, 
independence from parents, and rituals that mark the entry to adulthood and 
new phases in life, such as graduation ceremonies. The COVID-19 situation 
has strongly affected each of these domains. One can never truly predict how 
an individual’s life course is affected by such a temporary situational change. 
In general, most adolescents will probably be resilient, and negative experi-
ences and a short-term reduction in well-being do not doom them to an adult 
life full of ill-being and psychosocial problems (Cicchetti and Rogosch 2002). 
Likewise, adolescents who are resilient during this stressful period cannot 
comfortable rely on a problem-free future. The longer-term impact can only 
be derived from rigorous future scientific studies on adolescents. However, 
this should not prevent society from creating optimal circumstances for 
growth while we are still in the midst of the crisis.
First of all, as they are vulnerable to psychological problems, it is of pivotal 
importance to monitor and support adolescents. The current COVID-19 
situation is one of many changes for adolescents. Social distancing under-
mines social support of their most intimate companions, which may lead to 
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loneliness and decreased well-being. Accessible tools and informal and low-
key professional guidance are needed to prevent psychosocial problems, such 
as depression (Golberstein et al. 2020). Examples include eHealth tools that 
challenge adolescents to cope with stress, such as our recently released Grow 
It! application (Hillegers et al. 2020).
Second, face-to-face contact with friends is not a luxury for adolescents; it 
is a developmental need. Social media is a blessing for adolescents, but it can-
not compensate for the richness of learning experiences and support that face-
to- face interactions provide. Third, during the lockdown measures, adolescents’ 
potential for growth and resilience was hindered because parents had to 
restrict opportunities for independent decision-making. In sum, in the new 
common, parents, teachers, and professionals should protect adolescents only 
when needed and allow for autonomy, independent decision-making, and 
contact with their friends whenever possible. Even when society is locked 
down, the window of opportunity for growth needs to be open for adoles-
cents. After all, if adults support youngster in acquiring social skills and per-
sonal resources during a formative period in life, the next generation will be 
better able to cope with stress and societal changes to come.
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To Solve the Coronavirus Crisis: Click Here
Esther Keymolen
Human beings are technical beings. From the clothes we wear to the space-
ships we fire into the sky, all these technologies are developed with the aim to 
protect ourselves, improve ourselves, and control the fickle world in which we 
live. Therefore, it should not come as a surprise that when hit with one of the 
biggest health crises of the last century, all over the world, governments have 
turned to technology to contain this life-threatening event. Most of these 
proposed—or already developed—technological solutions are data-driven: 
contact-tracing apps to establish with whom an infected person interacted, 
apps to provide proof that someone is not ill and can therefore access a build-
ing or public transport, facial recognition to identify people in the street or to 
check whether they are effectively quarantined, etc.
Just as the turn to technology to solve this crisis does not come as a surprise, 
neither does the protest it has caused. Critical citizens and civil rights organi-
zations worry about the possibility of personal data being shared with private 
parties, about governments ending up using the collected information against 
citizens, and they fear an overall loss of privacy and freedom if these applica-
tions became widely used. Overall, they suspect that what is introduced as a 
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temporary instrument to counter this crisis will have long-lasting effects on 
society.
In the Netherlands, the Prime Minister and the Minister of Health tried to 
calm things down by stating that they “did not suddenly pick up a new hobby 
and were definitely not interested in finding out individual citizens’ where-
abouts.” Moreover, they assured that sufficient checks and balances would be 
implemented, applications developed and tested before the public eye in an 
“appaton,” and—naturally—the end result would be GDPR proof.
The underlying assumption of this line of defense is that the technology 
itself is not a matter of big concern as long as it is properly embedded in the 
social, technical, and economic context. Of course, we have to make sure that 
sufficient democratic safeguards are set in place, oversight is taken care of, and 
all legal requirements are abided by; then we would be fine. Or not?
In 1980, political philosopher Langdon Winner (1980) wrote a—now—
famous and foundational book chapter and article called “Do artifacts have 
politics?” In this work, he argues that technologies are not just neutral objects 
being kept in check by the socio-technical context in which they function but 
that they are also politically significant in their own right. In a powerful man-
ner, technologies can transform human aspirations, Winner claims. Therefore, 
they deserve our specific attention. It is not sufficient to only look at the con-
text in which a technology is embedded or to count on good intentions, as the 
Dutch Prime Minister seems to suggest. We should also closely analyze the 
political qualities of the technology itself. In other words, we have to lay bare 
how technologies can steer the societal arrangements of power and control as 
well as how they impact the interactions that take place within these 
arrangements.
Whereas almost half a century ago, Winner predominantly focused on the 
political power of large energy systems such as nuclear plants, solar panels, 
and flood-control dams, I found his seminal work to still be extremely useful 
to grasp the political challenges we face when introducing data-driven solu-
tions in times of crisis.
 Settling Societal Issues Through Technology
By and large, Winner distinguishes two ways in which technologies can have 
political qualities. The first way is rather straightforward. A technology can be 
used to settle a certain societal problem. For instance, the COVID-19 contact- 
tracing app is promoted as a way to quickly inform people who might be at 
risk of having caught the virus. However, this is not necessarily the only goal 
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such an app could serve. One can also think of other uses, which are not com-
municated to the public but are, nevertheless, intentionally being built into 
the technology. It has been suggested that malicious companies could design 
a hidden backdoor into the app in order to collect and then monetize data. 
Also, theories of governments spying on their citizens or merely introducing 
the app to save on health costs have been voiced. These examples all presup-
pose a malicious actor who intentionally makes use of the design of a technol-
ogy to pull the strings without people noticing. The technology, like a Trojan 
horse, disguises the political intervention taking place.
Some may think the idea of a malicious actor intentionally hijacking a 
coronavirus app is too far-fetched. For Winner, bad intentions are not a nec-
essary condition for technologies to possess political properties. Actually, 
more often, technology has unintended political consequences. For instance, 
people might become overly confident because of the mere presence of the 
app and no longer strictly follow the social distancing rules. The app then 
ends up doing more harm than good. Or, in the long run, the app might be 
an enormous boost for e-health, leading care insurers to push for all kinds of 
new data-driven solutions, cutting back on financial compensation for face- 
to- face interactions. 50 years from now, historians might trace the start of 
their completely data-driven health care system back to the COVID-19 solu-
tions that are now being introduced globally.
Whether or not you think this is a future worth wanting, it certainly illus-
trates that technologies can have far-reaching, political consequences without 
anyone intentionally introducing the technology with such goals in mind. 
Depending on one’s position in society, the power to influence the course of 
a technological innovation, to domesticate it, avoid it, or completely hack it 
will differ. Especially in the first phase, when the technology is still the most 
moldable, decisions will be made that will materialize and become fixed in the 
technology itself and in the practices that it will mediate, now and in the 
future. Keeping this technological perseverance in mind, we should not leave 
it to companies, individual data scientists, or politicians only to decide on the 
design and functionality of such impactful data-driven solutions.
 Inherently Political Technologies
Whereas the previous examples illustrate how the design of a technology—
both intentionally and unintentionally—can influence and steer power and 
control in society, it also becomes clear that its political impact is not inherent 
to the technology as such. For instance, if we acknowledge that the 
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digitalization of health might have negative effects on our overall health care 
system, we can adjust it.
Winner claims, however, that there is a second category of technologies 
that lacks this kind of flexibility and is actually inherently political. With that, 
he means that to choose for a certain technology is to also choose for a par-
ticular form of political life. In order to function properly, some technologies 
require a social setting to be organized in a very specific way. For instance, to 
choose for nuclear energy is to choose for a highly controlled and hierarchical 
organization as the security risks of such a technology are extremely high. Or, 
in the case of the contact-tracing app, to choose for an app is to choose for a 
public of smartphone owners. As a result, elderly people, poor people, and 
people who on ideological grounds refuse to have a smartphone might be 
overlooked and excluded, missing out on vital information or early diagnosis 
and treatment because all health systems become geared towards the function-
ing of the app.
It is also choosing for an infrastructure controlled by private companies. In 
order for the tracing app to function properly, it is claimed that we need to 
work with the decentralized Bluetooth infrastructure released by Apple and 
Google. At first sight, this might look like a mere technicality—if these com-
panies enable an interoperable infrastructure, which will make the app func-
tional; that would be great! However, it actually also entails an enormous 
power shift in favor of two of the most powerful tech companies in the world. 
For example, it would push citizens to choose for their devices if they wanted 
to make use of the app. It would also open the door for these companies to 
shape public health care policies and steer the political agenda (Sharon 2020). 
Even without breaching individual privacy, these companies would be able to 
gain valuable insights in the way communities go about their everyday lives 
(Veale 2020).
It is certainly not easy to detect the inherent political aspects of a technol-
ogy. Indeed, because these infrastructural choices are framed as mere practical 
issues, in-depth democratic debate and control are lacking. In order words, to 
choose for this tracing app is to choose for accepting an infrastructure that is 
completely in the hands of two US-based tech giants who have interests and 
key values that do not necessarily align with those of a democratic society.
In times of crisis, it comes almost natural to policy-makers to turn to tech-
nology to help them govern a new and complex situation. However, technol-
ogy is not a neutral instrument and can impose all kinds of values and 
restrictions on society. What we can learn from Winner is that, while we 
might think that we are developing technological tools to control this crisis, 
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we are actually building the political life of our post-corona society: the politi-
cal life of our new common.
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The Comeback of the Old Theological 
Narratives During the Coronavirus Crisis: 
A Critical Reflection
Jan Loffeld
Martin Luther had no doubt about it: diseases were a punishment from God. 
In espousing this view, Luther, who was one of the first people to translate the 
Bible from Greek into another language, stood on firm biblical grounds. For 
the Semitic people of the biblical world, this causal connection had been self- 
evident as well. Diseases, plagues, catastrophes were the consequences of the 
sin that people commit. Human beings themselves—Adam and Eve—intro-
duced evil into creation, which was good in itself before, and they must bear 
the consequences. According to the doctrine of original sin, as it was later 
refined after this so-called “Fall of Man,” human beings are even born into a 
primeval state of guilt that is propagated from generation to generation, and 
from which they cannot liberate themselves. For Paul, in his letter to the 
Romans, this notion underlay the redemption, which he envisaged as being 
universal: sin is all-encompassing and so is the liberation from servitude that 
God works in Jesus Christ. Ultimately, the intuition that evil is the result of 
sin is the basis for the adage that adversity causes people to pray: sooner or 
later, human beings will be confronted with the contingency of their own 
lives, which, in the Christian perspective, is rooted in the fact that creation has 
fallen into sin. This is why the idea that adversity causes people to pray is often 
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trotted out in times of crisis even though it has long been empirically dis-
proven (Heuft 2017).
 The Nature of Redemption
The question of the nature of redemption was so important around the time 
of the Reformation that it sparked off a global schism. Salvation or damna-
tion, being included among or excluded from the elect, and the distinction 
between “good and evil”—these have long been important questions in the 
history of Christianity. Religion served to bring clarity and certainty to these 
questions. Ultimately, what was at stake was the question how religion gives 
meaning to the fact that human life escapes control or manipulation, i.e., is 
“unavailable” and contingent.
But there are at least two things that cast doubt upon the clarity offered by 
religion. First of all, there is a biblical issue: Jesus tells his disciples the story of 
eighteen people who died when a tower collapsed upon them and then pro-
vocatively asks them, “Do you suppose that these Galileans were worse sinners 
than any others?” (Lk 13: 4). Secondly, the Lisbon earthquake of the eigh-
teenth century was the event that gave rise, historically, to the theodicy, which 
questioned beliefs hitherto regarded as plausible. Thousands of innocent peo-
ple perished gruesomely due to a seemingly interminable city fire; only the 
red-light district escaped. Here, finally, the causality of a God who punishes 
justly, who rewards the good and damns the wicked floundered. There was 
empirical evidence here that the Christian causal link between the human act 
and historical occurrence was epistemically flawed.
 The Mystery of Evil
In modernity, this was one of the reasons for the emergence of a new theologi-
cal model of thinking. Human beings have become emancipated before God, 
yet they remain prone to guilt, and phenomenologically, guilt has not disap-
peared from the world. It still requires an explanation that can also function 
without reference to God. Karl Rahner (1984) articulated this in his 
Foundations of Christian Faith as “the fact that people are always under threat 
from themselves.” To use a classical expression: human beings, in one way or 
another, become wolves to themselves: if we accept the idea of God, this is 
because original sin is still at work in them; if we do not, it is because “radical 
evil” (Kant 1792) cannot be explained or eradicated even with the use of 
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reason. Rahner (1984) called this the “mystery of evil.” Whereas previously, 
evil in the form of epidemics or natural catastrophe could be explained as 
resulting from the fact that human beings—creation in its entirety—had 
brought original sin upon themselves by sinning against God, now, human 
beings themselves, without explicit reference to God, have become the authors 
of punishment for wrongdoing. Other factors are personified: “Nature strikes 
back!” or “Climate change is the way nature takes revenge for exploitative 
modern life.” The theodicy has been transformed into an anthropodicy: the 
question why people can be the cause of evil.
It is, or was, interesting to see during the coronavirus crisis how these old 
interpretative patterns or narratives returned as human beings were con-
fronted with the hitherto unimagined intrusion of human vulnerability or 
contingency. To give just two examples: the Dutch newspaper Reformatorisch 
Dagblad wrote in early March 2020 that the expansion of the coronavirus 
threat into a true pandemic was due to “the government of God”: “Christians 
confess that illness and health do not happen to them by coincidence. […] 
The coronavirus is only a secondary cause, a means in the hands of God. He 
sends disease like once He sent the plagues to Egypt to bring humankind to 
repentance.”1
Almost at the same time, the Brazilian liberation theologian Leonardo Boff 
published an article entitled “The Origins of the Coronavirus.” The opening 
words were: “From this moment on we have everything to fear, even the 
destruction of the human race; this would be the just price for our foolishness 
and barbarity.” This idea is premised upon the “Gaia hypothesis” which rep-
resents “Mother Earth” as a “self-regulating superorganism, as a living being, 
that is able to feel, think, love and care for itself.”2 It is no longer God but the 
Earth who punishes. Both interpretations thus use personifications as the 
metaphor, and both, in equal measure, believe that the guilt lies with human 
beings, who receive just punishment.
The theological legitimacy of both interpretations has been and still is sub-
ject to heated debate. However, it is important to ask a different question 
here: does an old “grand narrative”—that is what Christianity undoubtedly is 
in Europe—really do itself any favors in an increasingly secularizing society by 
using an old “little narrative” to explain and give meaning to human life? To 
put it differently: does Christianity truly do justice to its fundamental mission 
to speak of the God of Life by advancing such interpretations?
1 Cf. on this: https://www.rd.nl/opinie/commentaar/niet-corona-heerst-maar-god-regeert-1.1638981 
(10 June 2020).
2 Cf. on this: https://www.tagesanzeiger.ch/leben/gesellschaft/der-gerechte-preis-fuer-unsere- grausamkeit/
story/29234175 (10 June 2020).
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This question arises from the underlying impression that the return of these 
old narratives, specifically in times of crisis, is primarily fed by resentment. 
The Indian cultural scholar Pankaj Mishra has recently pointed out in a pro-
found analysis how strongly human actions in general, as well as develop-
ments in cultural history, spring from a feeling of resentment, i.e., the specific 
feeling of having been short-changed:
An existential resentment concerning the being of other people, provoked by an 
intense mixture of envy and the feeling of humiliation and impotence; a resent-
ment that is always there and is ever increasing, that is poisoning civil society 
and undermining political freedom, and that is currently bringing about a turn 
to authoritarianism and dangerous forms of chauvinism across the globe (Mishra 
2017: 25).
This argument, which Mishra develops very broadly and highly plausibly, 
can also be applied to aspects of current religious life. For Christians, it can 
lead to the belief that Christianity’s deepest wound in modernity is its loss of 
the monopoly on interpreting human life and its fate. It continues to be a 
challenge for Christians to truly respect the autonomy of the world, and at the 
same time, to believe that the world has not been abandoned to its own fate. 
When the old narratives are repeated, it is often forgotten how dark the image 
of God is (a punishing God, or a God who deistically abandons creation to its 
own fate) and how crude the anthropology that these old narratives convey. 
Moreover, the notion that adversity teaches people to pray is based upon a 
functional understanding of religion, which runs the risk of turning God into 
an idol for personal desires and needs, only to be jettisoned again when it is 
no longer required.
 Human Unavailability
An alternative for these resentment-based coping strategies is an understand-
ing of Christianity as an option for interpreting the world. This option is then 
also presented as such in the market of worldviews. The German sociologist 
Hartmut Rosa (2019) has shown in his latest book Unverfügbarkeit 
(Unavailability) how this can be done in a way that could appeal to contem-
porary culture. This volume, published in 2019, directly engages those experi-
ences of vulnerability that modern societies going through the coronavirus 
crisis must existentially process. Rosa regards the attempt to render the world 
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universally “available” through modernity as failed and argues by contrast for 
the “acceptance of the unavailable.”
It is perhaps no coincidence that the concept of unavailability originally derives 
from a theological context. Theology uses it to express a foundational element 
of the human relationship to the world, which continues to be of sociological 
and philosophical, as well as psychological interest, even if all theological or 
metaphysical assumptions about the essence of God (or even about whether 
there is any essence of God at all) are rejected. […] In my lay opinion, the core 
of the Jewish-Christian image of God consists entirely of a resonance-theoretical 
representation: even if God […] is thought as fundamentally unavailable, the 
relationship between God and humankind is nevertheless conceived as one of 
mutual accessibility-for-relatedness: […] responsivity here means […], so to 
speak, a hearing, attentive interrelatedness, which has a transformative power, 
but at the same time respects both sides’ ‘own voice’ and ability to answer: 
whether resonance arises, and what its outcome is going to be remains unavail-
ably undetermined. In my view this conception underlies the practice of prayer 
[…] (Rosa, 67f.).
This alternative interpretation of contingency or human unavailability, 
which even modernity cannot wipe out, piques our theological attention spe-
cifically during the coronavirus crisis. Christianity has an option to offer: a 
God whose image has been liberated from the constraints of functionality and 
from a dark anthropology and theology; an option that can help to process 
human unavailability—but without any coercion and freed from universal 
claims (such as that the world has fallen in sin) that are, in any case, no longer 
plausible in secular cultures. Christian theology can reflect on what it means 
to see the world etsi Deus daretur (“as if there were a God”), and pastoral 
ministry can offer the related practice. But this must not be communicated to 
all people by any possible means, to avoid overwhelming their free will. It will 
free us from feelings of superiority (including those of a fundamentalist 
nature) and will possibly give rise to new pastoral creativity, which has in fact 
already been evident during the coronavirus crisis. Therefore, this way of deal-
ing with human contingency can during times of crisis as well as during ordi-
nary times, do greater justice to both Christian self-understanding and the 
just principles of liberty that rule modern societies than the reassertion of 
older, often resentment-based narratives can. It would be appropriate if this 
were also to become the “new common” in theological reflection and teaching.
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20
Rethinking Education in a Crisis: How New 
Is a New Common Really?
Max Louwerse, Marie Postma, Maarten Horden, 
and Anton Sluijtman
The COVID-19 pandemic has disrupted the status quo in many areas of soci-
ety, including education. At all educational levels, on-site lecturing had to 
switch instantaneously to an online mode of instruction. This transition was 
so straightforward, that the argument could be made for online education to 
become a permanent fixture, particularly if it is more efficient, cheaper, and 
more effective than traditional education. Extensive meta-analyses, however, 
show that most online teaching practices do not lead to better educational 
outcomes than the on-site alternatives. Worse yet, the traditional face-to-face 
mode of lecturing is ineffective in the absence of personalized interactions. 
The proposed solutions are offered by artificial intelligence research, including 
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virtual reality, intelligent tutoring systems, and serious games—solutions that 
have so far not been extensively implemented in practice. The current health 
crisis provides our educational professionals with an opportunity to rethink 
their teaching practices and focus on applying these promising new alternatives.
In the months during which the COVID-19 pandemic dramatically 
affected the lives of many around the globe, society at large tried to find ways 
to adapt to the new circumstances. One sector of society, i.e., education, 
transformed almost instantaneously. From 1 day to the next, the usually 
vibrant sites of primary, secondary, and higher education emptied, and all 
educational activities switched to online. While the shift to online education 
has been challenging in many ways, the fact that the change could be effectu-
ated so rapidly and, in general, quite successfully raises the inevitable question 
whether online education should not become an integral part of the way chil-
dren, students, and adults receive formal education—a new common.
One of the very few benefits of a crisis like COVID-19 is that it forces 
society to rethink aspects and processes that are traditionally resistant to 
change. Education is one such aspect. Due to the pandemic, millions of stu-
dents had to be taught differently than before, and the disruption yielded the 
question what education actually entails. If lectures in which information is 
transferred can easily be offered online, is there any advantage to being an 
audience in a lecture hall compared to being an audience in front of a com-
puter screen? If the difference is negligible, then the practical advantages of 
the new (digital) reality may outweigh any disadvantages. For example, online 
courses can be recorded once and used again, thereby freeing time for tailored 
lecturer–student interactions. Remote contact may feel less personal, yet, for 
the same reason, contact may be established easier by students who otherwise 
feel too timid to approach the lecturer after class. Since students do not need 
to travel to attend a lecture, participation barriers are removed for students 
residing at a distance from the campus. Given these advantages of online edu-
cation, should online education become the new common, and if so, what is 
the best online education?
 The “Old” Common
Universally, physical lectures are by far the most commonly used form of 
knowledge transfer. As Bligh (1998) points out, despite the many research 
findings in educational psychology disputing the traditional teaching format 
and the developments in educational technology, there has been little change 
in the way people are taught around the globe. This is true not only for chil-
dren but also for adults in the context of life-long learning. In fact, as 
 M. Louwerse et al.
139
demonstrated by old Roman reliefs and paintings originating in the Middle 
Ages throughout human history, becoming educated tended to be synony-
mous with being lectured. Despite Enlightenment and the Industrial 
Revolution, and with the digital society rapidly changing our interactions 
with the world and each other, the status quo of education has been remark-
ably resistant to change. This would be understandable if the common form 
of being educated were superior to any of its alternatives. That, however, is 
hardly the case.
Based on an extensive review of educational practices, Bligh (1998) con-
cludes that lectures offer little promise in inspiring thought or attitude 
changes. In another extensive meta-study, Hattie (2015) evaluated some 1200 
peer-reviewed meta-analyses on student achievement and reported 256 vari-
ables that affected student achievement positively or negatively. Unsurprisingly, 
student-dependent variables were the greatest source of variance in learning, 
and variables such as ADHD, deafness, and depression affected achievement 
negatively. The second most important source of variation, however, were 
teacher-dependent variables. As Hattie noted, most educators were them-
selves successful as students in the classical classroom setting and may thus 
belief that the setting provides optimal conditions for learning if the students 
apply themselves. Yet, it is the educators’ awareness of how to achieve impact 
in a teaching situation and their willingness to change and adapt that are the 
most important contributing factors to the learning success of their students. 
According to Hattie, the question we need to ask ourselves is not “What 
works?” but, rather, “What works best?”
The conclusion Hattie (2015) draws is echoed in the meta-analysis of 
Schneider and Preckel (2017). They observed that most teaching practices 
may give rise to positive effect sizes with regards to learning achievement, but 
some have considerably larger effect sizes than others. In other words, if we are 
striving for excellence, not every teaching method goes. In practice, evaluating 
what works best may be difficult as it depends on the comparisons being made 
as well as on the type of education being looked at. For instance, universities 
are more selective than primary or high schools, so it is likely that the average 
university student population consists of highly motivated individuals. 
University students also have more experience with classical formal education. 
According to Schneider and Preckel’s analysis, however, also for these stu-
dents, there is a clear advantage of tailored interaction. Encouraging frequent 
class participation, stimulating questions and discussion, and asking open- 
ended questions tend to improve the instructional quality of courses. Ironically, 
the ambition to provide high-quality university education to ever-growing 
numbers of students has resulted in overcrowded lecture halls and a dramatic 
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decrease in the opportunity to interact and to stimulate questions and discus-
sion, thus rendering the traditional mode of knowledge transfer ineffective.
 The “New” Common
When the COVID-19 pandemic hit societies across the world, on-site lec-
tures transformed into online interactions. The transformation was necessary 
and seemed to work well given the unprecedented circumstances. According 
to Schneider and Preckel (2017), online education in general seems to be a 
decent substitute for on-site education. Online learning turns out to be almost 
as effective as learning in the classroom. If student achievement in online 
education is on par with on-site education, it would be wise to invest in online 
lectures and podcasts, massive open online courses (MOOCs), and online 
learning platforms not only during a COVID-19 crisis but also beyond.
However, studies focusing on the comparison between online and face-to- 
face courses come to a different conclusion. Xu and Jaggars (2014) analyzed 
the data from half a million courses taken by over 40,000 community and 
technical college students and found lower overall grades in the online sec-
tions of the same course compared to the face-to-face sections. Moreover, 
males, younger students, black students, and students with lower grade point 
averages yielded the strongest declines, suggesting a performance gap between 
online and face-to-face modes of interaction. An extensive analysis of MOOCs 
by Reich and Ruipérez-Valiente (2019) used the data from MIT and Harvard 
MOOCs, including 565 course iterations from 261 different courses, with 
12.67 million registrations. The dropout rate was 96% on average over a 
period of 5 years. Of course, it can be argued that completion rates are not the 
goal. It may be the case that enrolled students are merely curious and then 
drop out. That in itself would be an interesting finding, but Reich and 
Ruipérez-Valiente (2019) noted that course completion remained relatively 
low even among students who pay for courses, and, interestingly, they observed 
similar differences across types of students as Xu and Jaggars (2014). Arguably, 
the negative effects of online teaching could partly be alleviated if online edu-
cation is combined with on-site education in blended learning, but this step 
would only be successful if we can avoid the problem of large classrooms and 
little personalized student–lecturer interaction in the first place.
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 AI in Education
If there were no alternatives to the two scenarios described above, we might be 
justified in concluding that the traditional mode of lecturing, while not ideal, 
is the best we can do. Yet the alternatives are there, and their effects on student 
achievement are promising. In particular, games in virtual reality and interac-
tive virtual reality simulations of real-world processes have a positive impact 
on student performance that is considerably higher than online education 
(Hattie 2015; Schneider and Preckel 2017). A meta-analysis of studies on the 
effectiveness of virtual reality-based instruction on students’ learning out-
comes in K-12 and higher education showed that games, simulations, and 
virtual worlds were all effective in improving learning gains. Even though it is 
true that these technologies involve starting costs in software development, 
computer hardware, and instructional time, the scalability of the solutions is 
likely to outweigh the investments needed.
What could a new common in education consist of? Louwerse et al. (2020) 
argue that immersive education could consist of virtual reality in which the 
content of education is brought closer to the learner and vice versa. It could 
consist of serious games that allow for bringing together excitement and learn-
ing, for instance by exploring past times through the (virtual) eyes of those 
who lived during those times. It could consist of intelligent tutoring systems 
that provide personalized education 24/7, for instance by a computer having 
a conversation with a student in natural language (Graesser et al. 2004). It 
could consist of utilizing learner analytics, by measuring student progress, not 
after the educational process but during the process itself, intervening when 
intervention is most needed.
Tilburg University has been involved in a number of projects that investi-
gate innovative educational technologies. For instance, on campus, the DAF 
Technology Lab offers a Cave Automatic Virtual Environment (CAVE) sys-
tem that provides immersive education to students. In one of the experiments 
we conducted, we investigated learning gains in a neuroscience class presented 
in virtual reality, whereby students were asked in the CAVE system to link 
brain structures to their labels, their functions, and the brain locations. The 
findings demonstrated that students yielded higher learning gains in the vir-
tual reality environment than in traditional educational settings, such as text-
book learning. This experiment was conducted using both a college subject 
pool population and a group of students in a cognitive science course that 
involved a neuroscience class (de Back et al. 2020). In addition, the research 
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in the DAF Technology Lab has shown how to measure neurophysiological 
data that cue learning in students (Tinga et al. 2019).
In another project, we collaborate with the non-profit organization 
SpaceBuzz to create ambassadors of planet Earth. The result of the collabora-
tion is an innovative educational program aimed at introducing primary 
school education to the subjects of science and technology in the context of 
sustainability in a way that is playful and easy to learn. The program has been 
developed in line with the career path of a real astronaut. It consists of a pre- 
flight astronaut training, involving a variety of activities and lessons in the 
classroom that prepare children for their journey into space. After the chil-
dren pass the pre-flight astronaut training, a 15-m long rocket arrives at the 
school to virtually launch the children into orbit. When the children sit down 
in the rocket and put the virtual reality headsets on, their chairs move hydrau-
lically and the rocket is launched into space under the guidance of a virtual 
reality embodiment of an actual astronaut. Finally, in a post-flight training at 
the children’s school, the children give press conferences to friends and family 
and tell them about their experiences in space. An experiment with some 200 
children from elementary schools has shown that learning gains ensued from 
the SpaceBuzz virtual reality experience and could be predicted through neu-
rophysiology, specifically eye gaze (van Limpt-Broers et al. 2020).
 Conclusion
The COVID-19 pandemic has hit all aspects of society, including education. 
It has also provided us with an opportunity to rethink education, if not dur-
ing the crisis itself, at least beyond the crisis. Extensive analyses in the educa-
tional psychology literature have shown that traditional forms of education 
are only effective if combined with small-scale, interactive, and tailored modes 
of instruction that are hardly achievable in the current educational landscape. 
Online education as such does not provide a viable alternative. In our view, 
the solution lies in the implementation of innovative solutions, such as those 
developed by our team at Tilburg University, in the DAF Technology Lab, 
and by SpaceBuzz. These educational solutions offer exciting new avenues of 
investigating what a new common really should consist of.
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21
Involve Residents to Ensure Person-
Centered Nursing Home Care During Crises 
Like the COVID-19 Outbreak
Katrien Luijkx, Meriam Janssen, Annerieke Stoop, 
Leonieke van Boekel, and Marjolein Verbiest
In the Netherlands, nursing homes provide residential and long-term com-
plex care to older adults with impairments in different health domains. The 
life expectancy of nursing home residents is rather limited in general. For a 
few decades now, autonomy, well-being, and quality of life are increasingly 
being recognized as important in nursing home care, and the exclusive focus 
on enhancing safety, health, and longevity is no longer dominant. Although a 
medical perspective is still present in nursing homes because many residents 
need some form of medical care, the person-centered care (PCC) model is 
gradually being adopted in nursing home practice (Koren 2010). PCC aims 
to facilitate residents in living the life they desire and in being recognized as 
unique individuals with their own histories, life goals, and preferences 
(McCormack 2001). The various voices of residents need to be heard, and 
tailored care is essential but challenging for professional caregivers because of 
different individuals living in a group. Therefore, nursing homes struggle to 
bring PCC into practice although they embrace the idea.
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 Nursing Home Lockdown
Nursing homes have been hit hard by COVID-19. Registration data show 
that, in the period from March 18 until May 13, 38% of the suspicions of 
COVID-19 infections in nursing homes were confirmed. The risk of death 
was three times higher for residents with confirmed COVID-19 infections 
compared to residents who tested negative. Male residents with a confirmed 
COVID-19 infection had a two times higher risk of death compared to female 
residents. Dementia, kidney failure, and Parkinson also increased the risk of 
death (Van Loon et al. 2020).
Worldwide restrictive measures, including social distancing, have been 
taken to protect public health and to flatten the curve. Medical insights, 
mathematical modeling, and opinions of the public and experts led the Dutch 
government to decide to close nursing homes on March 19 for everyone 
except professional caregivers providing essential care on a daily basis. From 
one day to the next, nursing home residents were no longer allowed to meet 
their loved ones and were sometimes even expected to spend their days in 
their own rooms or apartments. The high prevalence of poor physical health 
in nursing home residents dominated this decision without taking into con-
sideration the psychosocial impact of such measures. It is still unknown to 
what extent the voices of individual residents or their loved ones have been 
taken into account in decisions with such a large impact.
 Social Relationships
Social relationships are a basic human need (Maslow et al. 1970). Unsatisfied 
social needs negatively impact both physical and mental health (e.g., Cacioppo 
et al. 2003) while satisfied social needs positively impact physical and mental 
health as well as well-being (e.g., Golden et al. 2009). Involvement of family 
members in nursing home care improves the well-being and quality of life of 
both residents and their loved ones (Janssen et al. 2011). Moreover, also for 
nursing home residents and their spouses, love, intimacy, and sexuality are 
fundamentally important aspects in their lives (Roelofs et al. 2017, 2019). To 
enhance person-centered nursing home care, it is essential to involve family 
members as well. It is important to involve both residents, and their family 
members to find out the preferences and needs of the residents. Therefore, 
nursing homes stimulate and facilitate family participation.
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During the lockdown of nursing homes, staff and family members acknowl-
edged the importance of social relationships. They searched for and found 
creative solutions for residents to talk to and be in contact with their loved 
ones while preventing physical contact. Examples are video calling facilitated 
by staff, welcoming visitors in specially designed spaces using Perspex to 
enable the eye to eye contact, and using a phone to listen to each other’s 
voices. Furthermore, aerial work platforms were placed to enable loved ones 
to see each other’s faces.
In contrast to community-dwelling older adults, nursing home residents 
and their loved ones did no longer have any autonomy in weighing the risk of 
a COVID-19 infection against the importance of fulfilling their social needs. 
They were unable to decide for themselves whether they wanted to meet loved 
ones or not and to touch, kiss, or hug each other or not. Individual residents 
might have preferred to meet with their loved ones and hug them, despite the 
risk of a COVID-19 infection. This meant that, even in the last phase of their 
lives, residents, and their loved ones including spouses with whom they had 
long histories had no choice nor voice in this matter.
 Visiting Arrangements
On May 11, a pilot started, covering 26 nursing homes spread over the coun-
try, to test whether it was possible to allow visitors in nursing homes without 
causing new COVID-19 outbreaks. Visiting arrangements varied among par-
ticipating nursing homes but were all in line with the restrictive measures in 
place at the time. In the first weeks, only one dedicated visitor for each resi-
dent was allowed to visit his or her loved one. Visiting times varied among 
nursing homes from 30 to 60 minutes to no time restrictions at all. Only visits 
by appointment were possible due to a mandatory health check (Koopmans 
et al. 2020).
A general study covering all 26 nursing homes and an in-depth study 
including five nursing homes monitored the compliance to these restrictive 
measures and the impact of the visiting arrangements on staff, visitors, and 
residents by proxy (Hamers et al. 2020; Koopmans et al. 2020).
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 Loved Ones Visiting Again
As expected, the study showed that visiting arrangements are highly valued by 
both loved ones and staff. Loved ones are very happy to visit their spouse or 
parent again. Especially when a resident has hearing problems and/or demen-
tia, a visit in person is of much more value than video calling and all other 
creative solutions to meet social needs. Although the use of mouth masks or 
being unable to meet in the private room of the resident makes the visit some-
what impersonal, family members are relieved to meet their loved ones in 
person because they are aware of the short life expectancy of nursing home 
residents in general. During the lockdown, many family members worried 
whether they would ever be able to meet their loved ones in person again and 
whether they would still recognize them. For some family members the visit 
was confronting due to the visible (cognitive) health deterioration of the resi-
dent during the lockdown of the nursing home (Koopmans et al. 2020).
 Residents by Proxy
Loved ones and staff were asked about the impact on residents to meet their 
family after a long period. Due to ethical concerns in combination with the 
time pressure of the monitoring studies, it was impossible to observe or inter-
view residents themselves (Hamers et al. 2020; Koopmans et al. 2020). Based 
on the insights of proxies, it is evident that the lockdown of nursing homes 
affected the well-being of residents negatively, increased loneliness and some-
times seemed to lead to a decline in health. Residents enjoyed being reunified 
with their families after a long and often lonely and uncertain time and were 
cheerful, livelier, and more active after having been visited. They are looking 
forward to the next visit. For some residents with dementia, visits were rather 
confusing and led to sadness and agitation because they did not really recog-
nize their loved ones anymore, got overstimulated during the visit, and were 
constantly looking for their loved ones after the visit. For some of these resi-
dents it was, therefore, decided to reduce or even stop the visits (Koopmans 
et al. 2020).
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 Involve Residents and Loved Ones
To enhance PCC, it is essential to know the needs, preferences, and possibili-
ties of nursing home residents themselves, also in times of crises like the 
COVID-19 outbreak. Studies that compare the perspective of nursing home 
residents to that of proxies, for instance, loved ones or staff members, show 
that these perspectives differ (e.g., Dröes et al. 2006; Gerritsen et al. 2007). 
This nuanced difference may affect the resident’s experience of feeling heard, 
seen, and respected as a unique individual in the care and support he or she 
receives. Therefore, it is of utmost importance to study the perspectives of 
nursing home residents in general and on the closure of nursing homes in 
particular. Although it is ethically challenging and not easy to interview resi-
dents with dementia, it is possible (Roelofs et al. 2017). Nevertheless, the 
perspectives of nursing home residents during disasters or crises are scarcely 
studied (Van Boekel et al. 2020), which was also the case in the studies moni-
toring the Dutch visiting arrangements in nursing homes (Hamers et al. 
2020; Koopmans et al. 2020).
Although nursing homes, supported by the national government, aim for 
adopting a person-centered approach, during the first peak of the COVID-19 
outbreak, nursing home residents and their loved ones were not involved in 
decision making. That is a missed opportunity. We therefore call both the 
government and nursing homes to involve residents and their families in deci-
sion making both in general and in times of crises because it is essential to 
know how residents weigh the risk of a COVID-19 infection and the possible 
implication of them opposing social isolation. Against the background of 
their short life expectancy, they might prefer to meet loved ones despite the 
risk of a COVID-19 infection. A new outbreak of COVID-19 can be expected 
in the future and also within nursing homes, therefore we have to adapt to a 
new common. It is time to stop talking about residents and their loved ones 
and start talking with them. Involvement of the residents and their families in 
policies and daily care in the new common is necessary to maintain person- 
centered care in nursing homes.
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22
Crisis Information Management: 
From Technological Potential to Societal 
Impact
Kenny Meesters
Every day, we make decisions, both in our personal and professional 
lives. Ranging from choices regarding our mode of transport to our daily gro-
cery shopping, and from investment decisions to choices about marketing 
strategies. Today, we can rely on a wide range of information sources to aid us 
in these decision-making processes. Mobile phones, online communities, and 
a host of digital services give access to a wide range of information. In short, 
spurred on by technical developments and economic incentives, information 
has become a common commodity in our society (Lissenden et al. 2015).
When faced with a crisis situation, we are confronted with an unexpected 
and unknown situation in which quick action is needed to remedy the situa-
tion or prevent escalation to worse. For example, in these situations, scarce 
resources and capacities have to be allocated while the knowledge about the 
situation is often limited. This time pressure to act, the high level of uncer-
tainty, and the ambiguity of actions to undertake make crisis management 
specifically challenging (van den Homberg et al. 2014). Information plays an 
important role in reducing uncertainty in a crisis. Information allows decision 
makers, for example, to assess the situation, evaluate alternatives, and 
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coordinate efforts between different stakeholders. The phrase “information 
saves lives,” commonly uttered in crisis responses, exemplifies this importance 
(Comfort et al. 2004).
Therefore, the challenge during a crisis situation is to obtain relevant, accu-
rate, and timely information to support key stakeholders in their decision- 
making process (Gralla et al. 2015). While existing information is often 
rapidly outdated or inaccurate in these situations, the underlying information 
technologies enable various ways to quickly obtain information. In fact, today, 
there is a myriad of possibilities to manage the information available to emer-
gency responders, information managers, and decision makers. Social media 
and crowd-sourcing techniques can prove a valuable source of information to 
understand the key issues faced; data analytics and artificial intelligence can 
be used to uncover trends and key events in a crisis; web platforms and reposi-
tories are used to disseminate information products (Meier 2011).
However, there is an important distinction to be made between available 
information and actionable information (Derczynski et al. 2018). The infor-
mation, or rather possible information, generated by these tools and available 
to decisions makers can in fact be extensive. To utilize the potential of all this 
information and its supporting technologies, a better alignment is needed 
between information availability spurred on by new technologies and its effec-
tive use in the decision-making process. Therefore, today, the challenge is no 
longer the availability of the information but rather designing, structuring, 
and managing flows of information to support the decision-making process in 
a networked manner (Coyle and Meier 2009).
 COVID-19 and Information Management
During the COVID-19 outbreak and the response to this outbreak, the 
importance of information to support decision makers became abundantly 
clear. In the Netherlands, public health care agencies tracked the number of 
infected people, hospitals reported the capacity on a daily basis, and medical 
suppliers kept close track of the stocks. As the outbreak continued, the stream 
of information continued to grow: transport agencies reported the number of 
travelers, information from telecommunication services were used to track 
crowd movements, and financial services began reporting the economic 
impacts. Across the globe, similar efforts were undertaken to collect, process, 
and disseminate information. The United Nations Office for Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), for example, set up dedicated sections at 
 K. Meesters
155
their Humanitarian Data Exchange to support global monitoring, and John 
Hopkins University launched their Coronavirus Resource Center.
A complicating factor in this specific crisis for decision makers is the wide-
spread and long-lasting impact of the pandemic across all facets of our societ-
ies. This also meant that the number of actors involved grew substantially, and 
with the addition of each actor, the information network expanded. Each 
actor was generating and disseminating his/her own information but also col-
lecting information through their networks to fulfill their information needs. 
At the same time, an increasing number of initiatives that aim to support the 
information management tasks were developed and offered. These included 
analytics to discern trends, models to assess the effects for different interven-
tions, or systems to monitor the situation. These developments provided deci-
sion makers and crisis response organizations with a slew of options to choose 
from. In a short time, the complexity of managing information grew excep-
tionally fast.
Managing information in general, and specifically the flow of information, 
has become crucial in the COVID-19 outbreak. More than obtaining the 
information itself, the purposeful design of information management pro-
cesses and systems has become crucial (Meissner et al. 2002).
 From Potential to Impact
The COVID-19 outbreak presented new challenges to emergency responders. 
The multifaceted impact of the outbreak on our society over a longer period 
significantly increased the number of actors, decision makers, information 
needs, and thus information management tasks. The technical building blocks 
for systems to support these tasks are available, ranging from technologies for 
obtaining data automatically and in large quantities to systems that support 
processing this data into information and visualizing the results.
While technologies presented opportunities to gain access to the increased 
volume of information, process the information to form key insights, and 
enable organizations to exchange this information, the nature of the pan-
demic outbreak warrants a reconsideration of the information management 
approaches commonly used. The duration of this crisis, technological advance-
ments, and the abundance of information facilitate and even necessitate the 
need for a more structural approach to information management. The chal-
lenge is no longer technical in nature or due to the absence of information but 
rather the effectively management of this potential to support decision mak-
ers. This is requiring organizations to consider not only the technical and 
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information side but also the organizational and human aspects of their 
organizations.
As illustrated in Fig. 22.1, leveraging the potential of information and tech-
nologies is not only a technical challenge but it also requires organizations to 
reconsider their procedures, capacities, and culture. It requires alignment 
between the organizational aspects and human factors. Specifically, regarding 
the COVID-19 crisis, two specific aspects are of importance due to the 
increased size of the information landscape:
• Information Needs: To manage information flows effectively, it is impor-
tant to understand the information needs. Identifying the needs of the 
decision makers provides guidance in assessing the value of incoming infor-
mation, the required categories of information, and the required quality. 
More importantly, determining and monitoring the information needs also 
enables organizations to determine if there is any information missing and 
to actively fill these gaps, rather than act on the available information. 
Using this “gap” analysis, additional sources can be identified or developed, 
or further information processing can be included to align the information 
with the decision maker’s needs (Meesters and Van de Walle 2013).
• Organization and People: To effectively manage information and use the 
available technologies, the fit with the organizational processes and capaci-
ties is a key consideration. There are numerous options available to emer-
gency responders and organization. However, selecting, effectively using, 
and integrating these options requires specific knowledge and capacities. 
It also requires organizations to adapt a different approach towards a 
Fig. 22.1 Elements for Effective Information Management (source: author)
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more networked information management approach. Collaborations can 
be formed not only for the exchange of information but also for the required 
capabilities to manage it (Paulus et al. 2018).
 Information as Aid
The above developments and trends illustrate important developments and 
considerations for emergency responders and crisis management organiza-
tions to effectively leverage the potential of information during a crisis situa-
tion. However, decision-making during crisis information, and subsequently 
the need for information, does not only pertain to crisis responders, govern-
ment agencies, or organizations with a public role. As in every emergency, 
civil society plays a critical role in the crisis response (Walter 2004). Every 
organization, community, and individual is making choices in these uncertain 
times. In fact, individual decisions made by citizens largely determine the 
effectiveness of the crisis response. This individual responsibility is even more 
important during pandemics and other public health emergencies.
It could be argued that today, and especially during the COVID-19 out-
break, information itself has become a primary need. Moreover, through tech-
nologies such as web 2.0, more and more people are actively creating and 
sharing digital information. Social media, for example, allow people to share 
first-hand experiences directly with a large community (Coyle and Meier 
2009). This warrants an important change for crisis responders, government 
agencies, and our society in general, and requires adapting the information 
management principles used in crisis response organizations (Meesters 
et al. 2019).
Notwithstanding this potential, there are important considerations to be 
made in light of these developments. Especially in an emergency, those who 
are more vulnerable will likely have less access to critical information. The 
reduced online presence, in general, will also result in underrepresentation in 
digital sources. In contrast, those with information literacy skills, access to 
information technologies, and strong networks will not only have access to a 
larger amount of information to base their decision-making on but can also 
leverage their connections and social networks to obtain crucial support. The 
COVID-19 outbreak, in particular, has shown the importance of the ability 
to “stay connected” by digital means. During these crisis situations when peo-
ple are most vulnerable, the digital divide increases even further (Comes 
et al. 2019).
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 Enabling the New Common Through Information
As we move to a new common, decisions continue to be made by a wide range 
of actors, not in the least the our communities and their individual members. 
The effective transition to a new common in our society depends on the align-
ment and ability to make informed decisions. Therefore, we need to expand 
the information management landscape of crisis management. This requires 
the organization to reexamine their information management approach. Not 
only in terms of technologies employed, such as social media, and consider-
ation of the information needs of the community members. But specifically 
in relation to their organizational capabilities, policies, and processes.
While careful ethical, societal, and security aspects have to be considered, 
the need for and value of information in the decision-making process reaches 
beyond the scope of emergency responders and their organizations. Through 
the exchange of information, communities and civic organizations can not 
only be informed but even empowered to effectively participate in both the 
response and information management processes (Piccolo et al. 2017). They 
can deliver valuable information to decision-makers, and vice versa their 
own decisions can be aligned with other stakeholders as well (Meesters et al. 
2021). However, to leverage this potential, a paradigm shift is required in 
crisis organizations and their information management towards an inclusive 
and reciprocal approach.
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23
Efficient Scientific Self-Correction in Times 
of Crisis
Michèle Nuijten
When the COVID-19 pandemic hit in early 2020, the scientific community 
was quick to respond. Within 4 months after the first reported COVID-19 
case, over 13,000 papers related to COVID-19 were published in scientific 
journals. On top of that, over 7000 preprints (self-published PDFs) were 
posted online (see Fig. 23.1; Fraser et al. 2020; Fraser and Kramer 2020).
It is encouraging to see the speed with which the scientific community has 
responded to the pandemic. Perhaps even more encouraging is that science 
has played such an important role in shaping policies and interventions 
against COVID-19 and its consequences. If there was ever a time in which 
the importance of science to society was highlighted, it is now.
However, it is important to keep in mind that science is a human endeavor 
and, therefore, not flawless. Scientific publications, both preprints and peer- 
reviewed articles, can be affected by errors and bias.
Already, we have seen some high-profile cases of flawed papers in the 
COVID-19 literature. For example, a paper published in the prestigious jour-
nal The Lancet reported that the antimalarial drug hydroxychloroquine could 
be dangerous to people with COVID-19. This finding brought an abrupt halt 
to multiple clinical trials in which this drug was tested as a potential treatment 
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of COVID-19. Almost immediately after publication, the scientific commu-
nity noted that it was highly unlikely that such a large and detailed database 
on COVID-19 was collected in such a short time and started questioning the 
validity of the findings. When the authors could not verify the data, the article 
was retracted, along with another high-profile article by the same authors that 
was based on the same dataset (for more details, see e.g., Davey 2020; Ledford 
and Van Noorden 2020; Rabin and Gabler 2020). These retractions raised 
questions about the potential risks of conducting research under so much 
time pressure. The global crisis may have prompted researchers to cut corners 
in data collection and analysis in order to get their studies out there as soon as 
possible. Lower levels of scrutiny are never desirable but may be particularly 
problematic when scientific findings are communicated and sometimes even 
implemented before formal peer review has taken place. To quickly separate 
the weed from the chaff in the COVID-19 literature, we need an efficient 
correction mechanism.
 Scientific Self-Correction
Science is often said to be self-correcting, reflecting the idea that science is an 
iterative process that will lead us to “the truth” step by step by constantly 
updating information. Self-correction should weed out findings that turn out 















Fig. 23.1 Number of COVID-19 preprints and journal articles over time (data source: 
Fraser and Kramer (2020))
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overnight. Someone has to actively correct the scientific record for scientific 
“self-correction” to take place (see also Vazire 2019).
The main self-correction mechanism is replication. In a replication study, 
researchers collect and analyze new data while closely following the methodol-
ogy of the original study. If the replication study shows the same results as the 
original study, the results are corroborated. However, if the replication study 
shows different results, it may undermine the trust in the original finding. 
Especially if a string of replication studies keeps showing different results than 
the original study, the original result is eventually discarded in favor of the 
replications’ results.
A downside of replication studies is that they can take a lot of money and 
time, both of which are scarce. Especially during times of crisis, such as the 
current COVID-19 pandemic when we need fast answers to our questions, it 
is important to have efficient correction mechanisms at hand.
 Reproducibility Checks as an Efficient 
Self-Correction Mechanism
I would like to add an additional, more efficient tool to the self-correction 
toolbox: analytical reproducibility checks, or simply reproducibility checks. A 
paper is successfully reproduced when reanalysis of the original data, follow-
ing the original strategy, produces the same results as reported in the paper. 
Note that, as opposed to replication, reproducibility checks do not involve 
collecting new data. This makes reproducibility checks much quicker and 
cheaper than a replication.
It may seem self-evident that reanalyzing the same data following the same 
strategy as the original authors leads to the same results. Unfortunately, this is 
often not the case. Not only errors in the data cleaning and typos in reporting 
results but also lack of clarity in describing analyses or unavailable data can all 
result in findings that are not reproducible (Hardwicke et al. 2018; Ioannidis 
et al. 2009; Nuijten et al. 2016; Stodden et al. 2018).
Reproducibility is a minimum standard for research quality (Nuijten et al. 
2018; Peng 2011). If it is unclear how the data led to the reported findings, 
these findings cannot be substantively interpreted. The importance of repro-
ducibility for interpretation became clear in the hydroxychloroquine case 
described above, where the paper was retracted because the findings were not 
reproducible: neither the readers nor the authors themselves were able to 
reproduce the reported results based on the data.
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Many conclusions in the COVID-19 literature are based on statistical anal-
yses. Think about estimates of the mortality rate, assessments of the accuracy 
of COVID-19 test kits, or tests whether a treatment is effective by comparing 
means in experimental and control conditions. In such cases, reproducibility 
checks may be an efficient tool to quickly verify reported results.
 Detecting Reproducibility Problems
Reproducibility checks can be done at different effort and complexity levels. 
A reproducibility check could consist of an in-depth reanalysis of the original 
data, but some reproducibility problems can be spotted without access to raw 
data. The latter are so-called “statistical reporting inconsistencies” that can be 
detected in the paper itself. Such an inconsistency arises when the numbers 
belonging to a set do not match.
Consider the following fictional example. Say that a paper states that “7% 
of the patients with Covid-19 died in hospital (5/100).” Purely based on the 
reported results, it can be concluded that the numbers are not internally con-
sistent: 5 out of 100 patients is 5%, not 7%. At this point, it is unclear which 
of the reported numbers is incorrect. What is clear, however, is that the result 
in its current form is not reproducible and, therefore, not reliable: even with-
out reanalyzing the underlying data, we can conclude that it is impossible to 
arrive at this combination of numbers.
Reporting inconsistencies can occur in a wide variety of statistics. For 
example, the reported accuracy of a test kit should be consistent with the 
reported true positive, true negative, false positive, and false negative rates. 
Similarly, the reported total sample size should match subgroup sizes, odds 
ratios should match raw frequencies, reported p-values of statistical hypothe-
sis tests should match their test statistics and degrees of freedom, etcetera.
Screening a paper for reporting inconsistencies is an efficient way to detect 
reproducibility problems: it can be done quickly and you have immediate, 
objective feedback about the trustworthiness of a particular result. A next step 
could be a full reanalysis of the original data to see if the same numbers can be 
reproduced. Such a reanalysis could possibly be extended by sensitivity analy-
ses: do the results still hold up under different (justifiable) analytical choices? 
For example, what happens to the effect when one extreme observation is 
removed? Or when the analysis is redone without an arbitrary covariate?
I would argue that if any of the steps above do not hold, the result is not 
robust. Either it is unclear how the data led to the reported results—in which 
case the results cannot be meaningfully interpreted—or the results only hold 
 M. Nuijten
165
under a highly specific set of analytical choices. In such cases, we may not 
need to perform a replication study in a new sample to determine whether or 
not to trust the study.
 Closing Remarks
Especially in COVID-19 research, where new scientific findings are some-
times immediately implemented, we need quick ways to determine whether 
the reported findings are trustworthy. Relying on “traditional” scientific self- 
correction in the form of replication studies in new samples may not be suf-
ficient: replication takes a lot of time and—maybe more importantly—if the 
results in the original study are erroneous, it is not possible to meaningfully 
compare them to the replication results. Systematic reproducibility checks 
could be an efficient way to spot errors and speed up scientific self-correction 
in the COVID-19 literature.
The current pandemic provides an incentive to reassess the way science 
progresses. It highlights the risks of “rushed” science and emphasizes the need 
for efficient robustness checks. But efficient robustness checks are not only 
relevant in times of crisis: society progresses faster than ever and science needs 
to work hard to keep up. We can take this opportunity to develop new habits 
in the way we conduct science by systematically assessing the reproducibility 
of results, screening papers for reporting inconsistencies, reanalyzing data, 
and performing sensitivity checks. Additionally, we can use this logic not only 
to assess, but also to improve the robustness of our results by fully reporting 
our statistical results, sharing our data and analysis scripts, and reporting 
results of alternative analysis strategies.
By recognizing the importance of the link between the data and the reported 
results—the importance of reproducibility—we can improve scientific self- 
correction and scientific progress in times of crisis and beyond.
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Fortified Nudges? Protecting 
the Vulnerable in a Post-COVID Society
Robin Pierce
The eagerly awaited transition back into a functioning and vibrant society 
presents numerous challenges, not the least of which is how to protect the 
vulnerable. As society emerges from the “crisis” phase and the lockdown is 
lifted, it remains unclear to what extent it should be left to the vulnerable to 
protect themselves.
The elderly, the infirm, and those with existing health conditions are par-
ticularly susceptible to tragic outcomes from the coronavirus. To be vulnera-
ble to a severe impact of COVID-19 turns the disease into a pervasively 
lurking death threat. Yet, to suggest that the vulnerable spend their lives in 
retreat in order to significantly minimize the risk is problematic in multiple 
ways. As policy-makers craft the way forward, the question must be asked 
whether an appeal to the goodwill and voluntary cooperation of people, along 
with the slow evolution of social norms, is an adequate approach to protecting 
the vulnerable. Already, some lockdown measures are showing signs of dura-
bility, likely to last beyond the crisis needs. For example, avoidance of rush 
hours, tech-facilitated remote meetings, and working from home have all 
demonstrated a degree of success sufficient to question whether the “old com-
mon” continues to be necessary or is even preferable. For not only can these 
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measures be cost-saving, climate-friendly, and more efficient, they also act 
against the spread of the virus.
But even as the “new common” way of doing things is embraced, some of 
the “old common” is likely to return, both as a matter of practicality and of 
preference. Leaving our homes to enjoy the theater, a dinner on the town, or 
a trip to the library are likely to have few satisfying substitutes. But what 
about the vulnerable among us? What is the nature of societal responsibility 
to protect the vulnerable in the post-COVID society, and what kinds of 
approaches will lead to an optimal balance of rights, liberties, and interests 
that do not place the vulnerable at undue risk of a life-threatening disease? 
This short essay offers Fineman’s notion of “inevitable dependency” as a basis 
for society’s obligation to create protective measures that do more to ensure 
the safety of the vulnerable compared to those that rely heavily on the good-
will of individuals. Measures that balance the two fundamental interests of 
protection of life and protection of freedom should lead us in creative direc-
tions that support goodwill with meaningful action. This essay proposes “the 
fortified nudge” as a step in this direction.
 Inevitable Dependency
Political philosopher Martha Fineman offers the concept of inevitable depen-
dency as a feature of what it is to be human in society. Essentially, the term 
refers to the fact that all members of society will experience a period of depen-
dency that will make them vulnerable in ways that the rest of society is not 
(Fineman 2017). This dependency, she argues, is inevitable. Though very few 
of us may navigate through life with minimal dependence and vulnerability, 
as human beings, we will all experience it.
In the post-COVID society, there will be the familiar vulnerabilities of 
frailty, disease, social and economic disadvantage, and so on, but there will be 
new forms of vulnerability occasioned by COVID-19 and its processes—how 
it spreads, the long-term effects, and how it impacts those afflicted with it. In 
many cases, the existing or pre-COVID vulnerabilities provide fertile ground 
for severe disease impact. However, COVID-19 creates new categories of vul-
nerability by its impact on the body. These can include damage to heart tissue 
(Wang et al. 2020) or lungs (Wilson 2020; Spagnolo et al. 2020) or exploiting 
weaknesses brought about by diabetes, cardiovascular disease, and other co- 
morbidities. In America, COVID-19 has exacted a particularly heavy toll on 
African-Americans (Price-Haywood et al. 2020). Some countries have noted 
a particularly harsh impact on persons with dementia (Yao et al. 2020), 
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including those living at home. For persons having one or more of these vul-
nerabilities, the consequences of contracting the coronavirus could be fatal. 
How we protect the COVID-vulnerable in a post-COVID society will be a 
critical feature of a successful transition.
There are many challenges in knowing when and how to re-open, not the 
least of which is what will constitute sufficiently protective measures such that 
it will not unnecessarily cost lives. This is a matter of policy. What will it take 
to support our return to living as a connected and vibrant larger social com-
munity and what should be the responsibility of the state and the larger soci-
ety? While voluntary acts are welcome, expecting the COVID-vulnerable to 
rely on the goodwill of others when their lives may be at stake seems unrea-
sonable. Something more reliable and predictable is necessary.
 Insufficiency of Voluntary Measures
While nudges can be justified in a post-COVID society, such essentially vol-
untary measures are unlikely to be sufficient to minimize the risk to the 
COVID-vulnerable when the majority of people in that society no longer 
perceive a serious threat. The incentive to maintain social distancing behaviors 
is likely to diminish when such awkward behaviors no longer serve immediate 
interests. Nevertheless, while the most serious threat has passed for most peo-
ple in society, the vulnerable remain at the mercy of this lurking decimator. 
Some who fall into this category have become resigned to a life in retreat, 
some for the remainder of their lives. Society owes more to these individuals 
than an offer “to pick up something at the store or pharmacy.” A life in isola-
tion due to heightened risk that disproportionately falls to the lot of the vul-
nerable is unfair. In a post-COVID society, inevitable dependency, here 
perhaps best articulated as inevitable vulnerability, requires more than mere 
encouragement to behave responsibly to protect those at heightened risk. 
Rather, inevitable vulnerability would suggest a new form of self-interest that 
expands immediate self-interest, is more personal than “enlightened self- 
interest” (in which one sees the benefit to oneself in benefitting others) and 
casts the actors as responsible stewards investing in their own futures as well 
as those of the vulnerable. Moreover, the failure to do so would result in a 
profoundly marginalized status for the COVID-vulnerable as their ability to 
participate in the life of society would be substantially diminished. Most 
Western societies have crossed this terrain with mandatory accommodations 
for persons with disabilities. However, unlike persons with disabilities, the 
COVID-vulnerable are merely at risk, not disadvantaged in any manifest 
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sense. They can go shopping, visit the library, and get to and from work with 
no special assistance. What differs for them from the majority in a post- 
COVID society is the level of risk and the likely consequences should that risk 
materialize. Thus, the harm is actually speculative, although grave. It is the 
gravity of this harm that justifies measures beyond voluntary action.
 Fortified Nudges
A fortified nudge would appear as one of many variations of the nudge, a 
concept introduced by Thaler and Sunstein in 2005 (Thaler and Sunstein 
2009). It refers to state action that uses insights from behavioral economics to 
influence behavior such that people act in their own self-interest but also pre-
serves choice. A classic example is placing fruit and vegetables in front of the 
pizza in the cafeteria. The choice is preserved, but patrons have been nudged 
to choose the healthier option. This strategy could be used to influence people 
to behave in ways that are less likely to spread the virus. We see this in the use 
of sidewalk distance bubbles, design artifacts indicating where people should 
stand to minimize contagion. A fortified nudge would take this design artifact 
a step further such that standing closer than the recommended 1.5 m is quite 
difficult. This is moving toward Lessig’s regulatory tool of “code” or “architec-
ture,” in which the environment is designed in such a way that choice is 
largely or completely eliminated (Lessig 2003). There are many challenges to 
architecture, including legitimacy because often the compulsory behavior is 
being mandated by private parties and the required action is in their interests. 
By contrast, a fortified nudge would maintain the essential qualities of a 
nudge, performed by the state in the best interests of the people whose behav-
ior is being influenced, but the fortified nudge, while preserving choice, takes 
a stronger hand in the steering of behavior. Thus, social distancing measures 
authorized by the state would also make another choice more difficult in some 
way. If proven effective, these measures might include the physical reduction 
of capacity on public transportation or browsing alternatives in the library 
that do not require touching. Thus making a trip to the library an enjoyable 
activity for the COVID-vulnerable, who would not have to risk their lives 
to do so.
The point is that if the COVID-vulnerable is to have a chance to flourish 
and participate in the life of society, measures need to be sufficiently robust to 
consistently and reliably reduce the risk to this segment of the population. 
Goodwill and voluntary efforts can go a long way, but the consistency of such 
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measures is essential to transitioning to a fair, inclusive, and well-functioning 
society.
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Can AI Help to Avert the Environmental 
Great Filter?
Eric Postma and Marie Postma
While the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on our lives is still evident on 
a daily basis, there is a much larger disaster looming in our future. We are 
faced with massive evidence that civilization is threatened by a climate disas-
ter, and drastic measures are needed to avoid a point of no return. Will 
humankind succeed in adopting the necessary measures in time? Some scien-
tists view the possibility of the environmental “Great Filter”—an event that 
eventually wipes out any instance of intelligent life, including our own—as 
inevitable (Webb 2002). In the 1950s, the physicist Enrico Fermi, during a 
lunch with his colleague, famously raised the question “Where are they?” 
addressing the apparent lack of extraterrestrial intelligent life in a galaxy where 
the formation of planets is common. For sure, it is a disconcerting idea that 
the answer to Fermi’s paradox, namely that a Great Filter prevents an expand-
ing lasting life (Hanson 1998), may apply to our own technological society in 
a not so distant future.
In this essay, we explore the potential of present-day AI systems to mitigate 
the apparent human inability to respond timely and adequately to the immi-
nent peril threatening the existence of our civilization. We will argue that 
contrary to focusing on the widespread concerns of AI superseding humanity, 
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the role of AI in climate change solutions needs to be prioritized and appreci-
ated. To illustrate the potential of AI, we first contemplate the suboptimal 
human response to the nonlinear dynamics of the COVID-19 crisis. 
Subsequently, we generalize our observations to the climate crisis.
 The COVID-19 Crisis
Similar to the climate crisis, the potential dangers of the coronavirus were 
known in Europe and the US ahead of the pandemic. Yet, despite the fore-
warning evidence collected in Wuhan, China, the governmental response in 
most Western countries was insufficient and overdue. In the famous docu-
mentary An Inconvenient Truth, Al Gore used the apt metaphor of a frog in 
a pot of slowly heated water. Gradually raising the temperature of the water 
until boiling point leaves the frog inactive until it dies from the heat. At any 
point, the frog could have jumped out of the pot but it ignores the accumulat-
ing evidence.1 What the frog fails to acknowledge is the nonlinear dynamics 
of the boiling event in relation to its ability to save itself, thereby shutting its 
eyes to the fact that, at some critical point, small changes in temperature 
parameters will have irrecoverable effects.
The nonlinear dynamics of various events is beautifully captured in the 
classic model in physics, called the percolation model. The model can be 
exemplified in the scenario of a forest fire; see Fig. 25.1. Consider a forest in 
which the trees are positioned at a fixed distance from each other. When the 
inter-tree distance is large and one tree burns, the other trees remain unaf-
fected. Now imagine a knob (called a parameter in most models) that we can 
turn to adjust the inter-tree distance. If we turn the knob to a very low inter- 
tree distance (say, less than 1.5 m), a single burning tree will cause a fire that 
will devastate the entire forest. The graph shown below sketches the universal 
pattern witnessed in percolation models. The vertical axis represents the pro-
portion of surviving trees, the horizontal axis the knob position where the 
inter-tree distance increases by moving to the right along the axis (numbers in 
arbitrary units). At the value of 5, a so-called “phase transition” occurs. The 
macroscopic behavior transforms from a disaster into a non-hazardous local 
fire. Note that the slope of the S-shaped function depends, amongst others, 
on the size of the forest: for very large forests, the slope becomes much steeper 
1 For your information, the metaphor is based on an incorrect assumption (Fallows 2006). According to 
biologists, a frog that is gradually heated in a pot will actually jump out on time, thereby apparently 
demonstrating a better survival instinct than the human species.
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and the phase transition would be very sudden. A very small change in inter- 
tree distance can then determine the fate of the forest.
Physicists rely on simple models, such as the percolation model because 
these often exhibit universality. In fact, it is easy to see how the model can be 
applied to a virus spreading in the human population, with a small change in 
social distancing measures resulting in either halting or accelerating the pan-
demic. Unfortunately, our high-school mathematics curriculum is mainly 
focused on linear relationships: small changes in a parameter value induce 
small changes in the output value. Consequently, we often lack intuition for 
nonlinear behaviors (May 1976) and implicitly assume that small changes 
have small effects.
In the case of pandemics, the expectation of a linear growth may lead to a 
dangerous underestimation of the speed with which the disease can spread in 
a population. According to Zacks and Franconeri (2020), even when con-
fronted with nonlinear simulations, people will find the nonlinearity counter-
intuitive and have the tendency to extrapolate a straight growth line. The 
importance of integrating reliable data with appropriate models (Alamo et al. 
2020) is demonstrated by the analysis of the response of the Dutch Government 
to the COVID-19 pandemic. The Dutch national newspaper NRC 
Handelsblad (NRC 2020) described how a microbiologist from the city of 
Breda, Jan Kluytmans, initiated the introduction of an intelligent lockdown. 
On March 22, 2020, Kluytmans used a British epidemiological model from 
the internet to compute the number of infected persons, given the 18 
Fig. 25.1 Scenario of a forest fire (source: authors)
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COVID-19 fatalities in the province of North-Brabant. Whereas the RIVM 
estimate for March 22 was 1413 COVID-19 infections, the computation 
performed by Kluytmans resulted in a much larger number: at least 42,000 
infections two-and-half weeks prior to March 22. With so many infections 
two-and-half weeks prior to March 22, the number of infections should be 
certainly higher than the RIVM estimate of 1413. Kluytmans’s intervention 
may have averted a disaster in the Netherlands; in terms of the percolation 
model, we may have been near the phase transition point.
 The Climate Crisis and Hybrid Intelligence
The climate crisis is comparable to the COVID-19 crisis, albeit at a more 
moderate timescale. Our civilization as we know it is unsustainable. 
Unprecedented increases in global temperature and pollution levels represent 
warning signals that we are aware of, yet a collective action at the governmen-
tal level has been slow, insufficient, and mired by short-term political gains. 
AI is not a panacea for climate change, but it can positively influence and 
guide the transition towards a sustainable society.
First and foremost, AI algorithms can be used to improve the predictions of 
climate models (Huntington et al. 2019). By solving discrepancies in the out-
puts of currently employed models, such as the Earth System Model (ESM), 
and by refining their estimates, climate adaptation planning can be improved. 
In addition, AI algorithms can facilitate the measurement of environmental 
factors. An example of how this can be done is an AI algorithm we recently 
developed to quantify automatically floating plastic waste using video cameras 
on bridges (van Lieshout et al. 2020).
A second major target is the transformation of the information context into 
a sustainable one while avoiding the anti-democratic pitfalls of persuasive 
computing, i.e., the use of technology to steer an individual course of action 
(Helbing et al. 2017; Postma 2019). In her recent paper “Should AI be 
Designed to Save Us from Ourselves?,” Lahsen (2020) states that “[o]nly 
rethinking and redesign of the principles and technologies that generate infor-
mation contexts within which public decisions are made can positively engen-
der the future we will get” (p. 66). Innovations in AI should focus on 
facilitating the creation of such information contexts in order to overcome the 
human tendency to forage information that leads to the desirable conclusion 
rather than an undesirable belief (Kruglanski et al. 2020). Ironically, AI algo-
rithms are currently used on a massive scale by technology companies to cre-
ate information contexts that may cater to prior beliefs yet lack long-term 
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viability. The challenge is to counter this trend with AI technologies specifi-
cally designed to support the transition to a sustainable society. One example 
of how this can be done is provided by Rolnick et al. (2019) who present an 
impressive overview of ways in which AI and machine learning can tackle 
climate change. An important tool for individual action is the use of AI to 
provide individuals with instantaneous feedback about their carbon footprint. 
Such personalized feedback shapes our decisions about modes of transport, 
types of diets, and purchases. Realizing AI-supported personalized feedback 
systems coupled to financial incentives (motivation) has the potential to facil-
itate behavior change.
 How to Avoid the Entropic Abyss: A Case 
for Hybrid Intelligence
Despite the clear wins that the use of sophisticated AI models can deliver in 
our struggle to avoid the planetary entropic abyss, it is important to remem-
ber that, while AI systems based on machine learning are very good at making 
predictions, they lack common sense reasoning. For instance, if there were a 
sudden surge in hospitalizations due to an extremely cold weather period, any 
human expert would understand that this may confound the COVID-19 pre-
diction model. On the other hand, AI models may overcome the limited 
information-processing capacity of humans by taking into account all relevant 
data. Clearly, at the current stage of AI research, the best of both worlds is the 
combination of human and machine intelligence, so-called “hybrid 
intelligence.”
Hybrid intelligence aims at expanding human intelligence instead of replac-
ing it. It offers the best of both worlds by combining the general intelligence 
of humans with the narrow task-specific intelligence of AI. The development 
of hybrid intelligence requires the knowledge of experts who understand both 
humans and machines, including their strengths and weaknesses. The unique 
Tilburg University research and education program Cognitive Science and AI 
represent a hotspot of such interdisciplinary talent. In the end, whether the 
age of Anthropocene will lead to collapse or to the metaphorical frog being 
rescued will depend on our society making—or being nudged to make—that 
decision. It is highly unlikely that the new common can be achieved without 
the help of AI technology that understands and supplements human cogni-
tion and motivation.
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Values and Principles as Cornerstones 
of a Renewed Normal
Corien Prins
The effects of the outbreak of the coronavirus on our health, our economy, 
and our societies are being seen and felt around the planet. In countless ways, 
our society and familiar customs are being disrupted and challenged. In this 
light, we frequently hear that we are simply going to have to learn to live with 
this “new normal” and a socially distanced economy. But given a vaccine now 
becomes available: What are the changes that remain in place and to what 
extent will our society have reinvented itself?
 To Roll Back Crisis Solutions
Aside from the fact that, once the vaccine is broadly available, some of today’s 
emergency measures will no longer be necessary, we should also acknowl-
edge that certain measures cannot remain in place indefinitely, among oth-
ers, due to their invasiveness. For example, digital technology has proven to 
be a powerful tool in both tackling the spread of the coronavirus and allow-
ing countless societal processes to continue. However, some of its current 
applications are at odds with the principles of the law and with fundamental 
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rights. Consider, for instance, concerns regarding the protection of privacy 
in relation to digital monitoring of citizens’ behavior (such as tracking apps; 
the use of data about restaurant reservations for coronavirus monitoring, 
etc.). But equally, the benefits of some of these new digital ways of working 
(greater efficiency, reduced costs, etc.) should not be allowed to lead, insidi-
ously, to a society in which certain groups in our society are (even more) 
disadvantaged in socio-economic terms. After all, a good laptop and internet 
connection are not available to every family. And not everyone is able to 
keep pace with the sudden digital transformation of so many key societal 
processes. Similarly, there are concerns regarding the continued focus on the 
use of digital learning environments in higher education. The current crisis 
has meant that our education system has become even more dependent on a 
few very large tech companies (mainly based in the US). In providing their 
services, these commercial companies are able to collect user data from stu-
dents and researchers, which can be used to offer personalized marketing 
and services. In essence, digitalization in higher education increasingly also 
means the privatization of tasks that have traditionally belonged to the pub-
lic domain. What does the continuing digitalization of education mean for 
the public values that our system of education is meant to serve? Now that 
we are taking careful steps towards a relaxation of the measures, it is a good 
time to discuss the desirable intensity of the use of digital applications. 
Everything had to be done in a hurry in the initial phase. In the period 
ahead, there will be more time for reflection, and the question lies before us: 
what kind of balance between physical and digital—between offline and 
online—are we looking for? Digitalization has a lot to offer, but at the same 
time, it can change or diminish things fundamentally to such an extent that 
we need to ask ourselves if those changes are indeed desirable. A debate is 
vital, particularly now it has become clear that some changes must not be 
embraced permanently and even come with the necessary risks attached 
(Sheikh and Prins 2020).
The need for a public debate on the responsible use of digital technology 
and the relevant values associated with that is just one illustration of the fact 
that the current crisis and its aftermath are pushing many new challenges and 
questions onto the agenda. In this short contribution, I would like to frame 
two such questions in particular. From a legal point of view, what would the 
equivalent be of the socially distanced economy? And secondly, from the 
point of view of the law and the rule of law, which considerations do we need 
to focus on if we are to reinvent our society?
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 Socially Distanced: A Metaphor for a Renewed 
Legal System
The initial response to the first question—the equivalent of the socially dis-
tanced economy—probably centers on the numerous legal provisions that 
have been affected by the crisis and, in addition, the provisions that have been 
implemented to cope with the (effects of the) crisis. These include things like 
emergency decrees, rules regarding economic support measures, the relaxation 
of certain rules in the field of competition or healthcare, and the interpreta-
tion of certain notions in contract law, such as that of unforeseen circum-
stances. It has been necessary to review these aspects of the law in order to 
soften the impact of the crisis or to share the pain more equitably or because 
they were preventing action being taken to manage the situation effectively. 
At the same time, of course, some new legal measures have been introduced 
too, including rules to prevent unscrupulous individuals from profiting from 
others’ misfortunes by charging excessive prices for certain products.1
However, hopefully, the legal equivalent of social distancing means more 
than just a few technical changes to the application of the law or the more 
flexible application of existing legislation and legal concepts. After all, social 
distancing is essentially all about protecting the most vulnerable in our society 
and ensuring solidarity. This means that we need to look at the architecture of 
the law from a new perspective. This implies that we aim to take it one step 
further than merely the legal measures that we take at this very moment to 
deal with the crisis. After all, does the fact that countless aspects of the law 
have had to be overridden or amended not make it painfully clear that our 
legal system is inadequately equipped to support or sometimes even prioritize 
the most vulnerable? Does it not show that the weakest and most vulnerable 
in our society have been neglected and forgotten to some extent when it 
comes to the law? There are plenty of examples of this in my field of exper-
tise—law and technology. At the global level, for example, extremely restricted 
use is made of the compulsory license in patent law even though two billion 
people in the world still have no access to affordable basic medication (Durisch 
and Gajardo 2018). And, incidentally, this does not only happen in the 
African continent but in the Western world too. For example, the political 
prioritization of international trade treaties has meant that a country like 
Canada, which had actively been using compulsory licenses to import generic 
1 For example, the new legal regime in Ontario: https://www.ontario.ca/laws/regulation/200098.
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medicines, was obliged to abandon the use of this instrument. The prices of 
medicines in that country rose sharply as a result (‘t Hoen 2009).
This is just one example of what can be seen as a much more generalized 
trend. Years of beating the drum for “self-reliance” and “competition” have 
also affected the structures and reflexes of our system of law. The discipline of 
the market and the dominance of each individual’s responsibility for his/her 
own life (and also, therefore, for any misfortune that comes his/her way in 
life)—all combined with an emphasis on the most efficient possible use of 
capacity, capital, and technology—have colored the way in which we apply 
the law as well as the law itself. Although almost every field of the law has 
provisions in place to ensure that the public interest cannot be ignored com-
pletely, the legal provisions that serve to underscore public values and embody 
fundamental norms often belong in the category of “exceptions” to the gen-
eral provisions of the law, rather than fundamental principles.
 Values and Principles Underlying 
the Renewed Normal
A crisis such as the one we are currently witnessing means that, in many areas 
of society, we are forced to rethink established patterns and familiar arrange-
ments. This includes the arrangements that we, as a society, have made in the 
form of the law. The results of this rethink will become tangible in the months 
and years to come in the form of numerous new or amended laws, court rul-
ings, and agreements between parties. Various areas of law will be redesigned, 
ranging from social security for self-employed persons to better control over 
the supply of medical equipment.
But let us, above all, make sure that the legacy of this crisis goes beyond just 
these areas. The coronavirus is forcing us to confront our own vulnerability as 
human beings. And this ought to make us reconsider the way in which we 
distribute or redistribute wealth and promote solidarity within our societies: 
pensions, insurance, housing, health care, and education must be the main 
areas that we focus on. After all, this is how we create a strong middle class on 
which every robust democracy is built. But the new panorama that is opening 
up before us must also extend to countless “minor” arrangements that our 
legal system currently provides for, from civil liability to special tax arrange-
ments for multinational companies. Above all, let us make sure that social 
distancing serves as a reminder of the role of the law in promoting solidarity 
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with other people and the acceptance of measures that are designed primarily 
in the interests of other people.
Sustainable change will require an appreciation of both new and traditional 
ways of working and living together and the ways in which we interact socially 
and economically. The sum of all these changes will result in what could be 
referred to as “the renewed normal.” For it is important to realize that, in this 
new reality, certain principles and underlying values in our democratic society 
will need to be preserved as well. In other words, emergency solutions and 
their short-term benefits (increased efficiency, reduced costs, etc.) should not 
be allowed to lead (insidiously) to practices that are actually at odds with the 
principles on which our society is based. Hence, it is crucial that we reflect on 
the values in our democracy that must be saved from being washed away in 
the tide of the current crisis.
This brings me to summarize and formulate a crucial issue for the agenda 
of academic and political thought and discussion. Clearly the above shows 
that the numerous challenges we face in light of the coronavirus crisis defi-
nitely includes the challenge of reflecting on which values and principles our 
reinvented society and renewed normal should be based.
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A New Democratic Norm(al)? Political 
Legitimacy Amidst the COVID-19 Pandemic
Tim Reeskens and Quita Muis
With “patient zero” diagnosed at Tilburg’s ETZ hospital, the province of 
Noord-Brabant has been the bedrock to implement far-reaching non- 
pharmaceutical interventions to prevent COVID-19 from spreading across 
the Netherlands. The government response to COVID-19 was a self- 
proclaimed “intelligent lockdown,” which provided Dutch residents with 
relative freedom by allowing them to go outside but to do so responsibly 
(RIVM 2020). However, measures taken to “flatten the curve,” as advised by 
RIVM health experts, have unavoidably constrained some civil liberties too. 
The effectiveness of these interventions crucially depends on the public sup-
port not just for the measures but also for the political system implementing 
them. The aim of this contribution is to provide insights into how political 
legitimacy has changed amidst the COVID-19 pandemic by analyzing novel 
longitudinal panel data as part of the European Values Study.1
In this, the Netherlands is an interesting case as it is conceived of as a liberal 
democracy characterized by strong democratic appraisal (see Fig. 27.1; EVS 
1 We would like to thank Loek Halman, Ruud Luijkx, Inge Sieben and Leen Vandecasteele for valuable 
comments on this contribution, as well as Giovanni Borghesan for producing the post-stratification 
weights.
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2020); furthermore, political institutions receive widespread public support 
(Bovens and Wille 2008). Political legitimacy2 combines these two aspects 
(Easton 1965; Norris 2011), namely expectations from the government (i.e., 
more democratic versus more authoritarian governance) together with sup-
port for their functioning. When populations have strong demands from the 
government, but the latter are unable to fulfill them, a “deficit” arises (Norris 
2011). This deficit might ultimately jeopardize the successful implementation 
of required non-pharmaceutical interventions.
At a more theoretical level, these public expectations from the government 
align with what is referred to as “diffuse system support.” This term represents 
a generalized attachment to the core values and principles of a political system 
(Norris 2011: 22), such as the separation of powers, freedom, self- 
determination, and moral autonomy (Dahl 1989). Evaluations of govern-
ment functioning are also named “specific system support,” expressed by the 
popularity of and trust in, for example, incumbent prime ministers, party 
leaders, and political parties (Norris 2011: 21). Scholarship suggests that 
explanations for diffuse and specific support are largely different (Mishler and 
Rose 2001).
2 We understand “political legitimacy” from a Weberian perspective as it describes it by “the basis of every 
system of authority, and correspondingly of every kind of willingness to obey, is a belief, a belief by virtue 
of which persons exercising authority are lent prestige” (Weber 1964: 382).
Fig. 27.1 Perceptions of democratic governance across Europe, 2017 (source: European 
Values Study 2017 + own calculation)
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Diffuse support is thought to be rather stable because the attachment to 
more or less democratic values is understood to result from socialization at a 
young age (Inglehart 1977, 1997). Older generations were raised in insecure 
contexts, making them prioritize safety and stability while younger genera-
tions grow up in relative security, facilitating attachment to values such as 
individual freedom and autonomy. Psychological insights (Maslow 1943), 
however, suggest that in moments of crisis, when insecurity prevails, a short- 
term value change can occur. In such circumstances, people decrease their 
focus on civil liberties, thereby demanding stronger leadership (Boin and ‘t 
Hart 2003; Inglehart 1997).
By contrast, specific support often fluctuates as it depends on the function-
ing of incumbent political actors, which is usually based on a rational assess-
ment of their performance, economic outcomes, and individual well-being 
(Norris 2011). In case of an existential threat, such rational evaluations make 
room for more emotional responses, such as the “rally round the flag effect” 
(Mueller 1973). Hence, political support is expected to increase during the 
crisis COVID-19 poses, regardless of the measures taken by the government.
 Analytical Strategy
To assess changes in diffuse and specific political support, we analyzed unique, 
representative panel data of the Dutch population as part of the European 
Values Study (EVS 2020) and fielded as part of the LISS Panel.3 Data were 
collected at two different time points: before (2017) and amidst (May 2020) 
the COVID-19 pandemic. For the initial data collection, 2053 respondents 
are interviewed, of which the majority (N = 1288) participated in 2017 and 
in the follow-up survey designed to capture the influence of the current pan-
demic. In this follow-up, several questions from the Main Questionnaire were 
repeated. Here, we are interested in people’s attitude towards having a strong 
leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections (1 = very 
bad; 4 = very good) as measure for diffuse support; trust in government 
(1 = none at all; 4 = a great deal) is used as an indicator for specific support. 
These items are supplemented with unique questions measuring the perceived 
individual consequences of the coronavirus crisis; for this contribution, we 
include the item measuring salience of COVID-19, namely the extent to 
3 The LISS Panel consists of approx. 7500 individuals, drawn from the population register based on a true 
probability sample, hence representative of the Dutch population. Each month, panel members are asked 
to respond to questionnaires. For more information, see http://www.lissdata.nl.
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which people are generally concerned about the coronavirus crisis (1 = not at 
all; 5 = to a large extent). We also include time-invariant characteristics like 
age, gender, and education. After excluding respondents without informa-
tion, 973 respondents remain.
To assess individual changes in diffuse and specific system support, we cal-
culated a difference score by subtracting respondents’ answers in 2017 from 
their answers in 2020 (Allison 1990). We performed one-sample t-tests and 
regression analyses to arrive at the results described below. Post-stratification 
weights were applied.4
 Results
Figure 27.2 displays the overtime changes in diffuse and specific political sup-
port. For diffuse system support, we see an increase in the desire for a strong 
leader during the pandemic: the mean changed significantly from 2.07 in 
2017 to 2.16 in 2020 (p < 0.01). For specific system support, we observe a 
significant increase in trust in government from 2.42 in 2017 to 2.61 in 2020 
4 Due to word count limitations, we are not able to present more detailed information on the data, vari-








2017 2020 2017 2020
Strong Leadership Trust in Goverment
Fig. 27.2 Change in political system support, 2017–2020 (source: European Values 
Study Netherlands 2017, 2020  +  own calculations. Post-stratification weights are 
applied)
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(p < 0.001). Together, the findings confirm our expectations that in times of 
crisis, people long for strong leadership instead of more democracy. At the 
same time, they evaluate the performance of political institutions more posi-
tively, which leads to more political legitimacy.
To explain these shifts, we find that the salience of the corona crisis does 
not lead to a demand for stronger leadership. However, those who are con-
cerned about the crisis do indicate more trust in the Dutch government. 
While generation and gender turn out to be unrelated to diffuse system sup-
port, education does have an effect. Especially the lower educated increasingly 
prefer a strong leader. In addition, the higher educated have indicated more 
support for the government amidst the COVID-19 pandemic. Combined, 
although we observe some differences in the increase in diffuse and specific 
system support, political legitimacy has largely increased in society as a whole 
(Table 27.1).
 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have demonstrated how the Dutch government has gained 
political legitimacy amidst the COVID-19 pandemic through decreased 
democratic aspirations and, simultaneously, increased trust in government. 
These findings confirm the idea that, in times of crisis, people find comfort in 
strong leadership, thereby turning to illiberal tendencies, and that their 
Table 27.1 Changes in diffuse and specific political support regressed on relevant 
covariates, Netherlands 2017–2020 (Source: European Values Study Netherlands 
2017, 2020)
Support for strong 
leader Trust in government
Intercept 1.650*** (0.157) 1.147*** (0.117)
Salience of COVID-19 0.017 (0.031) 0.056* (0.023)
Generation (Ref: Great Gen)
  – Baby boom –0.107 (0.081) –0.079 (0.059)
  – Generation X –0.112 (0.088) –0.091 (0.064)
  – Millennials –0.106 (0.089) –0.010 (0.065)
Levels of education –0.090*** (0.015) 0.029** (0.011)
Gender (Ref: Man)
  – Woman 0.056 (0.052) 0.028 (0.038)
2017 level –0.579*** (0.028) –0.502*** (0.028)
R2 0.334 0.266
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001. Entries represent parameter estimates from two 
OLS regressions, with standard errors between brackets. Post-stratification weights are 
applied
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rational evaluation of the government is, at least temporarily, replaced by a 
more emotionally driven “rally” effect. The fact that this is present in large 
sections of society indicates a specific and unique period effect.
The implementation of non-pharmaceutical interventions, and particularly 
the intelligent lockdown, required political legitimacy, and this appeared to 
have been successful. However, existing research already indicates that such 
shifts in political support in response to crisis situations are often temporary. 
Hence, it is important for national governments to be aware of the fact that 
the political legitimacy they have been enjoying can vanish sooner rather than 
later. Combined, although some authors have recently expressed optimism 
that the implementation of non-pharmaceutical interventions to contain the 
coronavirus has rejuvenated democracies (see Bol et al. 2020), our under-
standing is that such expectations of widespread political legitimacy in the 
new common are rather grim.
References
Allison PD (1990) Change scores as dependent variables in regression analysis. Sociol 
Methodol 20(1):93–114
Boin A, ‘t Hart P (2003) Public leadership in times of crisis: mission impossible? Publ 
Admin Rev 63(5):544–553
Bol D, Giani M, Blais A, Loewen PJ (2020) The effect of COVID-19 lockdowns on 
political support: some good news for democracy? Eur J Polit Res. in press
Bovens M, Wille A (2008) Deciphering the dutch drop: ten explanations for decreas-
ing political trust in the Netherlands. Int Rev Adm Sci 74(2):283–305
Dahl RA (1989) Democracy and its critics. Yale University Press, New Haven
Easton D (1965) A systems analysis of political life. Wiley, New York
EVS (2020) European values study 2017: integrated dataset (EVS 2017). ZA7500 
Data file Version 3.0.0. GESIS Data Archive, Cologne
Inglehart R (1977) The silent revolution. Changing values and political styles among 
western publics. Princeton University Press, Princeton
Inglehart R (1997) Modernization and Postmodernization. In: Cultural, economic 
and political change in 43 societies. Princeton University Press, Princeton
Maslow AH (1943) A theory of human motivation. Psychol Rev 50(4):370–396
Mishler W, Rose R (2001) What are the origins of political trust? Testing institutional 
and cultural theories in post-communist societies. Comp Pol Stud 34(1):30–62
Mueller JE (1973) War, presidents and public opinion. John Wiley & Sons, New York
Norris P (2011) Democratic deficit. Critical citizens revisited. Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge
 T. Reeskens and Q. Muis
195
Rijksinstituut voor Volksgezondheid en Milieu (RIVM) (2020) Aanpak bestrijding. 
Rijksinstituut voor Volksgezondheid en Milieu, Bilthoven. https://www.rivm.nl/
coronavirus- covid- 19/aanpak- bestrijding. Consulted on June 11, 2020
Weber M (1964) The theory of social and economic organization. Free Press, New York
Open Access  This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons 
Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), 
which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium 
or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the 
source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence and indicate if changes 
were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chap-
ter’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the 
material. If material is not included in the chapter’s Creative Commons licence and 
your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted 
use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.
27 A New Democratic Norm(al)? Political Legitimacy… 
197© The Author(s) 2021
E. Aarts et al. (eds.), The New Common, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-65355-2_28
28
Balancing Public Health and Economic 
Interests Whilst Creating New 
Opportunities for Labor Migrants
Conny Rijken
The COVID-19 pandemic unveils structural weaknesses and vulnerabilities 
in societal structures that we have become to take as ordinary parts of our 
society. This especially holds true for such structures in the labor market in 
general (see Chap. 5 by Bekker) and especially for labor migrants, the focus of 
this chapter. Over the past decades, rigorous scholarly work contemplated the 
precarious working conditions of migration workers due to labor market flex-
ibilizations and avoidance of labor laws that have, in turn, received limited 
political attention and little willingness of industries and corporations to 
change these practices (Costello and Freedland 2014; Anderson and Ruhs 
2010; Rijken and de Lange 2020). The COVID-19 crisis not only augmented 
these situations of precariousness but also enlarged the awareness of the 
dependency of developed countries on migrant workers and, in some coun-
tries, led to a positive response by way of regularization of the migratory status 
of migrant workers, e.g., in Italy. Interestingly, risks of COVID-19 outbreaks 
among migrant workers exposed working and living conditions that were 
known but neglected for too long. Apparently, the COVID-19 crisis has 
revealed that a public health risk generated more impact than academic and 
grounded research on work and living conditions of migrant workers and the 
work of organizations fighting for migrant workers’ rights. In the remainder 
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of this chapter, I will first address how COVID-19 has impacted the position 
of migrant workers before discussing opportunities created for migrant work-
ers and the way forward.
 The Impact of COVID-19 on Migrant Workers
According to the Migration DATA portal, one out of five workers in Northern 
America and Western and Middle European countries is a migrant worker. 
Sectors in which they are working, for instance, are agriculture, domestic 
work, cleaning services, distribution centers, and personal care workers. 
Migrants make important contributions in addressing the pandemic but are 
at the same time exposed to higher risks of contracting the virus (Fasini and 
Mazza 2020). Due to various reasons, labor migrants, especially those at the 
low end of the labor market, are among the first to be affected. They are dis-
proportionately impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic as well as the mea-
sures taken to tackle it.
Working remotely and from home has been part of the lockdown in many 
countries. Since, immigrants are less likely to work in jobs that can be per-
formed remotely and, consequently, were either exposed to an increased risk 
of being infected by the virus or suffered from loss of income if they discon-
tinued working (Borjas and Cassidy 2020). Migrant workers often work for 
temporary work agencies and those with short-term contracts or working for 
such agencies were among the first to lose their jobs. They were often excluded 
from national COVID-19 policy responses such as compensation for loss of 
income, un-employment benefits, or social security (ILO 2020). In cases in 
which residency is linked to employment, this not only led to job loss but the 
loss of residency as well, putting migrant workers into undocumented or 
irregular status as travel restrictions and lack of spare funds to pay for traveling 
home prevented them from returning to their home countries. This equally 
occurred when visa or work permits expired during the coronavirus pandemic. 
Furthermore, travel restrictions prevented migrant workers from taking up 
employment abroad even if they had already signed a contract or had made 
expenses to a recruitment agency or facilitator, for instance. Information on 
COVID-19 measures is often only available online and not in a language 
migrant workers understand, making these measures less accessible for them. 
Finally, living conditions in crowded housing pose a particular risk to the 
spread of COVID-19 among migrant workers. They are often accommodated 
in abhorrent conditions with multiple persons in a room, making it impossi-
ble to keep the required distance to prevent infections. Accommodation 
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provided by their employers or by a temporary work agency for whom they 
work creates multiple dependencies. Migrant workers who refused to share a 
room with a person whom they did not know got fired because of refusing. 
Thus, migrant workers are excluded by host societies, which is one of the 
shortcomings of the old common revealed by the COVID-19 crisis as identi-
fied by the editors of this book in Chap. 1 of The New Common.
 Responses on the Position of Migrant Workers
Paradoxically, sectors in which migrant workers work are characterized by 
unskilled labor that is looked down upon. However, during the coronavirus 
crisis, the work of migrant workers have been labeled as “essential jobs” (Fasini 
and Mazza 2020). Countries with a high dependency on migrant workers in 
these sectors came to realize the importance of these workers. Although they 
are praised for their work during the coronavirus crisis this has not led to an 
improvement of their working and living conditions or to more job security 
and higher wages.
Indeed, in many Western European countries, they were needed in seasonal 
agriculture to harvest the products. Confronted with the closing of borders, 
governments were faced with the ethical question to balance health concerns 
and economic losses, with the position of the migrant worker as the object to 
this dilemma. The economic argument prevailed; regardless of the travel bans, 
Italy flew in farmworkers from Morocco, and Germany flew in some 80,000 
seasonal workers from Eastern Europe amid the corona crisis (Pettrachin 
2020). The risks for the migrant workers seemed to be of subordinate impor-
tance. While it is well known that migrant workers are accommodated in 
crowded collective facilities, are collectively transported in vans to and from 
the workplace, and work in close proximity, these factors did not ring any 
alarm bells. Only when a new outbreak of COVID-19 emerged in the meat 
processing industry in Germany and the Netherlands, attention was paid to 
their living and working conditions. However, the concerns were not about 
the well-being of the migrant workers but about of the risk of the spread of 
the coronavirus, again demonstrating an assessment of the situation that bal-
ances health concerns with economic losses and indeed, a reflection of Hardin’s 
“Tragedy of the Commons” (Hardin 1968).
Despite the neglect of the position of migrant workers and mostly due to 
economic goals, the coronavirus crisis generated some positive responses that 
ameliorated the position of migrant workers. Italy provides such an example 
where the situation of undocumented migrant workers received the attention 
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that led to an overall improvement—albeit on a temporary basis. After real-
izing that, during the lockdown and with borders closed, Italian farmers are 
highly dependent on undocumented migrant workers for harvesting, the 
migration skeptical Italian government adopted a law to temporarily regular-
ize the status of up to 200,000 undocumented migrant workers to prevent the 
collapse of the agricultural sector. This exemplifies the balancing of public 
health and economic concerns with a recognition of the important role of 
migrant workers and an acknowledgment of the precarity of their situation. 
However, by June 15 2020, 32,000 applications were received primarily from 
domestic workers and caregivers (91%) and, surprisingly, not that many from 
farmworkers due to strict conditions and dependency on their employers to 
apply for regularization. Another positive approach is the regularization of 
migrants with pending immigration applications in Portugal, including access 
to health care and social services during the pandemic. Other examples of 
reckoning and improving the situation of migrant workers are the extension 
of migrant working visas or amnesties to alleviate constraints faced by migrant 
workers and their families in some destination countries, e.g., Belgium, 
Lebanon, Morocco, South Africa, Thailand, and the United Arab Emirates 
(ILO Policy Brief, April 2020).
 Revamping the Debate Post-Corona
These practices are part of a wider debate, not only in the EU but more 
broadly in migration destination countries, which is based on the paradox 
between, on the one hand, migration skepticism resulting in strict migration 
policies and a lack of legal migration pathways and, on the other hand, the 
demand for cheap labor of corporations to maximize profit at the expense of 
labor laws and humane living conditions. In the EU, the debate evolves 
around the balance between free movement and decent labor standards 
(Anderson and Ruhs 2010; Bogoeski 2020). The systemic and structural 
manifestation of the position of migrant workers points at a societal accep-
tance of different treatment that ties in with the current Black Lives Matter 
movement against discrimination of black people and those with a colored 
skin or migratory background, who often work in the same, low-skilled, low-
paid sectors. The time seems to have arrived to have a broader discussion on 
inclusive societies and to curb latent forms of discrimination. This momen-
tum should be used to regain attention for migrant workers in precarious 
work situations and to reconsider fundamental—social, legal, and eco-
nomic—structures in our society that facilitate such situations. One thing we 
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have learned from this crisis is that such a process gains wider attention if the 
economic and business argument could be integrated into this debate. Let us 
not lose this momentum and strive for a more inclusive society and curb 
inequality as encouraged by the sustainable development goals.
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Is COVID-19 a Crime? A Criminological 
Perspective
Toine Spapens
Is COVID-19 a crime? The answer to that question seems relatively straight-
forward. Although the virus may be viewed as a “villain,” we cannot treat it as 
a criminal. However, how the virus impacts societies and government 
responses to the crisis raises serious criminological questions. In this chapter, 
I briefly address three. I will start by looking at the effects of COVID-19 and 
particularly the lockdowns on criminal activities. My second question is 
whether we should rethink our response to crimes that may facilitate future 
pandemics, particularly wildlife trafficking. Finally, I will discuss some exam-
ples of systemic inequalities, which affect the impact of the virus on societies. 
Given the current state of affairs, I will raise questions and ideas for future 
research, rather than provide clear-cut answers.
 The Effects of COVID-19 on Criminal Activities
It is an interesting question how COVID-19 affected the behavior of crimi-
nals. At the beginning of the crisis, it was clear that some were quick to seize 
the opportunity to fraudulently offer products such as hand gels, facemasks, 
and other protective equipment of questionable quality, which were 
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sometimes not delivered at all. However, as governments stepped up produc-
tion, such opportunities rapidly diminished. The lockdowns imposed in many 
countries also had a noticeable effect on crime. For several weeks, figures on 
shoplifting, burglaries, and other street crimes decreased to almost zero. From 
a theoretical perspective, this is understood by applying the routine activities 
theory, which predicts that crime occurs when a motivated offender, a suitable 
target, and a lack of capable guardians converge in time and space (Cohen and 
Felson 1979). The lockdowns probably affected all parameters. There were 
fewer targets, guardianship increased, whereas convergence settings decreased. 
Furthermore, criminals are human too, and on average not very healthy 
(Odgers et al. 2007), and we may hypothesize that this caused them to avoid 
the risks of catching the virus. On the other hand, several countries such as 
the United Kingdom have reported a substantial increase in intimate partner 
violence (Townsend 2020). Here, unfortunately, the lockdowns resulted in 
“motivated offenders” and “suitable targets” being in each other’s vicinity 
more often than usual.
The effect of lockdowns on more complex organized crimes is less clear. 
Opportunism was visible in the shape of the Italian mafia offering loans to 
small entrepreneurs who were hit by a lack of customers, but essentially this 
type of “philanthropy” was probably built on the loan sharking activities the 
mafia has traditionally been involved in (D’Angelo and Musumeci 2016). So 
far, Dutch drug producers and traffickers seem hardly affected by COVID-19. 
Perhaps ecstasy is less in demand because of the canceled festival season and 
the ongoing restrictions on nightlife, but little has changed in the market for 
cocaine, according to preliminary enforcement agencies’ information 
(EMCDDA and Europol 2020). Governments’ efforts to continue interna-
tional trade and transport meant business as usual for traffickers, judging 
from recent seizures of cocaine shipments in Dutch ports. Small-scale distri-
bution to customers was not affected either particularly because Dutch crimi-
nals increasingly ship drugs in postal packages. Although means of production 
for synthetic drugs seem to be less easy to obtain, large synthetic drugs pro-
ducers usually buy large amounts of precursor chemicals when on offer and 
stockpile what they do not need immediately (Spapens 2016; KLPD 2012) 
Assuming that they still hold reserves, short- term effects on production seem 
unlikely.
A question that has worried authorities is whether criminals who lost their 
illegal income have shifted to other “markets” and to cybercrime in particular. 
Here, opportunities are assumed to have increased because more people are 
working online from home. Indeed, the numbers of cyberattacks reported to 
the police rose, but the question remains whether this can be explained by 
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increased efforts of existing cybercriminals or because others have switched to 
online crimes. Criminological research does show that those involved in com-
plex crimes tend to specialize rather than multitask (Spapens 2017). Skills are 
more important than one might think, as are mindsets. Those involved in 
relatively simple property crimes are usually looking for easy money and 
immediate satisfaction of needs but often lack patience for crimes that require 
more time to render a profit (Spapens 2017).
If we may draw a general conclusion from the observations above, it is clear 
that the period in which measures were imposed on people’s freedom is yet 
too short to cause substantial changes in criminals’ behavior.
 Rethinking Our Response to Crimes That May 
Facilitate Future Pandemics, Particularly 
Wildlife Trafficking
Whilst epidemiologists have been warning us for the risk of a pandemic for 
many years, “green” criminologists have also expressed worries in connection 
to wildlife trafficking. Even if animal trade is legal and meets regulatory 
requirements, it brings live animals and animal products into close proximity 
with people engaged in commerce and consumption/use, whether as food, 
pets, medicinal ingredients, or for other purposes (Broad 2020). That is not 
to say that illegal activity presents no added risks. Poor transport conditions, 
avoidance of quarantine controls on import, or black-market trade outside 
regulated markets and retail outlets where health inspections may be focused 
certainly presents incremental concerns (Broad 2020).
In the past decades, illegal trade in endangered wildlife has developed into 
one of the most important types of environmental crime. The trade in live 
animals mostly concerns protected birds and reptiles. Although Asia and 
China, in particular, are the most important destinations for trafficked wild-
life, demand for exotic animals remains high also in the United States and 
Europe (Van Uhm 2016). The Netherlands, for instance, is a major hub for 
the trade in exotic birds (Van Uhm and Spapens 2018).
Apart from its detrimental effects on endangered species’ survival as well as 
on local ecosystems, there is also a substantial risk that living animals carry 
viruses and diseases. However, until COVID-19, the problem was primarily 
perceived as economic because diseases could spread to production animals 
(Van Uhm and Spapens 2018). Countries apply extensive sanitary rules when 
it comes to wild animals, but traffickers logically circumvent health checks. 
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The trade in wildlife is as such not illegal but regulated as a normal economic 
activity. Consequently, first-line enforcement falls upon administrative agen-
cies, which usually have limited powers of investigation whereas maximum 
prison sentences and financial penalties are often low (Elliott 2009; 
Spapens 2014).
The question is, therefore, whether we should now drastically rethink our 
approach to wildlife trafficking. The trade in wildlife is currently regulated in 
the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna 
and Flora (CITES). CITES focuses on protecting endangered species against 
overexploitation and the risk of extinction but does not specifically address 
the risk of diseases. Furthermore, it leaves many legal and practical loopholes 
that criminals may exploit. Of course, a purely repressive approach will not 
suffice: it is far more important to develop interventions that help to change 
our socially constructed appreciation of the value of scarce wildlife.
 Systemic Inequalities and the Impact of COVID-19
There is extensive literature on how crime and other problems affect vulnera-
ble groups in particular, and COVID-19 is no exception. Critical or “radical” 
criminologists focus, on the one hand, on systemic drivers of such inequalities 
and, on the other hand, look at the roles of corporate and government actors. 
Contrary to mainstream criminologists, they have also argued that the object 
of study of criminology should not be limited to behavior included in penal 
codes. Indeed, a wide range of damaging behavior is not criminalized at all, 
for example, tax avoidance and unregulated fishing. Therefore, the focus 
should also be on “blameworthy harm,” structural inequalities, and on “crimes 
of the powerful,” particularly by corporate and governmental actors.
Relevance of societal inequalities in the context of COVID-19 can easily be 
illustrated. For example, countries such as the United States and the United 
Kingdom report far more casualties amongst ethnic minorities, particularly 
amongst socially and economically deprived groups (Price-Haywood et al. 
2020; Barr et al. 2020). In the Netherlands, the effects of inequality are visible 
in the labor market. For example, the virus has disproportionally hit Eastern 
European migrant workers in the meat sector. Conditions at the workplace, 
housing, and transport increase risks, for example, because rules of social dis-
tancing cannot be met (Winkel 2020). Another worrying sign is that 
COVID-19 generally appears to have a heavier impact in areas where pollu-
tion problems are higher. In the Netherlands, this possibly applies to parts of 
North-Brabant and Limburg with a high-density bio-industry and the 
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resulting environmental problems. Earlier, these areas were also struck more 
severely with Q-fever (Lucassen 2020). Although establishing specific causal 
effects would require extensive research, consensus is that where large num-
bers of humans and non-human animals—either wildlife or production ani-
mals—live in close proximity, the risk increases that zoonotic diseases develop 
and spread (Broad 2020).
From a criminological point of view, the efforts of governments to reduce 
the harmful impact of COVID-19 on societies are equally important. This 
encompasses a wide range of issues, which I can mention only briefly. To 
begin with, negligence may be considered as causing blameworthy harm. It 
may also offer criminals opportunities to step into the vacuum left by legiti-
mate authorities, for example, in Rio de Janeiro’s favelas where drug gangs 
imposed a lockdown to protect inhabitants since President Bolsonaro did not 
take the virus seriously (Schipani and Harris 2020). Second, it raises classic 
questions. To what extent are governments allowed, for instance, to rein in 
civil liberties to prevent harm by applying instruments of mass surveillance or 
otherwise? What is the lesser harm: people dying of COVID-19 or eco-
nomic damage?
Whether COVID-19 will be a flashpoint leading to shifts in criminal mar-
kets; rethinking how we relate to non-human animals and wildlife, or even 
restructuring some of the structural flaws of the “treadmill of production” that 
characterizes our dominant economic system and shapes our societies remains 
an open question.
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There Is an App for That: Technological 
Solutionism as COVID-19 Policy 
in the Global North
Linnet Taylor
The COVID-19 pandemic took high-income countries entirely by surprise. 
Despite funding pandemic preparedness programs in Asia for more than 
20 years, donor countries had not experienced an uncontrolled pandemic 
since HIV in the 1980s. When Ebola, Zika, SARS, and MERS threatened, 
countries outside the immediate geographic neighborhood or income level of 
those diseases’ places of origin were left largely untouched. This led many 
northern countries not to take seriously the emergence of the novel coronavi-
rus in 2019 as the existential threat it turned out to be. In contrast to the 
swift, comprehensive response of South-East Asian countries, authorities in 
Europe and the United States assumed this coronavirus would behave like its 
predecessors SARS and MERS, which made their hosts seriously ill and sent 
them home, reducing their ability to infect others. Instead, the new virus 
presented itself with a very different epidemiology, hiding mostly unseen 
amongst the young and active while they infected those around them and 
ravaging the elderly and sick wherever it spread.
What happened next around the world was both harrowing and illuminat-
ing. Lacking protective material resources, the human capacity for contact 
tracing, or understanding of the disease, policymakers in higher-income 
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countries turned to technology for a miracle. The technology sector responded 
with history’s most extensive hackathon, illuminating the mutual shaping of 
technology and public health policy. The most striking feature of the techno-
logical response to the pandemic has been the degree of solutionism (Morozov 
2013) driving it—the belief that complex problems can be solved by techno-
logical intervention alone.
 The Solutionist Approach to the Pandemic
The driving example of solutionism during the first wave of the pandemic was 
the claim by a group of public health information specialists (Ferretti et al. 
2020), that contact-tracing apps were the only way to stop the disease once it 
had spread out of control. The idea that an app could solve the pandemic was 
too attractive to ignore, and the policy take-up in higher-income countries 
was immediate and universal. Existing tracking technologies were repurposed 
for the pandemic response as vendors took the opportunity of the newly cre-
ated market to increase the visibility of their products. However, the apps 
developed soon demonstrated fundamental problems: they were vulnerable to 
false positives, where people would potentially receive many messages per day 
from their phone telling them to isolate based on contacts that may not, in 
fact, have been likely to infect them. Conversely, the apps would also miss 
many occasions when brief contact did in fact have a high likelihood of result-
ing in infection—they would be more likely to flag a 10-min conversation 
with a coronavirus sufferer where both parties were wearing masks than an 
event where someone was directly sneezed on in a queue or a supermar-
ket aisle.
These problems are compounded by the false negative rate of coronavirus 
tests (Kucirka et al. 2020). They are further exacerbated by the frequency of 
asymptomatic infection, where in up to 80% of cases individuals themselves 
remain unaware they are infectious (Day 2020). In addition to the problem of 
inaccurate information, apps were not imagined by their advocates as support 
to human contact tracers, who were instead excluded from the proposed mea-
sures almost entirely. Despite evidence from Asian countries that people 
would only self-isolate based on governmental requests to do so, conveyed by 
human contact tracers (Bloomberg 2020), most high-income countries 
decided not to invest in training human contact tracers during the first months 
of 2020. In the Netherlands, the main infectious disease liaison for the public 
health authorities, Sjaak de Gouw, played down the value of human contact 
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tracing, calling it pointless while arguing against even testing people for the 
disease (an essential addition to contact tracing), saying, at the height of the 
first wave in April 2020: “what is the rationale behind the strategy of extensive 
testing? You do not prevent infections that way” (NRC 2020a).1
With these beliefs driving public health policy advice in the EU, it would 
have been wise to question the value of an app as the main approach to com-
bating the pandemic. For an app to receive valid information on whether 
people were infected, testing would have to be both available on demand and 
accurate enough that people would trust that information rather than facing 
continual automated demands for quarantine. Moreover, even if an auto-
mated system functioned perfectly, the rate of asymptomatic disease meant it 
would be provided with inadequate data at best (Babones 2020).
Why, then, was the focus so heavily on apps at a time when the remedy 
appeared to be material resources, behavior change, and building human 
capacity? Stafford Beer, in his work on organizational cybernetics (Beer 2004), 
advocated that, in order to analyze a technological system, we should ask what 
we observe it actually doing in the world, rather than what it is intended to 
do. If we apply this logic to the case of coronavirus apps in the Netherlands 
and other EU countries, success on several levels could be observed during the 
early months of 2020. First, the app development process fulfilled a psycho-
logical need for something constructive to do, providing both a goal and a 
clear deliverable for government and the technical community, at a time when 
efforts to combat the pandemic were failing and an economy-destroying lock-
down was becoming the only option. Second, the process achieved a political 
function by distracting attention from governmental failures and the resulting 
death toll (NRC 2020b). Third, they fulfilled a rhetorical function by sup-
porting the public health authorities’ narrative that testing and human con-
tact tracing, which were not possible given the lack of material and trained 
human resources, were also not necessary (NRC 2020a). However, contact- 
tracing apps have not, at least so far, fulfilled the need to actually trace the 
contacts of people infected with COVID-19. As of July 2020, no country has 
been able to demonstrate that contact-tracing apps can work either in terms 
of adoption or effective isolation of the infected (Bloomberg 2020).
The app phase of the pandemic response also served a market-building 
function by orienting at least some of the policy response and public attention 
away from complex problems of technology provision (ventilators, mask 
manufacturing capacity, and other material resources) toward the simpler 
1 Wat is de rationale achter de strategie van het vele testen? Besmettingen voorkom je er niet mee.
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problem of repurposing existing population surveillance infrastructures. 
Along with the apps, over the first months of the pandemic, many solutionist 
projects were proposed including systems to detect coronavirus infection 
from voices (Futurism 2020), detecting infection clusters from sewage analy-
sis using technology originally developed for detecting illegal drug labs (Peccia 
et al. 2020), and a barrage of biometric systems repurposed from immigration 
and crowd surveillance toward remote temperature sensing (CSO Online 
2020). Some of these efforts are more scientifically credible than others, but 
all have one feature in common: they do not constitute prevention. Solutionism 
thrives on desperation, and the coronavirus has, in most of the world, pro-
vided a welcoming policy environment for it.
 Lessons of Solutionism
There are higher-level lessons to be drawn from these proposals for pandemic 
technologies, perhaps most importantly that allowing the market to be the 
sole driver of technology development will result in technology that primarily 
serves the market rather than the needs of the public. However, the most rel-
evant lessons for the ongoing effort to combat the pandemic are more imme-
diate. In parallel with the European and US responses to the pandemic, a 
different set of strategies adopted by South-East Asian countries exists. These, 
ironically, were based substantially on guidance from institutions founded 
and funded in the Global North such as the WHO, philanthropies, and uni-
versities. They involved early response, immediate travel restrictions, intensive 
testing and contact tracing, and enforced quarantine where cases were found. 
Where these measures were taken, both infections and deaths remained strik-
ingly low (BBC 2020; Science 2020). Despite a lack of material and techno-
logical resources, at the time of writing in July 2020, Vietnam has reported no 
COVID-19 deaths, and despite being both dense city-states and international 
travel hubs, Hong Kong has reported just seven deaths, and Singapore 26 
(Worldometer 2020). Meanwhile in the Global North, the problem is already 
being reframed as technology acceptance and convincing people apps will 
work (e.g., Metova 2020; Stanford news 2020) although policy attention is, 
at the time of writing in summer 2020, finally reorienting toward material 
and human responses to the emergency.
Perhaps the most important lesson we can take with us into the “new nor-
mal” of the pandemic from observing technological solutionism in the Global 
North is this: technology is important to pandemic response, but it must sup-
port rather than lead. The practical lessons of the pandemic are ones the North 
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already knew, because it was busy teaching them in the South: the state of the 
art on how to combat a pandemic is to test, trace, and isolate, and to do this 
exhaustively and accurately. Yet rather than apply this knowledge, govern-
ments turned out to be more ready to listen to Northern innovators than to 
the public health experts, often internationally funded, in Southern pandemic- 
affected countries. The response shows that the North has not acquired the 
necessary capacity for pandemic response, namely flexibility, a focus on the 
most vulnerable, and human capacity supported by the digital rather than the 
other way around. Instead, we seem to have trained hard in believing our own 
rhetoric on technological innovation and the power of the market as solutions 
to truly existential challenges.
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31
Fast Forward Science: Risks and Benefits 
in the Rapid Science of COVID-19
Jelte Wicherts
Since the onset of the SARS-COV-2 pandemic in late 2019, the scientific 
literature on the SARS-COV-2 virus and the disease COVID-19 has a growth 
rate that resembles the growth in confirmed COVID-19 cases that continue 
to make media headlines all across the globe. Figure 31.1 displays the number 
of publications listed in the scholarly publication platform PubMed that can 
be found with the string “COVID-19 OR SARS-COV-2” for all 26 weeks 
representing the first half of 2020. It shows that biomedical coronavirus 
research started slowly but increased to hundreds of articles per week—not 
unlike the spread of the virus itself. At the time of writing in mid-2020, 
around 2500 publications per week appear in PubMed on COVID-19 or 
SARS-COV-2. The curve appears to be flattening but we need to keep in 
mind the delay in posting of records in PubMed. The actual scientific litera-
ture on the coronavirus is even bigger because PubMed is restricted to bio-
medical outlets and does not cover the many other scientific fields that help 
us better understand and deal with the pandemic. This new biomedical litera-
ture has emerged at an unprecedented pace and highlights the commitment 
of thousands of researchers all over the globe to understand the virus and its 
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spread, to develop a vaccine, to find treatments for those afflicted, and to 
ultimately end the pandemic suffering.
Will the scientific community be able to end the suffering caused by the 
pandemic? Can we trust the insights from the rapidly emerging scientific lit-
erature on the coronavirus to implement wide-ranging social, economic, and 
health policies and vaccination programs? To answer these questions, I here 
relate the rapid science on the coronavirus pandemic to regular biomedical 
science and the meta-scientific insights on it. I focus my attention on peer 
reviews, open access, retractions, open data, and registration of studies. I end 
with an optimistic conclusion.
 Rapid Peer Review
The vast pace in publishing in the literature on the coronavirus reflects the 
speed of setting up studies, conducting the research, analyzing outcomes, 
writing up results, and the peer review process that seeks to independently 
check the quality of the work. With respect to the latter, we know that the 
typical review process at biomedical journals takes 3–4 months. For the early 
articles reporting coronavirus research, the median publication lag was 11 days 
(Kun 2020). This begs the question of how well reviewers are able to critically 



























































































































































One way to deal with limitations of the closed system of pre-publication peer 
review is to increase the number of critical readers by publishing work with-
out any restrictions under open access. In the first half of 2020, the coronavi-
rus literature included 27,373 publications in PubMed. In the same period, 
the literatures on cancer and cardiovascular diseases—the leading causes of 
death in the Western world—included 95,527 and 30,728 publications, 
respectively. Two-thirds of the coronavirus publications (18,715 or 68%) are 
publicly available under open access. These percentages are markedly lower in 
cancer research (42,775 or 45%) and cardiovascular research (12,892 or 
42%). Open access improves the dissemination of results and increases the 
number of potential post-publication reviewers by the thousands. In this 
sense, the biomedical literature on the coronavirus is more open than ever.
 Errors and Retractions
A main corrective mechanism of science is to avoid the publication of sloppy 
research through peer review. But if sloppy research gets published after hav-
ing passed peer review anyway, we can only hope that attentive readers scruti-
nize the publication and correct the record by publishing critiques or by 
corresponding to the editor that something in the original publication does 
not smell right. In that case, the editor might choose to retract the publication 
altogether. In that respect, retractions might reflect the self-corrective mecha-
nism of a field. Interestingly, the retraction rate of coronavirus publications is 
markedly higher than that in the wider literature (Yeo-Teh and Tang 2020). 
Surely, any retraction highlights a problem but also indicates that readers took 
action to correct the literature.
 Open Data
Trust in scientific findings can be enhanced by sharing the data underlying 
studies, allowing others to scrutinize the results through reanalyzes. Open 
data also allows many more researchers to work with the data. In the open 
science era, we see an enormous growth in open data sets and open resources. 
This is not different for coronavirus research anno 2020; in their review of 
open data resources relating to the coronavirus, Alamo et al. (2020) listed no 
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fewer than 152 links to websites housing open data or data resources that can 
be used to study the coronavirus. Surely, even today, there are still influential 
studies being published that fail to share data, but such obscurity will increas-
ingly become obsolete if funders, researchers, editors, and publishers really 
want to present the best research that can withstand any scrutiny. Open sci-
ence strengthens truth finding.
 Registrations
An earmark of methodological rigor that helps avoid selective publication of 
results based on their outcomes (publication bias) and counters many other 
biases in the analysis and reporting of research results is the registration of 
studies prior to data collection. Most randomized clinical trials are nowadays 
registered via platforms such as clinicaltrials.gov, if only because major medi-
cal journals would simply not consider publishing an unregistered trial. A 
quick and easy search on Clinicaltrials.gov indicates that, in the first 6 months 
of 2020, no fewer than 2250 studies on the coronavirus have been registered. 
Many of these studies represent randomized controlled trials that test the effi-
cacy of drugs to treat COVID-19 patients and early phase trials to study the 
working and safety of the much-desired vaccines that could end the pan-
demic. Figure  31.2 indicates the number of COVID-19 or SARS-COV-2 
studies newly registered per week in this period. By comparison, there were 
3355 new registrations for cancer research and 1974 for cardiovascular 
































































































































































Fig. 31.2 Registered studies clinicaltrials.gov (source: author)
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research in the same period. In other words, COVID-19 has become one of 
the main targets of biomedical science in a matter of 2 months! Over 100 
studies are being registered per week on this platform, and the current 2000 
studies are mostly still running.
 Light at the End of the Tunnel
Almost everyone in the world has been affected by social distancing policies 
due to the coronavirus pandemic, and a lot of people have suffered or passed 
away due to COVID-19. Many more will unfortunately perish because of it. 
But the graphs in Figs. 31.1 and 31.2 provide hope that the scientific com-
munity will beat the virus. This will not be an easy process. Scientific progress 
has never been a linear path up the mountain of knowledge. Scientific prog-
ress as we have seen it so many times in our history involved many dead ends, 
false positive findings, overhyped claims, dishonest science, wasted resources, 
biased analyses, fierce debates, erroneous methods, sloppy science, and the 
occasional major breakthrough. At the current rate, the literature on the coro-
navirus grows with over 350 publications per day. Many of these publications 
will later prove to be useless or flat out wrong. COVID-19 is an entirely new 
disease and hence research on it is expected to be noisy. It would be unrealistic 
to expect the emerging field to offer instantaneous results that are valid. 
Instead, we should expect the majority of findings to be false, biased, ignored, 
and later corrected by better designed and more rigorous studies. But we do 
not need all results of all studies to be definitive. We do not need 100% accu-
racy or 150 different vaccines for the same virus.
As long as scientists work transparently, sharing their work, data, and 
research plans online, and as long as scientists are overwhelmingly interested 
in the truth, science will go ahead and progress will be made. There is no way 
of telling when to expect the needed breakthroughs. Science is certainly not 
functioning optimally and could surely become more efficient. But science 
anno 2020 is bigger, faster, and more transparent than it ever was. The rapid 
science of COVID-19 and SARS-COV-2 is not perfect, but it offers hope and 
ultimately a solution to the coronavirus crisis. We might even expect the 
movement towards more rapid, open, self-corrective, and meticulous research 
to persist after the crisis to create a science that is more resistant to false claims 
and better equipped to promote global health and well-being.
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Now that my full-time return to Tilburg University is approaching, it feels 
kind of special to be asked by the editors to write a few concluding words in 
this intriguing book. Factually, a final word that I would like to see as a small 
prelude to my renewed involvement in education and research at our univer-
sity, building on its identity and profile and elaborating on answering the 
penetrating questions posed by the coronavirus pandemic in science and soci-
ety. Or even better: the task of ensuring that the right questions are asked.
“Never put a good crisis to waste,” Winston Churchill allegedly once said, 
and it seems quite appropriate to apply that wisdom to the current crisis as 
well because, with all the misery, there is also an opportunity for innovation, 
for experimentation, and for learning at many operational and fundamental 
levels. Seizing opportunities will be necessary because it is clear that the 
COVID-19 pandemic has put additional stress on our sometimes already 
insecure society. Let me use a quote from Gramsci from his prison journals to 
indicate the situation: “Die Zeiten, in denen das Alte noch nicht sterben kann, 
und das Neue noch nicht werden kan, sind die Zeiten der Monste.”1 The SARS 
CoV-2 virus is such a monster that makes pre-existing tensions more clearly 
visible or further increases them.
1 The times when the old cannot die and the new cannot yet be born are the times of monsters.
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The crisis disrupted and mirrored. As a society, we are being fiercely tested 
on many fronts. In my current responsibility, I have experienced on a daily 
basis how much improvisation and learning is needed in dealing with the 
crisis. On the one hand, this is due to the unprecedented dimensions that the 
global spread of the virus assumed. However, when we talk about the 
COVID-19 pandemic, it is certainly also due to the way in which the out-
break of the pandemic was fought. This is itself the cause of unprecedented 
forms of disruption in the social and economic domain. There are, so to speak, 
all kinds of adverse side effects of the sometimes hastily chosen approaches.
Some people rightly questioned whether we had sufficient regard for values 
such as proportionality and balance and whether the cure was not worse than 
the ailment. Difficult questions that will require a lot of scientifically based 
evaluation research. After all, in a crisis characterized by so many elements of 
uncertainty, so called “wicked problems” quickly emerge that usually cannot 
be solved with the routines and protocols prescribed in the classic crisis 
response manuals.
As can be seen in this book as well, it is evident that the initially dominant 
virologists and epidemiologists have been joined by researchers from numer-
ous other scientific disciplines. Economists, theologians, anthropologists, psy-
chologists, communication scientists, ethicists, and lawyers, for example, have 
also come forward. I consider that a very good development: the most danger-
ous thing that can happen to us is monodisciplinary tunnel vision. Traditional 
domain conflicts are of no use here. Multidisciplinary working and thinking 
seems essential to me, especially in the next phases of the crisis. Of course, the 
multiplicity of insights fuels the debate. But, on balance, that seems fine to 
me. After all, just like the virus, the problem we have to tackle is mutating. 
Several curves are going to demand our attention. The virus problem is mutat-
ing into a social problem: what has become more and more conspicuous in 
recent weeks about “the problem” of “the coronavirus crisis” is that, just like 
the virus we want to combat, it is mutating and changing in an erratic way.
The image of the virus that we have come to know as a creepy globe with 
many spikes attached to everything that is vulnerable and dear to us is also 
useful for this purpose. We are not nearly there yet.
Initially, of course, the fight was primarily aimed at public health. By the 
way, there was an impressive performance in the world of hospitals as the scal-
ing up of intensive care capacity was a huge achievement, not to mention in 
the world of nursing homes and other, somewhat less mediumistic areas of 
care. There was great performance and improvisation here too. We started 
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talking about “vital professions”; such a crisis is always good for realizing, once 
again, what is really of value.
Of course, this improvisation and learning is not limited to the world of 
health care and crisis management. The world of education and research was 
also confronted with the need to suddenly adapt to circumstances. Homage! … 
here too for all employees and, of course, for the students as well, but espe-
cially for those who wanted to contribute to this collection of essays. After a 
number of exceptionally intensive months in which Tilburg University’s lec-
turers and researchers had already been asked to put in a great deal of extra 
effort, allowing research and education to continue as best they could, despite 
everything, from a sometimes improvised home base with sometimes slightly 
uncomfortable digital resources. And a similar compliment can be made 
about this book. The editors managed to seduce some 50 colleagues, in the 
middle of their hard working times, to reflect on the crisis in a contribution 
to this collection. By the way, I understand very well that they did not need to 
be asked twice: this global, and for our generations, unprecedented outbreak 
of a virus inspires passionate researchers to ask numerous questions, including 
very fundamental ones. Existential questions, even. We as a society, as human-
ity, are tested in a way that was explored here and there mainly in some abstract 
scenarios. For they did exist: the explorations, the predictions, the scripts, the 
exercises, the reports. Moreover, there were earlier outbreaks as well, but at a 
distance from us in Western society, and at a distance—apparently—from our 
imagination. Above all, this imagination will stimulate and enable good and 
relevant research that will help us to attach importance to the many questions 
that exist and are yet to come in the inquisitive community of lecturers, 
researchers, and students that the university is and must be.
The new common will be special, that is for sure. We will have to move 
from a restrictive strategy to a more enabling one, and one that challenges us 
to put the economic and social dimensions, more so than was possible in the 
early stages of the crisis, on the agenda in a profound way. If the COVID-19 
crisis does indeed have characteristics of a systemic crisis, this calls for inspira-
tional perspectives on the reorganization of our society, which in recent 
decades may have subsided a little too much into, at times, benign pragma-
tism. I estimate that the renewed forms of spirit, occasionally inflamed and 
inspired by all the misery, can make an important contribution to this task. 
Now that the COVID-19 crisis has further and more radically exposed and 
exacerbated existing social, ecological, cultural, and economic tensions, a fun-
damental reconsideration of the mainly neoliberal and somewhat meagre 
dichotomy with which society was conceived purely as a market or state is no 
superfluous luxury. In recent months, people have turned out to be much 
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more than just “citizens” and “consumers.” They also turned out to be rela-
tional beings who use all kinds of voluntary association and interconnected-
ness to make the best of it together in spite of everything.
The lack of physical closeness increased the awareness of the great signifi-
cance of interconnectedness. I am curious how the contributions to The New 
Common help us and inspire us to give shape to it, including in our univer-
sity’s own community. I am looking forward to contributing to this.
Wim van de Donk,
King’s Commissioner in the province of North Brabant.
